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FOLLOWING THE DIRECTION OF
TRAFFIX: TRADE DRESS LAW AND
FUNCTIONALITY REVISITED

AMY B. COHEN*

ABSTRACT
For much of American history, in order to promote competition among
the producers of useful products, the law did not grant protection to the design
of such products unless the design met the demanding requirements for patent or
copyright protection. In the 1980s, an expansion of trade dress law resulted in
protection of product designs, with the courts relying primarily on the functionality doctrine to preserve the interest in competition. The functionality doctrine, however, riddled by ambiguity and conflicting interpretations, was not
effective in preventing overly broad protection of the designs of useful products.
As a result, more and more designs of useful products were insulated from competition through trade dress law protection, and society’s interest in obtaining
the best goods at the lowest cost was hampered.
In the last ten years, the Supreme Court has indicated its distrust of this
expansion of trade dress law. In particular, in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing
Displays, the Court narrowed trade dress protection by providing a broader definition of functionality. Many scholars have struggled to make sense of the
TrafFix decision, and many courts have struggled to apply it. The federal courts
and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board are split in their interpretations and
applications of the TrafFix holding. Thus, there is considerable confusion about
the extent to which the designs of useful products should be protected under
trade dress law. It is time to resolve this confusion and return to the earlier era
when trade dress law did not grant protection to the overall design of useful
products.
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INTRODUCTION

Consider the design of any object sitting in your office: your lamp, your
chair, your pen, even the stapler and tape dispensers. Each one is the result of
both functional and aesthetic design choices. Almost every day-to-day object
used was created with both of those needs in mind. In order to sell, the object
both has to work and appeal to the tastes of consumers. A comfortable chair
that is ugly will not sell, nor will an appealing chair that is uncomfortable. We
as consumers want products that serve both utilitarian and aesthetic needs, and
those who develop these goods invest time and money into designs that appeal
to both. Producers do not want their product designs to be copied by others who
have not made the same investment. The law, however, has generally been reluctant to grant such protection unless the design meets the requirements for
patent registration, or has features separable from the utility of the object that
meet the standards for copyright protection. This reluctance to protect the design of useful products is based on the policy that favors free competition in the
sale of goods.1 If, for example, a chair has been designed well to meet our utilitarian and aesthetic needs, then consumers and society benefit from having multiple producers competing to make that product at the highest quality for the
lowest cost. Patent or copyright law may give a manufacturer protection for a
limited period in order to provide the initial incentive to design that object,2 but
1
2

See infra notes 23–57 and accompanying text.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–151 (1989) (holding
that the patent system encourages “the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design” by granting an “exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years”); Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. Dist. of Columbia, 496 F.3d
1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that inventors are motivated to create by the expectation that, through procuring a patent, they will obtain exclusivity over the manufacturing,
use, and sales of the product, reaping the economic rewards during the patent’s term); SanofiSynthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he encouragement of
investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on
the right to exclude.”) (quoting Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599
(Fed.Cir.1985)). The greater profits available due to lack of direct competition are the “incentives for innovative activities.” See DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM
RESTORATION ACT, H.R.REP. No. 98-857(I), at 17 (1984). Likewise, the limited monopoly
created by the Copyright Act “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Monetary rewards were also
contemplated by the Copyright Act. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
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in the end, society benefits when all producers can copy and sell a design without permission from the original creator.
This attitude was the predominant view for much of American history.
Absent patent or copyright protection, the overall design of a product was available to anyone to copy, limited only by prohibitions against passing off the
product as coming from someone else, prohibitions which were enforced
through requirements of labeling.3 As a result of a slow change in trademark
and unfair competition law, however, that attitude began to shift, and by the
1980s, there was a growing body of case law that granted designers protection
against copying their product designs under trademark and unfair competition
law instead of patent or copyright law. What started as protection for the packaging and containers used to sell products—i.e., “trade dress”—eventually
turned into protection of the designs of the products themselves. Now the design of that chair, that pen, or even that tape dispenser was potentially protectable as trade dress, as long as the design or aspects of that design were not functional, and were distinctive enough to serve as an identifier of the source of
those goods. Now a competitor might be prohibited from copying that design
and providing consumers with a better or cheaper version of that object.
In the last ten years, the Supreme Court has indicated its distrust of this
trade dress law expansion in two important cases.4 In Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros.,5 the Court ruled that the design of a product could only receive trade
dress protection under federal law if it had acquired distinctiveness through
sales, advertising, and other promotions of that product.6 No product design
would be protectable until there was proof that consumers relied on that design
as a means of identifying the source of the goods.7
The Court narrowed trade dress protection even further in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing Displays.8 In TrafFix, the Court addressed the elusive ques-

3
4

5
6
7
8

471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (holding that the “rights conferred by copyright” were designed to
assure authors “a fair return for their labors” (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
See infra notes 23–57 and accompanying text.
See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix,
Moseley, and Dastar—the Supreme Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 237, 261 (2005) (“[T]he clear goal and the undoubted effect of this process [of
limiting the role of trademark law] is to expand the scope of permissible copying by contracting the scope of trademark protection, in a kind of zero sum game.”).
529 U.S. 205 (2000).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 212–13.
532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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tion of what it meant for a product design to be functional. With respect to the
utilitarian aspects of a product’s design, the Court endorsed the so-called traditional test for functionality: that a feature is functional “when it is essential to
the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device.”9 Moreover, the Court made it clear that competitive necessity was not the
correct test for functionality and that if the design was “essential to the use or
purpose” of the product, or affected “the cost or quality” of the product, then it
did not matter whether there were alternative designs that could be used.10 A
design that was functional, as so defined, was to be freely available to others for
copying.11 With respect to aesthetic features, the Court was even broader in its
definition of functionality. An aesthetic feature or design that was an important
ingredient in the success of the product was “functional,” and thus not protectable as trade dress.12 It seemed at first glance that the Court was making it very
clear that almost all product design would be unprotected under principles of
trade dress law. Only those features that were truly arbitrary and not important
to the commercial success of the product would be potentially protectable as
trade dress.13
Despite its seeming clarity, many scholars have struggled to make sense
of the TrafFix decision, and many courts have struggled to apply it. The federal
courts have split in their interpretations and applications of the TrafFix holding.14 In particular, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) and its
reviewing court, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, have essentially continued to apply a definition of functionality that was followed prior to the TrafFix
decision, while paying the case lip service.15 Although much was written initially after the Supreme Court decided TrafFix,16 little has been written in the last
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 33.
See infra notes 261–277 and accompanying text.
See generally Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress Functionality After TrafFix: The Lower
Courts Divide Again, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1219 (2003).
See infra notes 286–299, 507–618 and accompanying text.
See, e,g., Eric Berger, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.: Intellectual Property in Crisis: Rubbernecking the Aftermath of the United States Supreme Court’s TrafFix
Wreck, 57 ARK. L. REV. 383 (2004); Dorota Niechwiej Clegg, Note, Aesthetic Functionality
Conundrum and Traderight: A Proposal for a Foster Home to an Orphan of Intellectual
Property Laws, 89 IOWA L. REV. 273 (2003); Tracey McCormick, Note, Will TrafFix ‘Fix’
the Splintered Functionality Doctrine?: TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 40
HOUS. L. REV. 541 (2003); Palladino, supra note 14; Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall
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five years that addresses the issues in depth.17 In those five years, the case law
has continued to be confused and inconsistent.
It is time once again to re-examine that decision and the entire issue of
trade dress. Perhaps it is time to turn the clocks back to a time when product
design per se was not protectable as trade dress and was available for copying
unless protected by patent or copyright law. In Part II of this article, I will look
back at the cases of the twentieth century to trace the shifts in treatment of trade
dress. In Part III, I will examine the twenty-first century: the Walmart case, the
TrafFix case, and in particular, the decisions of the courts and the TTAB in the
last five years, which continue to reveal the underlying conflicts and inconsistencies in the law. In Part IV, I will propose a radical reversal of legal policy
that will eliminate the need for the anguished and inconsistent applications of
the functionality doctrine and better serve the best interests of both consumers
and designers of consumer goods.
II.

TRADE DRESS AND FUNCTIONALITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A.

Pre-Lanham Act Cases

As Professor Mark Thurmon described in his exhaustive 2004 article on
the history and development of the functionality doctrine,18 it seems quite clear
that prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946,19 courts did not recognize

17

18

19

of Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243 (2004); Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, Functional Design Features, and the Trouble with TrafFix, 9 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2001).
See, e.g., Perry J. Saidman, Functionality and Design Patent Validity and Infringement, 91 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 313 (2009); Amir H. Koury, Three Dimensional Objects as
Marks: Does a ‘Dark Shadow’ Loom over Trademark Theory?, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.
REV. 335 (2008); Andrew F. Halaby, The Trickiest Problem with Functionality Revisited: A
New Datum Prompts A Thought Experiment, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 151 (2007); Justin
Pats, Comment, Conditioning Functionality: Untangling the Divergent Strands of Argument
Evidenced by Recent Case Law and Commentary, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 515
(2006); Halpern, supra note 4, at 261.
Thurmon, supra note 16, at 257–71. Professor Thurmon’s article does an excellent job of
describing and analyzing the history and development of the functionality doctrine and I do
not intend to merely restate his thorough explication of that history. Instead, I wish to describe the general contours of the history of the functionality doctrine, using a number of cases as indicators of those contours before turning to my own view on the doctrine and where it
should be, which differs from Professor Thurmon’s.
The Trademark Act of 1946 (hereinafter “the Lanham Act”) §§ 1–74 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006)).
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any trademark protection for the overall design of a product.20 Trademark protection was limited to words and symbols used to identify products—so-called
technical trademarks,21 but not to the design of the product itself. Although
courts recognized unfair competition claims where a competitor copied a plaintiff’s product and attempted to pass the product off as its own, the remedy given
in such cases was not to prohibit the copying of the plaintiff’s product design.
Instead, the courts would generally require the defendant to take some action to
distinguish its product from that of the plaintiff, such as labeling or packaging
the product to make it clear that the product was not produced by the plaintiff.22
As parties began to bring claims seeking to prohibit the copying of aspects of their products beyond the technical trademarks, the courts began to develop rationales for denying them such a remedy. The principal rationale for
denying such relief was the effect it would have on competition. The courts
repeatedly articulated a policy in favor of free competition; that is, that no producer, in the absence of a patent, should be able to stop a competitor from copying its product, as long as no passing off was involved.
This can be seen in several early cases wherein parties sought to register
designs as trademarks under the predecessor to the Lanham Act.23 For example,
20

21

22
23

See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 257–71. See also Clegg, supra note 16, at 282–85;
Weinberg, supra note 16, at 10–14 (discussing early state cases that showed reluctance to
protect product designs based on the effect on competition).
At common law, technical trademarks were arbitrary symbols or words used to identify a
person’s goods. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 4:4, at 4-3 (4th ed.
1996). Technical trademarks had to be unique, fanciful, and non-descriptive; “automatically
distinctive and capable of immediately functioning as symbols of origin.” Id.; see also Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1961). The mark was
a property right that existed independently of statutory provisions for trademark registration.
Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel
Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 333 (1938).
See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 258.
In 1905, Congress passed An Act To Authorize the Registration of Trade-Marks Used in
Commerce with Foreign Nations or Among the Several States or With Indian Tribes, and to
Protect the Same (hereinafter the Trademark Act of 1905). 33 Stat. 724 (1905) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 81). While the right to own and use a trademark was a common law property
right, the statute created a system and codification of trademark practice. ORSON D. MUNN,
TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 16 (1934). It provided a procedure for registration,
created rules for valid marks, and made registered marks public record. Id. The Trademark
Act of 1905 allowed registration of any mark that distinguished the owner’s goods from
another’s unless it contained “immoral or scandalous matter,” was comprised of the flag, coat
of arms, or insignia of a country or state, or the mark so closely resembled another’s “as to be
likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public.” 33 Stat. at 725. Registration
provided prima facie evidence of (rebuttable) ownership as well as the right to bring suit in
federal court, where an injunction or damages could be granted for a violation of the owner’s
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in Herz v. Loewenstein,24 the plaintiff sought to register the design of packages
in which it sold its toothpicks.25 The process of sealing the packages produced a
corrugated embossing on the ends of the wrappers, which the plaintiff claimed
as a trademark.26 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled
against the plaintiff, reasoning that “[t]he mark is not placed upon the toothpicks, but is produced as a result of a distinct method of sealing the wrappers . . . . A trademark registration . . . would give appellant a perpetual monopoly.27 The trademark act cannot be used as an avenue to escape the limitations
of the patent law.”28
The court went on to quote from a Pennsylvania decision, Hoyt v.
Hoyt,29 stating:
[T]he trademark must relate to and distinguish the goods to which it is applied. For this reason, among others, the size or shape or mode of construc-

24
25
26
27
28
29

exclusive right to use the mark in conjunction with their goods. Id. at 728, 729; MCCARTHY,
supra note 21, § 5:3 (4th ed. 1996). Despite the seemingly few restrictions to the subject matter of a trademark registration under the Act, the Supreme Court had previously defined a
trademark as a “symbol” or “device.” Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92. Because of the requirement that the trademark be “affixed” to the goods or packaging, trademarks did not include shapes, packages, or containers, nor could they be the articles of merchandise themselves. See Trademark Act of 1905 § 29, 33 Stat. at 731; MUNN, supra at 34; Lars Smith,
Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia’s Tertium Quic Trade Dress Conundrum, 2005 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 243, 246 n.16 (2005). Courts were also unwilling to protect a product’s design.
See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that
a plaintiff “may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling” and that defendants
may “copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail” as long as he did not
pass himself off as the plaintiff in the sale).
The Trade-Mark Act of 1920 adopted the procedural provisions of the 1905 Act but
omitted the provision that made the registration of a trade-mark prima facie evidence of ownership. 41 Stat. 533 (1920) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 121). Ownership must be proven. Id.
§ 4, at 534. The statute was enacted “for the purpose of enabling manufacturers to register
their trade-marks in this country for the purpose of complying with legislation in foreign
countries, . . .” Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 334
n.21 (1938) (citing S. REP. No. 66-432, at 2 (1920)); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 71
F.2d 662, 666 (2d. Cir. 1934). It did not confer any substantive rights in the registrant.
Armstrong, 305 U.S. at 322. However, it created remedies for protecting registrations and
authorized triple damages for infringement. Trademark Act of 1920 § 4, 41 Stat. 534 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 124).
40 App. D.C. 277 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id.
See id.
22 A. 755 (Pa. 1891).
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tion of a box, barrel, bottle, or package, in which goods may be put, is not a
trademark. If there is any new or useful combination in the construction of
such box or package, it should be patented as an invention, if the owner wishes to prevent others from using it; but such package cannot be registered as a
trademark.30

Thus, the courts in this early period did not even recognize trademark protection
for packaging, but just for the words or logos used to identify products.
Similarly, in In re Oneida Community,31 plaintiff appealed the Commissioner of Patent’s refusal to register a “circular or O-shaped film having distinct
edges” that plaintiff placed on the back of its spoon bowls.32 The court found
that there was an expired patent covering just such a film, indicating that the
film was a means of protecting the precious metal from erosion.33 The court
concluded that plaintiff was rightfully denied registration.
[T]his is an attempt, under the guise of trademark registration, to obtain a monopoly of a functional feature of an article of manufacture. . . . A monopoly
may not be revived in this way . . . . Regardless of the patent, . . . this alleged
trademark should not be registered, for clearly no functional feature of a device is a proper subject for trademark registration.34

30

31
32
33
34

Herz, 40 App. D.C. at 278, quoting Hoyt, 22 A. at 756. See also Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490,
491–92 (D. Mass. 1886) (“A trade-mark is some arbitrary or representative device attached
to or sold with merchandise and serving to designate the origin or manufacture of that merchandise. I do not think that the merchandise itself, or any method of arranging the various
packages, can be registered as a trade-mark. . . . [T]he trade-mark must be something other
than, and separate from, the merchandise.”).
41 App. D.C. 260 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
Id. (citation omitted). These early courts were reluctant also to recognize marks on the products themselves if they were produced as part of the manufacturing process. In Capewell
Horse Nail Co. v. Mooney, the plaintiff sued the defendant for copying a pattern of small
checks stamped onto the head of its horseshoe nails. 172 F. 826, 827 (2d Cir. 1909). Because the nails were generally sold by the pound without any packaging to customers, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was passing off its nails as those of the plaintiff. Id. The
trial court ruled for the plaintiff, finding that the pattern was adopted as a trademark by the
plaintiff and “not as an incident of manufacture or primarily for ornamentation.” Id. On appeal, the court said that “[t]he real point in the case is whether the mark which defendant
stamps on its nails . . . is put there as a necessary incident of the process of manufacture.” Id.
at 828. The court agreed with the trial court that, in this case, the defendant had other ways
of producing nails without creating the pattern found on plaintiff’s nails and therefore, plaintiff was entitled to protection. Id. at 829. The court by implication, however, suggested that
marks that were produced as a necessary consequence of the manufacturing process would
not be protectable.
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The approach of the Commissioner of Patents and the court reviewing its actions was consistent with that of the courts determining protection under common law in terms of recognizing that the public had a right to copy the configuration of useful products in the absence of patent or copyright protection and
that there should be no trademark protection of such configurations. At least as
early as 1877, one court stated that “a trade-mark is always something indicative
of origin or ownership, by adoption and repute, and is something different from
the article itself which the mark designates.”35 The court went on to reason that
unless protected by a patent, “any one may make anything in any form, and may
copy with exactness that which another has produced, without inflicting legal
injury, unless he attributes to that which he has made a false origin, by claiming
to be the manufacture of another person.”36
This approach, which recognized that trademark protection did not extend to the configuration of a product and that there was a public right to copy
the design of unpatented articles as long as the imitator did not pass off his
goods as the product of the another’s, was also endorsed by the Supreme Court
in 1896 in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.37 In that case,
the defendant was copying the design of the plaintiff’s sewing machines and
also calling them “Singers.”38 Plaintiff asked the court to enjoin both the copying of the design and of the name “Singer.”39 The Court refused, finding that
plaintiff’s patents had expired on the design and that the name “Singer” had
become the generic designation for that design of sewing machine.40 The Court
stated, “It is self-evident that on the expiration of the patent the monopoly
created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by
the patent becomes public property.”41 The Court went on however, to say:
But it does not follow, as a consequence of a dedication, that the general power vested in the public to make the machine and use the name imports that
there is no duty imposed on the one using it, to adopt such precautions as will
protect the property of others, and will prevent injury to the public interest, if
by doing so no substantial restriction is imposed on the right of freedom of
use.42

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Fairbanks v. Jacobus, 8 F. Cas. 951, 952 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877).
Id.
163 U.S. 169, 200 (1896).
Id. at 178.
See id. at 204.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
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Thus, although the Court concluded that the defendant had the right both to
copy the design of the machines and the name Singer to identify those machines, it did not have the right to use either without adequately disclosing that
its machines were not produced by the plaintiff.43 The Court therefore enjoined
the defendant from using either the design or the name Singer without clearly
identifying that it, not the plaintiff, was the source of its goods.44
These early courts also began to address the role of functionality in evaluating unfair competition claims. For example, in Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co.,45 the court found that the defendant had not
engaged in unfair competition by copying the design of the plaintiff’s suction
cleaners because the plaintiff’s product configuration was “the most efficient
and economically manufactured form into which the mechanical combination
can probably be embodied.”46 The court held that to deny the defendant the
right to copy the most efficient design would give the plaintiff a monopoly to
which it was not entitled and would unduly burden those who wished to compete with the plaintiff.47 The court reversed the lower court’s injunction in favor
of the plaintiff.48 The court also found that the defendant had attached a name
plate to its cleaners which “unmistakably distinguished”49 its products from
those of the plaintiff.50 Thus, there was no unfair competition and the defendants only copied what the court held to be unprotectable.51
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 203 (1896).
Id. at 204.
191 F. 979 (7th Cir. 1911).
Id. at 981.
Id.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 980.
Id.
See also Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 962, 965 (2d Cir. 1918)
(defendant had the right to copy the shape of plaintiff’s shredded wheat cereal product, as it
was no longer protected by patent, but it had to take reasonable steps to distinguish its product from that of plaintiff’s, even if that meant deforming to some extent its own product);
Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 834 (3d Cir. 1916) (longitudinal corrugation on plaintiff’s hose was functional and no longer covered by patent; therefore, defendant
had a right to copy that configuration, where defendant had marked its products with its own
name and trademark); cf. Lektro-Shave Corp. v. Gen. Shaver Corp., 19 F. Supp. 843, 845 (D.
Conn. 1937) (where the court found that the cylindrical shape of plaintiff’s shaver heads was
not functional because “any other shape could be used . . . and would operate just as efficiently as one of cylindrical shape,” that defendant had “unnecessarily and knowingly imitated its rival’s shaver head in nonfunctional features,” and thus engaged in unfair competition, and that minor variations adopted by the defendant were too trivial to prevent confu-

Volume 50—Number 4

604

IDEA—The Intellectual Property Law Review

In 1938, the Supreme Court continued to agree with the approach of the
courts as well as the Commissioner of Patents, as reflected in Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co.52 In that case, the plaintiff was seeking protection against
the copying of both its product’s name, “Shredded Wheat,” and its pillow shape
design on the basis of common law principles of unfair competition.53 In ruling
for the defendant with respect to both claims, the court relied primarily on the
fact that the patent had expired on the process for making shredded wheat and
that the product’s pillow shape was a necessary consequence of the manufacturing process.54 Relying on Singer, the Court concluded that once the patent had
expired, the public had a right not only to use that process, but also to produce
shredded wheat in the same pillow shape, despite any secondary meaning associated with that shape.55 The Court also observed, almost in passing, that because the shape of the product was functional, it would impede competition if
protection against copying was afforded to the plaintiff.56 The Court said, “The
evidence is persuasive that this form is functional—that the cost of the biscuit
would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other form were substituted for the pillow-shape.”57
The Court, however, also recognized that the defendant’s right to copy
was not unlimited, which was consistent with the earlier cases. The Court said
that “Kellogg . . . was free to use the pillow-shaped form, subject only to the
obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.”58
The Court then found that Kellogg had taken reasonable steps to prevent such
confusion through its labeling and packaging, and that whatever remaining confusion might ensue outside that scope was beyond the reasonable obligations to
be imposed on Kellogg, and insufficient to justify enjoining it from copying the
pillow shape of plaintiff’s product.59

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

sion). See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 263–69, 308 n.288; Weinberg, supra note
16, at 10–14.
305 U.S. 111 (1938).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 119–20.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 122.
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938).
Id. at 121–22. See also Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark & Clark, where the court ruled
that the shape, scoring and color of plaintiff’s pills were functional and, if not protected by a
valid patent, then plaintiff could not prevent the defendant from selling the same drug in the
same form. 157 F.2d 725, 730–31 (3d Cir. 1946). The court, however, found that the defendant suggested to those dispensing the pills that they could pass off the defendant’s product
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Thus, in the pre-Lanham Act era, both federal registration and common
law protection were denied to the overall configuration of a product in the name
of promoting and protecting free competition in the design of products. Except
to the extent that a court would prohibit passing off, a product manufacturer
could not prevent the copying of its product configuration in the absence of patent or copyright protection. The remedy for passing off was limited to requirements of labeling or other actions to distinguish the defendant’s goods
from those of the plaintiff and did not include a prohibition against copying the
functional aspects of the product design itself.
B.

Post-Lanham Act Cases

In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act, which, unlike its predecessor, provided certain federal substantive rights to those who registered trademarks pursuant to its provisions.60 In addition to providing evidence of ownership, under the Lanham Act, a registration would be considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark as well as the registrant’s exclusive right to use
the mark in connection with the specified goods or services.61 A registrant could
sue for trademark infringement in federal court under the statute.62 In addition,

60

61

62

as those of the plaintiff. Id. at 731. Based on that conduct and not the copying itself, the
court concluded that the defendant was liable for unfair competition. Id. Nonetheless, the
court disagreed with the lower court’s injunction prohibiting the defendant from selling the
drug altogether. Id. As long as the defendant distinguished its pills from those of the plaintiff, it would still be free to sell the drug. Id.
Marks that were not registrable under the previous legislation became eligible under the
Lanham Act including service marks, marks that had acquired secondary meaning, and similar or same marks that were being used in good faith by more than one user in different parts
of the country without causing confusion. Lanham Act §§ 2(d), (f), 3, 60 Stat. 427, 428–29
(1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), (f), 1053). Whereas ownership of a mark was rebuttable under the Trademark Act of 1905 and registration created no substantial rights in an
owner under the Trademark Act of 1920, under the Lanham Act, a mark became generally
incontestable after a five-year period of continuous use. Id. § 15, at 433–34 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1065).
Id. § 7(b), at 430 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1057(b)). Although the Lanham Act does not require registration of marks, a registration certificate is more valuable under Lanham because
it provides notice and evidence of the owner’s right to use the mark, as well as proof that the
mark has been registered on the Principal Register. If the owner then files an affidavit after
five years of continuous use, the mark becomes incontestable and not subject to interference.
Id. §§ 15, 16, at 433–34 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1066); HARRY AUBREY TOULMIN,
TRADE-MARK ACT OF 1946, 51–52, 85 (W.H. Anderson Co. 1946).
See Lanham Act §§ 32–35, 60 Stat. 427, 437–440 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114–
1118 (providing for remedies against those who were found liable for infringing a registered
trademark)). Claims involving trademark disputes were able to be adjudicated in federal
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Congress created a broader cause of action in unfair competition for unregistered marks in section 43(a).63
As originally enacted, Congress defined a trademark for purposes of
registration differently from the way it defined the category of what was protectable under section 43(a). Unlike section 43(a) which prohibited the use of
any “false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same”64 to deceive or cause confusion,65 section 45 defined the term trademark
as “any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them
from those manufactured or sold by others,”66 and section 2 provided a number
of substantive reasons why a particular mark might be denied registration.67

63

64
65

66
67

court “without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the
citizenship of the parties.” Id. § 39, at 440 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1121).
See id. § 43(a), at 441 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)). Under the 1905 Trade-Mark Act, a
person who passed off their goods under another’s trademark was liable for damages to the
owner of the mark. § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (1905). The Lanham Act expanded liability of
the wrongdoer to “any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin . . . or any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.” Lanham Act § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)).
Id.
Although there is little discussion about this initially ignored section in the Lanham Act’s
legislative history, judicial interpretation has transformed section 43(a) into the preeminent
federal law for asserting claims against unfair competition. J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham
Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1996, at 45, 46 (noting that legislative history with respect to section 43(a) is “slight . . . inconclusive . . . with almost no mention of the subject matter” despite the lengthy and extensive discussion regarding the Lanham Act overall). Daphne Robert Leeds, a primary contributor to interpretation and passage of the Lanham Act, believed that the words “false origin”
in section 43(a) were intended to provide a remedy only against those who made false claims
about the geographic origin of their products, not against those who might engage in passing
off or other forms of unfair competition. Id. at 47; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 777 (1992) (stating that “origin” referred to geographic location of the
goods). It was the circuit courts that expanded the definition of origin to include the product’s source or manufacturer. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313
F.2d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 1963) (“We are further of the opinion that the word, ‘origin,’ in the
Act does not merely refer to geographical origin, but also to origin of source or manufacture.”). The drafters of the Lanham Act felt that federal registration was necessary to ensure
national protection of trademarks from infringement and access to federal courts as a forum
for claims of unfair competition. McCarthy, supra at 47–48.
Lanham Act § 45, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
Section 2 provides in part that registration is not available for marks containing immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter, marks that include the flag or coat of arms of any foreign
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Given the differences in the language, Congress clearly did not intend that section 43(a) would reach only deceptive use of registered or registrable marks,68
nor did it intend to allow for registration of everything that might be protectable
under section 43(a).69 Although section 43(a) might be read to prohibit a broader range of conduct than merely infringement of trademarks,70 there is no evidence that Congress intended to allow for trademark registration of the design of
products.
This is also evident from the registration cases decided under the Lanham Act for the first thirty years after its enactment. For example, in United
States Plywood Corp. v. Watson,71 the plaintiff sought to register as a trademark
the parallel pattern of grooves irregularly spaced along the length of the plywood it manufactured and sold.72 The court upheld the examiner’s refusal to
register that mark, stating that, “A trademark must have an existence so distinct
from the goods to which it is applied that it would be readily recognizable by the
public and by purchasers as an arbitrary symbol adopted to authenticate ori-

68

69

70

71
72

country, the U.S. or any state, marks that include the name, portrait, or signature of a particular individual except by that person’s written consent, or any mark that is so similar to an already registered mark that it would cause confusion or deceive purchasers. Id. § 2, at 428
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052).
“[I]t is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks.” Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. Section 43(a) “is the only provision in the Lanham Act that protects an
unregistered mark.” Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830
F.2d 1217, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987).
The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 substantially rewrote section 43(a), separating it
into two subsections: (1)(A), which allowed the statute to be used to bring a claim in federal
court for unregistered trademark, service mark, trade name, and trade dress infringement
claims, and 1(B), which offered the same purpose with respect to false advertising and product disparagement (false factual claims made about the goods or services of others) claims.
§ 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1121); see also McCarthy, supra note
65, at 53–54. The revision codified the case law interpretations of the statute, including the
nearly unanimous rule that statutory remedies available under the Lanham Act for infringement of registered marks also applied to violations of section 43(a). McCarthy, supra note
65, at 54. By approving and confirming the judicial expansion of this section, Congress’s actions were significant because it supported the conclusion that section 43(a) was “properly
understood to provide protection in accordance with the standards for registration in section
2.” Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 784.
“Since its enactment in 1946, . . . it has been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a
federal law of unfair competition.” Id. at 783 n.18 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-515, p. 40
(1988) (noting that although unsupported by the text, section 43(a) had been applied to cases
involving unregistered trademark infringement, violations of trade dress, and actionable false
advertising claims)).
171 F. Supp. 193 (D.D.C. 1958).
Id. at 194.
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gin.”73 If a pattern of grooves carved into wood was not “distinct” from the
goods, then clearly the overall configuration of a product would not be distinct
or protectable.74 The court went on to say:
A configuration of an article that is functional in character may not acquire a
secondary meaning so as to be subject to exclusive appropriation as a trademark for the article. Were the law otherwise, it would be possible for a manufacturer or merchant to obtain, in the guise of a trademark registration, a monopoly in perpetuity on such configuration, with ensuing serious potential
consequences to the public.75

Because the court found that the grooves inhibited checking and cracking, hid
nail holes, and prevented grain raising in the plywood, it concluded that the
grooves were functional and unregistrable.76 In reaching that conclusion, the
court relied heavily on a patent assigned to the plaintiff that taught that “shrinking, cracking, checking and swelling can be eliminated, and the deleterious effects thereof avoided, by gouging the surface or surfaces of the panel with a
multitude of closely spaced grooves . . . .”77 In fact, the court said that the fact
that the plaintiff was “attempting to register a patented article . . . , the patented
features being the very features of shape alleged to be distinctive as a trademark”78 was itself “sufficient to show that registration on either the Principal
Register or the Supplemental Register would be manifestly improper.”79 Thus,
the Plywood court reflected the concerns that were already part of the common
law, i.e., that providing protection to functional products or their functional features, especially where those features were already claimed in a patent, would
inhibit the interest in free competition.
These issues were also addressed by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), the court responsible for reviewing registration decisions.80
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 196.
See id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 194–95.
U.S. Plywood Corp. v. Watson, 171 F. Supp. 193, 194 (D.D.C. 1958).
Id. at 195.
Id.
In 1929, the U.S. Court of Customs Appeals was renamed the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, and its jurisdiction was expanded to include patent and trademark appeals
from the Patent Office, formerly the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475 (An Act To change the title of the
United States Court of Customs Appeals, and for other purposes). In 1982, The Federal
Courts Improvements Act combined the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
appellate branch of the former Court of Claims, creating a new federal appeals court, the U.S.
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The court’s 1961 decision in Application of Deister Concentrator Co.81 provides
an excellent discussion of the definition of functionality and the interplay of
patent and trademark protection. In that case, the applicant appealed the examiner’s refusal to register the rhomboidal shape of its shaking tables, a device
used to separate solid particles by shape, size and specific gravity for the purpose of concentrating ore and coal cleaning.82 The applicant claimed that all
other shaking table manufacturers used rectangular-shaped tables and that its
rhomboidal-shaped table was thus distinctive and recognized in the trade as indicative of the plaintiff’s product.83 Despite evidence that supported the applicant’s claim of secondary meaning, registration was refused based on the fact
that the rhomboidal shape was utilitarian and functional.84 The TTAB affirmed
the refusal, agreeing that the shape was functional, and noting further that, because the tables were made in accordance with an expired and subsisting patent,
the public would have the right to make tables of a rhomboidal shape after the
latter patent had expired.85
In an excellent opinion written by Judge Giles Rich,86 the court observed
that “the socio-economic policy supported by the general law is the encouragement of competition by all fair means, and that encompasses the right to copy,
very broadly interpreted, except where copying is lawfully prevented by a copyright or patent.”87 Recognizing, however, that the statute itself did not explicitly
bar registration of functional designs, the court reasoned that, in the absence of
patent or copyright protection, registration of a mark depended on whether the

81
82
83
84
85
86

87

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 96 Stat. 25 (1982); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F.
Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV.
385, 385–86 (1984).
289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
Id. at 497–58.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 498–99.
See generally GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS
AND PATENT APPEALS 131 (1980). President Eisenhower nominated Rich to be an Associate
Judge of the CCPA in 1956, where he served for twenty-four years on the bench, never missing a sitting. Id. at 132. See also HOWARD T. MARKEY, Foreword to RICH, supra at iii. As a
lawyer, Rich was a principal author of the 1952 Patent Act, the first legislation to codify all
federal patent laws. IP Hall of Fame 2006 Inductees,
http://www.iphalloffame.com/inductees/2006/Giles_Rich.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
Rich received multiple honors, including the Distinguished Government Service Award from
George Washington University for outstanding contributions in the industrial-intellectual
property field. RICH, supra at 133.
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
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applicant had an exclusive right to prevent others from copying that mark based
on common law principles.88 The court agreed with the established principle
that no one had the right to prevent copying of functional features in the absence
of patent or copyright protection,89 and therefore, no one could register such
features.
The Deister court also addressed two other important aspects of the
functionality doctrine. First, the court addressed the interplay of patent rights
and trademark protection. The court saw no independent significance to the fact
that the applicant had held a patent on the shape of its shaking table except as
evidence of functionality.90 The court saw the right to copy as an important public right based on principles that existed separately from the patent laws.91 The
court observed:
[T]he right to copy is not derived in any way from the patent law; it is a right
which inheres in the public under the general law except to the extent the patent law may remove it. The same is true of copyrights. When a temporary
incursion on the public right ends, the public right remains. No new right is
born.92

The court was addressing frequently made judicial statements that held once the
patent expires, the public then has a right to copy. Judge Rich wanted it to be
clear that the starting point is that the public always has the right to copy, and
that the patent and copyright laws are just limited incursions on that right.
This recognition of the importance of the public right to copy is also reflected in the court’s discussion of the interplay between the functionality doctrine and secondary meaning. The court agreed that the evidence established
that the shaking table’s rhomboidal shape had acquired secondary meaning and
was recognized by those in the trade as the goods of the applicant. The court,
however, ruled that, despite that secondary meaning, the shape could not be
protected as a trademark if it were functional.93 The court stated that “there is an
overriding public policy of preventing their monopolization, of preserving the
public right to copy. A certain amount of purchaser confusion may even be
tolerated in order to give the public the advantages of free competition.”94 Thus,
88

89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. The Lanham Act did not create trademark rights or ownership but merely provided for
registration of those that were owned and protectable under common law. Id.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 501.
See id.
Id. at 501 n.4.
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
Id. at 504.
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the court concluded that the public right to copy functional features outweighed
the public need to avoid confusion of source.95 The court observed:
In final analysis it would seem to be self-evident that government economic
policy as reflected in law must be determined by the legislature and the judiciary and cannot be left to depend wholly on the attitudes, reactions or beliefs
of the purchasing public. Public acceptance of a functional feature as an indication of source is, therefore, not determinative of right to register. Preservation of freedom to copy ‘functional’ features is the determining factor.96

The court adopted the term “de facto secondary meaning” to apply to those situations where a design might have acquired purchaser recognition as a designation of source but where the law nonetheless refused trademark protection of
that design based on its functionality.97 The court indicated that the courts in
such cases had not prohibited the copying of those designs, but had instead required some effort on the part of the competitor to take steps such as labeling to
avoid purchaser confusion.98 Thus, the right to copy trumped other concerns as
a general rule, balanced with a limited remedy to prevent consumer confusion in
appropriate cases by appropriate disclosure requirements.
The Deister court also struggled with the appropriate definition of functionality. The court noted that many courts had relied on the definition provided
in the Restatement of Torts; that a feature of goods is functional when it “affects
their purpose, action, or performance, or the facility or economy of processing,
handling or using them.”99 The Deister court recognized an additional definition
of functionality accepted by courts, i.e., that a feature of an article is functional
if it “contributes to its utility, durability or effectiveness or the ease with which

95
96
97

98

99

Id.
Id.
Id. at 503. The court cited Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), as an example of a case where a shape, the pillow shape of shredded wheat, had acquired secondary
meaning but was denied protection because the court found the public had a right to copy that
shape, the patent having expired. Id.
The Deister court quoted Kellogg, which held that the defendant was free to copy the pillow
shape of shredded wheat “subject only to the obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.” Deister, 289 F.2d at 504 (quoting Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120).
The court also quoted from W. Point Manufacturing Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., where that
court said, “imitation [of a functional feature] is privileged if it is accompanied by reasonable
effort to avoid deceiving prospective purchasers as to the source. This may frequently be
done by prominent disclosure of the true source.” Id. at 500–01 (quoting W. Point, 222 F.2d
581, 590 (6th Cir. 1955)).
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500–01 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (citing RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 (1961)).
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it serves its function.”100 These are very broad definitions of functionality, suggesting that any features that relate in any way to the utility of a product are
functional and thus not protectable under trademark law.101 Evidence indicated
that the rhomboidal shape of the shaking table provided a more efficient surface
by increasing the area available for “riffles” that helped to sort the various solids
more effectively, clearly meeting these broad definitions of functionality.102 In
reaching its conclusion that the rhomboidal shape was unregistrable, the court,
however, further refined its definition of functionality:
It should be clear from what we have said that we are not denying registration
merely because the shape possesses utility but because the shape is in essence
utilitarian. Where a shape or feature of construction is in its concept arbitrary,
it may be or become a legally recognizable trademark because there is no public interest to be protected. In such a case protection would not be lost merely
because the shape or feature also serves a useful purpose. . . . The Deister table deck, however, is shaped as it is only for reasons of engineering efficiency.103

The court concluded that the table’s rhomboidal shape was therefore functional
as it was “clearly primarily and essentially dictated by functional or utilitarian
considerations.”104 The court thus turned what was an extremely broad definition of functionality into one that may be significantly narrower—seemingly
redefining functionality to apply only when the feature was shaped or designed
exclusively for utilitarian purposes. If the feature was arbitrarily chosen for
reasons unrelated to utility, it could potentially be protectable.105
On the same day that it decided Deister, the CCPA also decided Application of Shakespeare Co.,106 where the applicant was appealing a refusal to
register spiral markings on its fishing rods as a trademark.107 The court found
that the spiral pattern was a direct result of the manufacturing process used to

100
101

102
103
104
105
106
107

Id.
See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 272–75 and cases cited therein (Restatement definition of “functionality” was broader than the definition which had been used by courts, allowing courts to find functionality more easily than under the more narrow definition which
preceded it). See also Weinberg, supra note 16, at 15 (overly broad definition of functionality adopted in Restatement was not widely influential in the courts).
Deister, 289 F.2d at 498, 505.
Id. at 506 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 504.
See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 276–77.
289 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
Id.
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make the fishing rods, which was covered by a patent.108 Although the court
concluded that the applicant correctly asserted that the spiral markings performed no function, it nevertheless upheld the refusal to register because the
markings were a necessary consequence of using the patented process which
would be in the public domain once the patent expired.109 The court said:
Were the spiral marking to be treated as a trademark the holder of the trademark rights would have a potentially perpetual monopoly which would enable
it either to prevent others from using the process which results in the mark or
force them to go to the trouble and expense of removing it. It is immaterial
that other processes may be available by which glass rods without the mark
can be made.110

This holding seems to broaden the scope of functionality from what the court
had held in Deister. The markings themselves served no purpose and were not
designed for utilitarian purposes as Deister seemed to require, but were merely
the after-effect of a utilitarian process. Looking at the two cases together, it
seemed that the CCPA was ruling that only product features that were intentionally chosen as arbitrary embellishments would be considered registrable. A
non-functional embellishment that resulted from the useful manufacturing
process would not be registrable, even if there were other ways to make the
product and avoid those embellishments.111
In later decisions, the CCPA and Judge Rich elaborated on this definition. For example, in Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co.,112 the court upheld a
refusal to register the applicant’s figure eight-shaped lock design based on functionality.113 That very configuration had been described in a patent issued to the
applicant’s predecessor in interest, which disclosed that the figure eight shape
meant that the housing could be constructed with only the minimum amount of
metal.114 In concluding that the evidence of the patent was sufficient to establish

108
109
110
111

112
113
114

Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id.
See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 277 n.139 (Shakespeare decision was based not only on
patent policy concerns, but also based on the fact that the pattern was hard to remove or design around and thus would have a detrimental effect on competitors if found to be protected
against copying).
413 F.2d 1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1197.
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a basis for summary judgment that the figure eight design was functional115 and
thus unregistrable, the court also addressed the appropriate limitations of the
concept of functionality.
The court, quoting from Deister, reiterated what it considered a truism
of trademark law: “a feature dictated solely by ‘functional’ (utilitarian) considerations may not be protected as a trademark; but mere possession of a function
(utility) is not a sufficient reason to deny protection.”116 The court then went on
to explain what it meant by this truism.
That truism in Deister, in its exception, merely reflects the obvious fact that
some articles, made in a purely arbitrary configuration . . . may perform a
function . . . which could equally well be served by containers of many other
shapes, and in such circumstances the incidental function should not by itself
preclude trademark registrability if the other conditions precedent are present.
That is a quite different situation from a configuration whose purpose is to
provide a functional advantage.117

Thus, the CCPA was establishing a test for registrability based on a definition of
functionality that was fairly broad; as long as the configuration of a product was
dictated by, and intended to serve, a utilitarian purpose, and was not merely
arbitrary and unrelated to that purpose, it would not be registrable. The existence of a utility patent which disclosed the configuration for which registration
was being sought was considered strong evidence that such functionality existed.118
115

116
117
118

Judge Baldwin dissented from this conclusion, stating that he was troubled by “the majority’s
acceptance of a single piece of evidence, the Best patent, as conclusively establishing functionality of such nature as to preclude registration.” Id. at 1200 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1199 (quoting Deister, 289 F.2d 496, 502 (1961)).
Id.
It is important to distinguish between utility patents, which are considered to be evidence of
functionality, and design patents, which are not. Under the Patent Act, “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” may be granted a utility patent. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, a utility patent requires that the invention have “practical utility,” In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1995), or, in other words, “real world use.” JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PATENT LAW 196 (2d ed. 2006). The degree of utility is not important as the statute only demands “full disclosure of a new and unobvious invention which is of some use to someone.”
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting). Design patents protect
the “new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. § 171.
Therefore, design patents are limited to decorative features and cannot encompass any structural or functional features of the underlying article. MUELLER, supra at 238. Since a design
must be non-functional to be eligible for a design patent, a design patent is in fact not at all
probative of functionality and may be evidence to the opposite end. See, e.g., In re Honeywell, 497 F.2d. 1344, 1347–48 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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During this same period of time, other federal courts were also addressing these same issues of registrability and protectability of trade dress. The decision of the District Court of Maryland in Car-Freshner Corp. v. Marlenn
Products Co.119 reflects this struggle. The case involved plaintiff’s pine treeshaped air fresheners and a defendant’s attempt to sell the same-shaped product.120 Plaintiff had obtained a trademark registration of the pine tree shape in
1952, but the court ordered that that registration be cancelled.121 To the extent
that plaintiff seemed to be claiming protection for the shape of the product itself,
the court observed that “[t]he fact that a trade-mark cannot be the article itself
applies to both common-law trademarks and to those registered. . . . The freedom to apply a trade-mark to an article . . . does not extend to making the mark
identical to the article.”122 Thus, despite the fact that the court concluded that
the pine tree shape was not functional because the shape “is nonessential and
performs no part in the intended function of the goods,”123 it nevertheless concluded that that shape would not be registrable because it would provide protection for the shape of the product itself.124 This reflects a restriction against registration that is much stricter than the rule adopted by the CCPA; the court here
would find registration improper for the overall shape of a product even if unrelated to its utility and arbitrary.
When the court then turned to the unfair competition claim, however,
the plaintiff found greater success against Marlenn, despite the fact that the
court had just concluded that the plaintiff’s mark was not registrable. The court
found that the defendant had intentionally copied the exact shape and dimen119
120
121
122

123
124

183 F. Supp. 20 (D. Md. 1960).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 26. The court found that the registration as issued only applied to pictures of plaintiff’s
product and not to the product itself, but then went on to conclude that if the registration was
as broad as plaintiff argued and applied to the shape of the product itself, that registration
would be invalid. Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 27.
The court also concluded that the mark as registered was descriptive and lacked secondary
meaning at the time of registration and thus was not properly granted registration. Id. at 27–
30. The District Court for the Northern District of New York later disagreed with the Maryland court’s conclusion that the pine tree shape was descriptive and found it to be suggestive,
and thus registrable without a showing of secondary meaning. Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto
Aid Mfg. Corp., 461 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (N.D.N.Y 1978). It appears that after the Maryland
district court had cancelled the registration, the plaintiff successfully re-registered it in 1961.
The New York district court did not address the question of whether it was improper to register the overall configuration of the product, though its conclusion would indicate that it saw
nothing improper about such a registration. Id.
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sions of the plaintiff’s product, which the court found to be non-functional and
possessing secondary meaning, and had done so knowingly, and with the intention of passing off its products as those of the plaintiff.125 The court enjoined the
defendant from further acts of unfair competition without defining the scope of
that injunction.126 Thus, although concluding that plaintiff’s registration of the
tree shape should be cancelled, the court nonetheless granted plaintiff some protection against the defendant’s use of that very shape in passing off its products
as those of the plaintiff. The plaintiff might have been quite justifiably confused
by what appears to be contradictory conclusions of the court. It is not selfevident why a design that does not merit registration should be nevertheless
protectable under unfair competition law.
The relationship between federal trademark registration and protection
under state unfair competition law was therefore unclear. Could a state provide
protection against copying the design of a product if that product was not registrable under the Lanham Act? In addition, could protection of that design be
granted under section 43(a) if the design was not registrable under section 2 of
the Lanham Act?
Although that precise issue was not before the Supreme Court, the
Court did address the underlying theories of these questions in two landmark
decisions in 1964: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.127 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting Inc.128 In Sears, the Court addressed the issue of whether a
state, through its unfair competition law, could prohibit the copying of an article
which was not protected by either patent or copyright law.129 In that case, Stiffel’s pole lamp design had been copied by Sears and sold in cartons labeled as a
Sears product, but without identifying tags on the lamps themselves.130 Stiffel
sued in part on the basis of its design and utility patents, but those patents were
declared invalid by the district court for want of invention.131 Thus, Stiffel’s
only remaining claim was based on state unfair competition law. Stiffel argued
that Sears was liable for causing confusion in the trade by copying its design
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Car-Freshner Corp. v. Marlenn Prods. Co., 183 F. Supp. 20, 45–46 (D. Md. 1960).
Id. at 46.
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
Sears, 376 U.S. at 225.
Id.
The appellate court confirmed the lower court’s finding that Stiffel’s patent was invalid.
Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963). Sears had sold the
Deca pole lamp a year prior which contained “all the essential elements” of the subsequent
Stiffel pole lamp, with the exclusion of an adjustable leg. Id. Therefore, the Stiffel design
was not new or novel, which is required for patent protection. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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and selling products which caused consumers to be confused as to their source.
Both the district court and the court of appeals held Sears liable under the unfair
competition claim.132
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, finding that Sears
was “doing no more than copying and marketing an unpatented article.”133 Relying in part on the Kellogg decision, the Court reiterated that if an article is not
protected under the patent laws, “the right to make the article—including the
right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—passes to the
public.”134 The Court ruled that state unfair competition law could not interfere
with that public right to copy, and therefore, Sears had the right “to sell lamps
almost identical to those sold by Stiffel.”135 The Court, however, recognized
that the states could, through unfair competition law, provide some remedies
against public confusion which could be caused by such copying:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods,
whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be
taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source, just as it may
protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels or distinctive dress in
the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings,
from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods. But because of the
federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such
copying.136

Similarly, in Compco, decided the same day as Sears, the Court addressed the
defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s lighting fixture design, for which the patent was also found to be invalid.137 In addition to copying the design, the defendant had copied the fixture’s cross-ribbing pattern, which was associated
with the plaintiff’s goods in the trade.138 The evidence showed that Compco had
taken care to label the fixtures and the containers clearly as being the products
of Compco and not the plaintiff.139 Despite the defendant’s efforts to label and
avoid confusion, the lower courts found Compco liable for unfair competition
under state law and again, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that, in
the absence of patent or other federal statutory protection, the design was in the
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Sears, 376 U.S. at 226–27.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 227 (1964) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 230 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938)).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 232–33.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 234 (1964).
Id.
Id. at 237.
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public domain and could be copied at will.140 The Court, however, went on to
observe that
As we have said in Sears, while the federal patent laws prevent a State from
prohibiting the copying and selling of unpatented articles, they do not stand in
the way of state law, statutory or decisional, which requires those who make
and sell copies to take precautions to identify their products as their own.141

The Supreme Court held that Compco was free to copy the plaintiff’s design.142
Because the lower courts’ judgment had erroneously prohibited Compco from
copying the plaintiff’s design and improperly awarded plaintiff damages for
such copying, the Supreme Court reversed.143
Both Sears and Compco addressed the potential conflict between federal
patent law and state unfair competition law and relied on the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause to justify the conclusion that state law could not provide protection for designs that federal law placed in the public domain.144 There is obviously no such Supremacy Clause problem when dealing with Lanham Act
protection for a design not protected under patent or copyright law, but the underlying policy conflict remains, as the reasoning of the courts in cases like
Sears, Compco, Kellogg, and Deister reflect. If the public has an overriding
right to copy an article unprotected by patent or copyright in the interest of
competition, then federal trademark law should not be allowed to impede that
right any more than absolutely necessary to achieve its goal of limiting consumer confusion. Public policy favoring the freedom to copy and compete fairly
would suggest that the same lines limiting state unfair competition law should
be drawn to limit federal unfair competition law, i.e., that there should be no
prohibitions against copying per se, but that federal law should be able to prevent confusion through labeling and disclosure requirements.145 This would also
support the conclusion that product design should not be registrable given the
increased aura of protectability that comes with registration, but should, instead,
only be protected by federal and state unfair competition laws. Courts can impose labeling and disclosure requirements if necessary, but should not prohibit
the copying of the design itself.

140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 238–39.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238–39 (1964).
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228–29 (1964); Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
See Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 137–38 (2004).
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Post Sears-Compco Expansion of Product Design Protection

As we have seen, up through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sears
and Compco, trademark law generally did not provide any prohibitions against
copying the overall configuration of a useful product, but it did provide for remedies such as disclosure and labeling to prevent consumer confusion as to
source when products were alike in configuration. In the next decade, however,
the courts began to expand protection of product design and provide remedies
against copying of articles that arguably would have been considered functional
and non-protectable under Sears and Compco.
In Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.146 (hereinafter
“TESCO”), the plaintiff sued under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, asserting a
federal unfair competition claim against the defendant who allegedly had intentionally copied the exact shape and configuration of plaintiff’s trapezoidal semitrailers.147 The trailers manufactured by the defendant were comparable in quality and were labeled as the products of the defendant.148 The district court held
the defendant liable under section 43(a) and granted the plaintiff damages, and
injunctive relief.149 That injunction, however, was later amended to permit the
defendant to make and sell semi-trailers with an exterior configuration that was
identical in configuration to those of the plaintiff. Although plaintiff appealed
the amendment, it later conceded that the issue was moot as defendant was no
longer making trailers in the shape of the plaintiff’s design at the time of the
appeal.150 The Eighth Circuit therefore dealt only with the issue of liability and
damages for the defendant’s previous conduct in copying the plaintiff’s trapezoidal trailer.151
The defendant argued that the trailer’s shape was functional, and thus
not protected against copying under section 43(a).152 The defendant relied in
large part on Sears and Compco, which the Eighth Circuit found inapposite because, in the court’s view, those cases did not address trademark law and the
doctrine of functionality, but rather only whether “state law could extend the
effective term of patent protection granted by the federal statutes” without con-

146
147
148
149
150
151
152

536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214 n.2.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1213 n.1.
Id.
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 1976).
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flicting with the Supremacy Clause.153 Although the court was correct that Sears
and Compco did not address the interaction of federal trademark law and patent
law, the court was too quick to downplay the underlying policy concerns that
the Supreme Court had articulated in reaching its results, i.e., the freedom to
copy the design of products that are in the public domain. The Eighth Circuit
observed that “[t]he protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair
competition is greater than that accorded by the law of patents because each is
directed at a different purpose.”154 In a footnote, the court made an even bolder
and seemingly incorrect statement, i.e., that “Sears and Compco recognized that
a design protected by trademark cannot be copied.”155 In fact, the Supreme
Court, as recognized in the language quoted above, merely said that states could
impose labeling and disclosure requirements to prevent confusion where similar
or identical designs were used in competition. Nowhere did the Court say that
such designs could be protected against copying under federal or state trademark
law.
The Eighth Circuit then concluded that the defendant had no right to
copy the design of the plaintiff’s trailers if the design was non-functional and
had secondary meaning: “Full and fair competition requires that those who invest time, money and energy into the development of good will and a favorable
reputation be allowed to reap the advantages of their investment.”156 In defining
functionality, the court quoted Deister for the principle that an arbitrary feature
or design that incidentally serves a useful purpose is not “functional” for purposes of denying trademark protection.157 Because there was sufficient evidence
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1215 n.6.
Id. at 1215.
“Where a shape or feature of construction is in its concept arbitrary, it may be or become a
legally recognizable trademark because there is no public interest to be protected. In such a
case protection would not be lost merely because the shape or feature also serves a useful
purpose.” Id. at 1218 (quoting In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 506 (C.C.P.A.
1961)). The court also quoted the broader definition of functionality used in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952), i.e., that design is functional if it is “an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.” TESCO, 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.
1976) (quoting Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343). That case involved china patterns, designs that
could not be considered functional in the utilitarian sense, but that had become recognizable
as Wallace’s in the trade and by the public. Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 340. The court found that
the china designs had to be considered functional because the “attractiveness and eye appeal”
of the patterns was “one of the essential selling features of” the china. Id. at 343–44. Thus,
the court held the china designs had an aesthetic appeal which could not be protected against
copying because “to imitate is to compete in this type of situation.” Id. at 344. Pagliero and
others like it spawned a parallel doctrine of functionality, known as “aesthetic functionality,”
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to show that the trapezoidal shape of plaintiff’s semi-trailers was “arbitrarily
designed for the purpose of identification [and] . . . no more than merely incidentally functional,”158 the Eighth Circuit held that the district court’s finding of
non-functionality under these definitions was not clearly erroneous.159 Thus, the
overall shape of a truck trailer, an object with an overriding purpose of utility,
was considered non-functional and protectable under section 43(a).160
The court upheld the district court’s findings that the trailer shape had
secondary meaning and that defendant’s copying was likely to cause confusion
among customers, even though the defendant’s products were clearly labeled as
its own.161 In reviewing the remedies awarded to the plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit
modified the lower court’s judgment and allowed the plaintiff to recover all of
the profits the defendant had made in the three states where the plaintiff’s design
had acquired secondary meaning and was thus protectable.162 Therefore, at least
for purposes of a federal claim under section 43(a), the Eighth Circuit concluded
that not only can a court prohibit copying of a useful article design, it can award
monetary relief to compensate a plaintiff and penalize a defendant.163 This
seems contrary to the concerns that the Supreme Court articulated in Sears,
where the Court concluded that “a State may not, when the article is unpatented
and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages
for such copying.”164
This narrow reading of Sears and Compco was also adopted by the District Court of New Jersey in Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp.165 that
same year. In holding the defendant liable for both common law trademark

158
159
160

161
162
163

164
165

which is generally beyond the scope of this article. See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 169–170 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995)), for the principle that “if a design’s ‘aesthetic value’ lies in
its ability to ‘confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of
alternative designs,’ then the design is ‘functional.’”); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067–72 (9th Cir. 2006) (general discussion of aesthetic
functionality, its history, and its meaning in the aftermath of TrafFix).
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1219.
See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 279–80 (TESCO represents a return to a focus on competitive
need as the basis of functionality determinations).
TESCO, 536 F.2d at 1220, 1223.
Id. at 1222.
See id. at 1222–23 (citing W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir.
1970)).
See text supra note 136 (emphasis added).
422 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976).
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infringement and unfair competition, the court rejected the defendants’ attempt
to rely on Sears and Compco as support for their right to copy the plaintiff’s
parking meter design.166 The design had been protected by both a utility and
design patent, but both had expired.167 The defendant claimed that since the
design was now in the public domain, plaintiff could not rely on trademark law
to prevent copying under the holdings of Sears and Compco.168 The court disagreed, ruling that Sears and Compco were limited to situations where there were
Supremacy Clause issues because state law was being invoked to extend protection beyond the term of a patent.169 That, however, seemed to be the very issue
before the court in Qonaar: the patents had expired on the plaintiff’s parking
meter design, and the plaintiff was relying on common law trademark and unfair
competition law to prohibit the defendant from copying its design even though
its patents had expired.170 The court, however, ignored this parallel and weakly
attempted to rationalize that, since the Lanham Act never creates trademark
rights but merely allows for registration of marks protected on the basis of
common law, the Sears-Compco rationale did not apply to the plaintiff’s claim
against the defendant.171 The court’s reasoning is not persuasive. It is not at all
clear how the Lanham Act figures into the plaintiff’s claim, where the mark was
not registered and the claim was not apparently based on the Lanham Act at all.
The court also concluded that the design of the parking meter was not
functional and thus was protectable as a common law trademark.172 The court
relied on the plaintiff’s assertion that no other producer used the same ice cream
cone-shaped configuration for the top of its parking meter and that there were
many other different possible configurations available to house a parking meter’s mechanism.173 The court rejected the defendant’s reliance on In re Honeywell,174 where the round configuration of a thermostat was held to be unregistrable even though other shapes were available.175 In Honeywell, the court had said
that the existence of those alternatives did not change the fact that the round

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 911.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id. at 911 (citing Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976)).
Id. at 908.
Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D.N.J. 1976).
Id. at 914.
Id. at 913.
532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
Id. at 182.
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shape was itself “essentially” functional.176 The Qonaar court found Honeywell
distinguishable, saying no other company had made parking meters in the same
design as the plaintiff, and concluded that the ice cream cone design was not
“primarily functional” without further explanation.177 Thus, the evidence of
alternative designs for parking meters was critical to the finding of nonfunctionality in Qonaar.
The confusion illustrated by this case is indicative of the state of the law
with respect to the doctrine of functionality and the protection of product design
in the 1970s. Sears and Compco along with earlier cases like Kellogg had left
the courts confused about the relationship between federal trademark law and
federal patent and copyright law. There was also uncertainty regarding how to
weigh the underlying policy concerns with preserving public access to the designs of useful products where those designs were not protected by federal patent or copyright law.178
A comparison of two cases involving the same design, the shape of a
building or kiosk used for a photograph developing store, further illustrates this
confusion. In Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc.,179 the New Jersey district court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief because its building design as a whole was functional, and not protectable
as a mark used to identify the plaintiff’s photograph developing services.180 The
court defined the standard of functionality, relying in part on Deister and Best
Lock, as follows:
176
177
178

179
180

Id.
Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 914 (D.N.J. 1976).
Thurmon, supra note 16, at 312 (“Courts were reluctant to take the Sears and Compco decisions as far as the Supreme Court’s language seemed to go.”); Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection, An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1360–62 (1987) (noting that “Sears and
Compco . . . have had a hard life” and reviewing decisions that read the cases narrowly);
Note, The Public Interest and the Right to Copy Nonfunctional Product Features, 19 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 317, 335–39 (1977) (reviewing cases showing a “significant judicial dissatisfaction with the rationale of Sears and Compco”).
425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977).
The plaintiff had a registered service mark for a two-dimensional drawing of the kiosk which
it used as its logo on advertising. Id. at 695. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
preliminary injunction with respect to the defendant’s use of a confusingly similar logo,
based both on service mark infringement under the Lanham Act and section 43(a)’s prohibition against unfair competition. Id. at 711. The court, however, refused to treat the design of
the building, a three-dimensional kiosk, as covered by that registration and analyzed the
plaintiff’s claims with respect to the building design separately from the logo design. Id. at
707. The court denied the plaintiff preliminary relief with respect to the defendant’s use of a
similar building design. Id. at 708.
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In order to determine whether the Fotomat kiosk, or substantial parts thereof,
is primarily “functional,” the relevant questions are whether the Fotomat
kiosk, as a whole, is designed and constructed in a manner which primarily
suits its purpose as a retail sales store; whether the Fotomat kiosk design contributes to the effectiveness with which Fotomat serves its customers; and
whether such functional purposes are merely incidental to the kiosk’s purpose
as a source-identifying device.181

The court concluded that the overall design of the kiosk was functional, saying
that, “Fotomat should not be able to prevent competitors from employing a type
of retail outlet which is well-suited to the conduct of drive-in sales by asserting
a building design service mark which is primarily functional.”182 The court conceded that unique or arbitrary aspects of the kiosk design might be protected,
but found that the defendant had not copied those features, and that there was
therefore not a probability that the plaintiff would succeed on its claim of service mark infringement based on the copying of the design of the kiosk.183
The court also analyzed the plaintiff’s claim of unfair competition based
on section 43(a). The court defined the difference between the service mark
infringement claim and the unfair competition claim.
It is possible to be guilty of unfair competition even when trademark infringement is not present, if use of a similar but noninfringing mark or device
is combined with unfair practices in a manner which is likely to deceive purchasers regarding the origin of goods under all the circumstances. . . . The
law of unfair competition recognizes that one may not simulate the distinctive
appearance of the place of business or advertising signs of a competitor unless
proper steps are taken against misleading the public.184

The court found that the defendant had not engaged in unfair competition with
respect to the kiosks because the defendant had adopted sufficiently distinctive
features in their design.
In contrast, the Kansas district court reached a contrary conclusion involving the design of the Fotomat kiosk shortly after the New Jersey decision.185
First, the court treated the plaintiff’s service mark registration as covering not
simply the two-dimensional design used as a logo, but also the threedimensional design of the building itself.186 Second, it concluded that the defendant had not presented sufficient evidence at trial to overcome the presumptive
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 706–07.
Id. at 709.
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Kan. 1977).
Id. at 1236–37.
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validity of the registered mark.187 The court found that that kiosk design was
distinctive and arbitrary and “not dictated by the function it was to serve.”188
The court reasoned:
Nor would enjoining others from using the building design inhibit competition
in any way, for defendant’s own expert testified that many other designs
would provide all the “functional” benefits which defendant claimed inhered
in this particular design. While this particular design did shelter the plaintiff’s
personnel and stock from the elements, it did so no better than a myriad of
other building designs. Therefore, while the design had some small element
of functionality, it was not “in essence” functional.189

The court acknowledged the opposite conclusion reached by the New Jersey
Fotomat court, but noted that the New Jersey court had been deciding the case
under the preliminary injunction standard, and did not have the benefit of the
evidence that had been introduced at trial in the Kansas case.190
Although that may, in part, explain the different conclusions reached
with respect to the functionality of the building design, the two courts also used
different functionality tests. The New Jersey court found the design functional
based on a broad definition which considered whether the design contributed to
the purpose and effectiveness of the store, but the Kansas court required the
design to be the best design, i.e. “better than a myriad of other building designs,” in order for it to be functional. Whereas the New Jersey court articulated
the underlying policy reasons for denying trademark protection to functional
designs, the Kansas court did not address those policy concerns. The two cases,
as demonstrated by their opposing conclusions and differing tests, reveal the
confusion in the case law in the 1970s with respect to the doctrine of functionality.
D.

The 1980s: Morton-Norwich and Inwood

In 1982, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals handed down one of
the most influential decisions on the issue of functionality in In re MortonNorwich Products.191 As discussed below,192 the TTAB and the Federal Circuit
continue to rely upon the Morton-Norwich decision in determining whether
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
See infra notes 286–299, 301–618 and accompanying text.
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trade dress is non-functional, and thus registrable under the Lanham Act. In that
case, the court determined that the shape of a spray bottle used for household
cleaning products was not functional and should have been registered. The
court, in another thorough opinion written by Judge Rich, carefully parsed the
steps necessary to determine functionality.
First, the court revisited the history of the functionality doctrine and its
underlying justifications, making an interesting and subtle change in how it
viewed the public right to copy, which, according to Judge Rich in the Deister
case trumped the producer’s desire to prevent confusion.193 While still recognizing the right to copy functional aspects of the design of a useful object, the court
seemed now to give greater weight to the concern with passing off. The court
said that “when a design is ‘non-functional,’ the right to compete through imitation gives way, presumably upon balance of that right with the originator’s right
to prevent others from infringing upon an established symbol of trade identification.”194 Although this is not strictly inconsistent with the holding in Deister,
there seems to be increased deference in the court’s language to the interest of
producers in preventing copying of their designs than there had been in Deister.
The court then observed that not every design of every utilitarian article
would be barred from registration, nor would even every useful design of a utilitarian article. The court opined that it was incorrect to define functionality to
apply to the design of any useful article. Whereas such designs might be de
facto functional,195 they were not necessarily de jure functional,196 and ineligible
for federal trademark protection. To find de jure functionality, and thus deny
trademark protection, required a finding that the design was superior to other
designs such that others would need to copy that design in order to compete
effectively. The court said, “[C]ourts in the past have considered the public
policy involved in this area of law as, not the right to slavishly copy articles
which are not protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which is more properly termed the right to compete effectively.”197
Again, this seems a different attitude from what Judge Rich said in
Deister, where he, in fact, did state that there was a public right to copy that
existed independently of the patent and copyright laws. Now Judge Rich was
193
194
195

196
197

See discussion supra notes 81–98.
In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1337.
De facto functionality “indicat[es] that although the design of a product, a container, or a
feature of either is directed to performance of a function, it may be legally recognized as an
indication of source.” Id.
De jure functionality indicates “such a design may not be protected as a trademark.” Id.
In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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basing functionality not on that public entitlement, but limiting it to circumstances where there was an actual impact on effective competition.198
The factors identified for determining this “superior” design and the
“need to compete effectively” also illustrated the court’s narrowing of the definition of functionality. The court discussed four types of evidence that would
bear on a determination of functionality: the existence of an expired utility patent which disclosed the utilitarian advantages of the design; advertising which
touted the functional advantages of the design; the absence of alternative designs available to potential competitors; and the comparatively lower cost of
manufacturing the plaintiff’s design compared to other available alternatives.199
The third and fourth factors made it clear that if other alternatives were available
and relatively equal in manufacturing costs, the plaintiff’s design was not likely
to be considered functional, even if that design was entirely dictated by functional considerations.
The court concluded that the design of plaintiff’s spray bottle was not
functional under this definition, placing the most weight on the third factor in its
analysis. The court found that:
a molded plastic bottle can have an infinite variety of forms or designs and
still function to hold liquid. No one form is necessary or appears to be “superior.” . . . The evidence . . . demonstrates that the same functions can be performed by a variety of other shapes with no sacrifice of any functional advantage. There is no necessity to copy appellant’s trade dress to enjoy any of the
functions of a spray-top container.200

Judge Rich and the CCPA thus seemed to be retreating to a more demanding
test for finding functionality, making it easier for producers to obtain registration of their designs.
Just a few months after the Morton-Norwich decision, the Supreme
Court revisited this issue for the first time since Sears and Compco, but only in
passing. In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,201 one of the
198

199
200
201

Others have interpreted the Morton-Norwich decision as being consistent with Judge Rich’s
previous rulings which were seen as based on the competitive need rationale more so than the
functionality standard. The holding in Morton-Norwich was viewed as a return to the competitive need rationale by courts that had been fluctuating between the two standards. See
Thurmon, supra note 16, at 271–83. See also Barrett, supra note 145, at 99–101 (finding that
Morton-Norwich relies on a definition of functionality which focuses on the practical effect
that trade dress protection for a design would have on competition).
In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Id. at 1342.
456 U.S. 844 (1982). This case was primarily about whether a drug manufacturer could be
held vicariously liable when pharmacists allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s trademark and
trade dress for its pharmaceutical product.
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defenses asserted for the defendant using the same colors as the plaintiff to identify particular drugs was that its trade dress was functional.202 In a footnote discussing that defense, the Court provided a definition of functionality: “In general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”203 The Court cited
only two cases in support of this definition; Sears and Kellogg. Citing these
cases in support of a case involving federal trademark and trade dress law would
seem to suggest that, in the Court’s view, Sears and Kellogg had a connection to
federal trademark law and were not irrelevant to the application of the functionality doctrine in such cases.204 It also could have been interpreted to mean that
the Court would take a harder line before granting trademark protection to the
design of useful products. The Inwood definition of functionality is clearly different and potentially broader in scope than that used in Morton-Norwich, which
requires evidence of the superiority of the design, not just that it is essential to
the article’s use or purpose.205 As Professor Margreth Barrett asserted, the citation to Sears suggests that the Supreme Court intended “essential to the use or
purpose” to require only a showing that the features of the design “play an important role in the product’s function, regardless of whether alternative designs
are available that could perform the role just as well.”206 That is, Barrett reads
Inwood to reflect a definition of functionality where the focus was on utility, not
the impact on competitors.207
It would remain for subsequent courts to shed further light on the meaning of the Inwood definition and whether the Morton-Norwich test was consistent with it. As Professors Thurmon and Barrett discuss,208 several circuit appellate courts addressed these issues in the 1980s, reaching differing decisions.
Interestingly, several courts, while citing Inwood, did not rely on, or even quote,
the Supreme Court’s language defining functionality. For example, the Seventh

202
203

204
205
206
207

208

See id. at 850.
Id. at 851 n.10. The court never addressed the question of whether the plaintiff’s trade dress
was functional or not, as its focus was rather on the question of vicarious liability.
See Barrett, supra note 145, at 141–43.
See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 283–85.
See Barrett, supra note 145, at 88.
See also Andrew F. Halaby, The Trickiest Problem with Functionality: A New Datum
Prompts A Thought Experiment, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 167 (nothing in Kellogg
or Sears supports the Inwood formulation of functionality); Weinberg, supra note 16, at 18–
19 (Inwood test is internally inconsistent).
Barrett, supra note 145, at 95–110; Thurmon, supra note 16, at 286–96. See also McCormick, supra note 16, at 562–66.
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Circuit in W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene Manufacturing209 cited Inwood as dicta for
support of its definition of functionality, i.e., that “a functional feature is one
which competitors would have to spend money not to copy but to design
around . . . . It is something costly to do without . . . rather than costly to
have.”210 The court, however, never explained how this definition fit with the
Inwood definition. In applying its definition to the plaintiff’s product—a stacking tray with hexagonal sides, the court concluded that the tray’s shape was irrelevant to its functioning and that there was no evidence that it was cheaper to
produce than differently shaped trays.211 Thus, the tray’s design would not be
considered functional in the utilitarian sense, although the court was willing to
go beyond the limited Inwood definition to consider the possibility of aesthetic
functionality.212 The Seventh Circuit decided several other cases addressing the
issue of functionality in the 1980s, but did not ever rely on, or explain, the relevance of the Inwood formulation in its analysis.213 In fact, in Schwinn Bicycle
Co. v. Ross Bicycles,214 the court concluded that the district court, in finding that
the defendant was unlikely to prove that the design of plaintiff’s exercise bicycle was functional, had been “led astray by words such as ‘optimal,’ ‘superior’ and ‘essential’”215 because “the burden of showing that a competitor’s design is the ‘best possible’ could extend the scope of trademark protection into
the domain that . . . is within the bounds of lawful competition.”216 Thus, the
209
210
211
212

213

214
215
216

778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 342–43.
See supra note 157 for discussion of aesthetic functionality. The court then went on to discuss the doctrine of aesthetic functionality and its possible application to the design of the
tray, a topic that is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at
303–08. See Clegg, supra note 16, at 308–12 (author proposes uniform treatment of both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality); Halaby, supra note 207, at 182–90 (law should not distinguish between utilitarian and aesthetic functionality but should define functionality based
on consumer desire for a feature, whether useful or aesthetic).
See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1191–92 (7th Cir. 1989)
(preliminary injunction vacated in part because district court erred in its application of the
functionality doctrine in determining that the configuration of plaintiff’s exercise bicycle was
non-functional); Serv. Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1126 (7th Cir. 1988) (injunction prohibiting defendant from copying the trade dress of plaintiff’s insulated beverage
server was affirmed as there was no error in finding that trade dress was non-functional);
Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987) (preliminary injunction
against copying plaintiff’s folding picnic table is upheld as configuration is not functional).
The court did not cite to Inwood in any of these decisions.
870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1189.
Id.
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language used in both Inwood (“essential”) and Morton-Norwich (“superior”)
was rejected by the Seventh Circuit on the grounds that it would impose too
heavy a burden on competitors who wished to copy the configuration of a product. Instead, the court preferred the definition adopted in W.T. Rogers that considered whether the design was costly to work around or do without, which was
a much broader definition of functionality that permitted far more copying of
designs by potential competitors.
Other circuits also did not address or even cite Inwood in determining
functionality issues in the 1980s. For example, the Fifth Circuit did not cite
Inwood, although it relied heavily on Morton-Norwich in finding that the plaintiff’s juice bottle was not functional because of available alternative designs and
indicated the bottle was not a superior design.217 The Tenth Circuit cited Inwood
for a different principle but did not rely on it at all in concluding that the shape
of plaintiff’s fishing reel was not functional. Instead, the court adopted a test
that looked at the effect on competition.218 Because the trial court had correctly
considered whether there were alternative ways to manufacture a comparable
fishing reel, the appellate court upheld that determination.219 The court seemed
almost to reject the Inwood formulation, saying, “This interpretation does not
limit functional features to those essential to a product’s operation.”220
The Second Circuit paid somewhat greater attention to the Supreme
Court’s Inwood definition of functionality. In LeSportsac v. K Mart Corp.,221
the court correctly characterized the Inwood definition as dictum, stating:
A design feature of a particular article is “essential” only if the feature is dictated by the functions to be performed; a feature that merely accommodates a
useful function is not enough. . . . And a design feature “affecting the cost or
quality of an article” is one which permits the article to be manufactured at a
lower cost . . . or one which constitutes an improvement in the operation of the
goods.222

The court went on to conclude that the district court’s finding of nonfunctionality was not clearly erroneous because there were many other ways to
arrange the design features of the plaintiff’s handbag and therefore, no danger of
217
218
219
220

221
222

Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 1984).
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d. 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 519. The court went on to suggest that those features that are aesthetically functional
would also be denied trade dress protection. Id.
754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 76 (citations omitted). This explanation was formulated by Judge Oakes in Warner
Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d. 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983).
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impeding competition.223 Thus, after quoting and explaining the Inwood formulation, the court relied on the evidence of available alternative designs to determine whether the features were essential to the handbag’s function or affected
the cost or quality of the product224—a blend of Inwood with one of the critical
factors in the Morton-Norwich case.
Two years later, the Second Circuit revisited the issue of functionality
in Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc.,225 where the defendant allegedly infringed the design of a rain jacket and asserted the design’s functionality as a
defense.226 In this case, however, the appellate court vacated the preliminary
injunction granted to the plaintiff because it concluded that the district court had
failed to apply the functionality standard correctly in determining that the rain
jacket design was non-functional.227 Unlike the handbag design at issue in LeSportsac, where the court had found several alternative designs available to competitors, the design in Stormy Clime did not lend itself to such alternatives. The
court observed, “By contrast, the arrangement of the principal features common
to both the [plaintiff’s and defendant’s rain jackets] appear to be dictated by the
purpose of providing a low-cost, unencumbering, waterproof jacket for wear
while playing golf and other sports.”228 The court, citing both Inwood and Morton-Norwich, went on to provide a more elaborate definition of functionality:
On one end, unique arrangements of purely functional features constitute a
functional design. On the other end, distinctive and arbitrary arrangements of
predominantly ornamental features that do not hinder potential competitors
from entering the same market with differently dressed versions of the product
are non-functional and hence eligible for trade dress protection. In between,
the case for protection weakens the more clearly the arrangement of allegedly
distinctive features serves the purpose of the product (including the maintenance of low cost), especially where the competitor copying such features has
taken some significant steps to differentiate its product.229

Although it is not entirely clear why the plaintiff’s arrangement served
the purpose of the rain jacket in ways that precluded producers from creating
reasonably competitive alternatives, the appellate court merely found that the
district court’s finding that there were alternative designs was not adequately
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 77.
Id. at 77–78.
809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 972.
Id. at 978–79.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 977.
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supported by the evidence.230 The court explained why it was important not to
define functionality too narrowly and thus expand the protection given by trade
dress law. In language reminiscent of earlier cases such as Kellogg, Sears, and
Deister, the court invoked the need to limit trade dress protection of product
designs to preserve the freedom to copy designs that were not protected by patent law.231 The Second Circuit also warned courts to proceed with caution so as
not to upset the balance between the freedom to compete by copying products
and the need to prevent confusion as to the source of goods.232 The court concluded:
By focusing upon hindrances to legitimate competition, the functionality test,
carefully applied, can accommodate consumers’ somewhat conflicting interests in being assured enough product differentiation to avoid confusion as to
source and in being afforded the benefits of competition among producers.233

Because the district court had failed to be sensitive to that balance, the
appellate court concluded that it had applied the legal standard of functionality
incorrectly and vacated the injunction issued in favor of the plaintiff.234 The
right to copy outweighed the concern with consumer confusion in this case.
Thus, in the aftermath of Inwood and Morton-Norwich, there was still
considerable confusion over the exact meaning of functionality. Although there
appeared to be a consistent concern with the impact on competition if a design
was protected by trade dress law and frequent reliance on the availability of
alternative designs as evidence of that effect on competition, the various circuits
were formulating the test for functionality in differing terms. Even within a
circuit, courts seemed to be giving different weight to the conflicting concerns
between the right to copy and the need to prevent consumer confusion.235 Some
courts focused more on utility to define functionality whereas others placed

230
231
232
233
234
235

Id.
Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 977.
Id. at 978–79.
Id. at 979.
It is also important to mention two other matters relating to these cases from the 1980s. First,
as described above, most of the principal cases were decided on the basis of the preliminary
injunction standard so there was not a full presentation of evidence as to competitive effect or
available alternatives before the courts when rending their decisions. Second, in all these
cases, the courts were placing the burden of proof on the defendant to establish functionality
instead of requiring the plaintiffs to prove non-functionality. The outcomes might very well
have been different if, as under current law, see infra note 280, the courts had placed the burden on the plaintiffs.
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more weight on competitive impact and the availability of alternative designs to
determine that competitive impact.236
Although the issues of trade dress and functionality were not directly
before the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,237
its discussion of Sears and Compco merits inclusion as it reflects the Court’s
continuing concern with the right to copy and the role that the functionality doctrine plays in striking the balance between that right and the concerns with consumer confusion. In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida
statute which prohibited the duplication of unpatented boat hull designs through
a direct molding process because it conflicted with the federal patent scheme.238
The Court observed that there is a “a congressional understanding, implicit in
the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which
the protection of a federal patent is the exception. . . . State law protection for
techniques and designs whose disclosure has already been induced by market
rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the patent laws by decreasing the
range of ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation.”239 The
Court cited to and discussed Sears and Compco as embodying this principle of
the right to copy unpatented ideas and products.240
The Court, however, also recognized that Sears and Compco, as well as
other cases decided after those two decisions, left room for some state regulation
of trade dress to prevent confusion in the marketplace. The Court observed that
Sears reflected “an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially
patentable but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto preempted by the federal patent laws.”241 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations which
would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law. . . . A state
law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the
public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy. . . . We understand this to be the reasoning at the core of our decisions in Sears and Compco, and we reaffirm that reasoning today.242

236
237
238
239

See generally Barrett, supra note 145, at 95–110.
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 151.

240

Id. at 152–57.

241

Id. at 154.
Id. at 156–57.

242
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Because the Florida statute was found to offer patent-like protection, the Court
struck it down.243
The question left somewhat undefined by Bonito Boats is where exactly
the Court would draw the line between permissible and impermissible state protection of product design trade dress. The Court suggested that state “protection
against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary meaning such that they operate as a designation of source”244
would be permissible, and that states “may place limited regulations on the use
of unpatented designs in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source.”245
The Court went on to observe that Congress itself has recognized that the need
to regulate unfair competition is not inconsistent with the patent laws, as reflected in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.246 “Congress has thus given federal recognition to many of the concerns that underlie the state tort of unfair competition, and the application of Sears and Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a
product which have been shown to identify source must take account of competing federal policies in this regard.”247 The Court thus invoked the doctrine of
functionality as one of the key concepts used to define the scope of protectable
trade dress, but did not discuss how that doctrine was to be defined.
The Court returned more directly to the question of how to define functionality in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.248 in 1995.249 Although the
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 166.
514 U.S. 159 (1995).
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), the Supreme Court also indirectly endorsed the role that functionality plays in balancing the right to copy with the concern with preventing consumer confusion. In that case, the Court ruled that trade dress generally could be protected if it were inherently distinctive without proof of secondary meaning. In response to concerns that this would result in overprotection of trade dress and a negative effect on the ability of other to compete, the Court turned to the Fifth Circuit’s definition of functionality as a reasonable limit on the scope of protectable trade dress. The Fifth
Circuit applied a rule that found that a design is functional and unprotectable “if it is one of a
limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition
would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection.” Id. at 775. The
Court then observed that this limitation on protectable trade dress “serves to assure that competition will not be stifled by the exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses.” Id.
Eight years later in the Walmart case, the Court would limit trade dress protection for
product design by ruling that product design trade dress could never be inherently distinctive
thus significantly narrowing the scope of the Two Pesos decision. See infra notes 253–259
and accompanying text.
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circuit courts in the 1980s may have paid little or no attention to the Inwood
functionality definition, after Qualitex, it would be more difficult to dismiss
Inwood as mere dicta with no persuasive effect. The Qualitex discussion of
functionality could also be characterized as dicta, as the central issue there was
the registrability of color alone as a trademark and not whether the color of the
product was itself functional, but it is still significant that the Supreme Court not
only cited Inwood, but quoted its definition of functionality.250 In its discussion
of why the functionality doctrine did not per se prohibit the registration of colors
as trademarks, the Court reviewed the policy justifications for the doctrine, i.e.,
the need to preserve competition and to prevent the use of trademark law to monopolize features that are not protected by patent law.251 Because color sometimes is not “essential to a product’s use or purpose and does not affect cost or
quality,”252 the court concluded that the functionality doctrine was not an absolute bar to the registration of colors as a trademark. Thus, the Court made it
clear that its definition of functionality in Inwood was not a casual statement
capable of being dismissed as dicta, but the continuing formulation of how that
doctrine should be defined.
What this definition would mean in real cases, however, was yet to be
tested or discussed by the Supreme Court. That opportunity would come early
in the 21st century.
III.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: WALMART, TRAFFIX AND THE
REDEFINITION OF TRADE DRESS PROTECTION
A.

Walmart, TrafFix and the Split in the Circuits

In March 2000, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that between the
concern for preventing confusion and the concern with promoting competition,
the latter concern was the weightier in its view. In Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara

250

251
252

Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (“‘[A] product feature is functional,’ and cannot serve as a trademark, ‘if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of
the article,’ that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage.” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 850 n.10 (1982))). The court also quoted the “important ingredient” test for functionality, but as we will see in our discussion of TrafFix, the court later made it clear that that test
only applied in cases of aesthetic, not utilitarian, functionality. See infra notes 271–272 and
accompanying text. See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 294–95.
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65.
Id. at 165.
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Bros,253 the court did not address the issue of functionality itself, but in discussing another issue relating to trade dress protection, this policy choice came into
focus. The plaintiff claimed that Wal-Mart had copied the design of its children’s clothing and, thus, engaged in unfair competition in violation of section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.254 The jury found for the plaintiff, and Wal-Mart appealed, arguing in part that the clothing design was not distinctive and not protectable trade dress under section 43(a) because there was insufficient evidence
of secondary meaning.255 The plaintiff asserted that its design was inherently
distinctive and therefore, automatically protectable without needing evidence of
secondary meaning.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiff and reversed. The
Court reasoned that it would be against public interest to protect product design
without an evidentiary showing of secondary meaning, i.e., evidence that the
public associated the plaintiff as the source of the goods based on the design of
its clothing.256 The Court stated:
The fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than
source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it
also renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness principle more harmful
to other consumer interests. Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits
of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product
design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of
suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness . . . .257

The Court considered the functionality doctrine itself an inadequate guard
against this interference with free competition, given the deterrent effect of potential infringement lawsuits. It concluded that, although word marks and packaging and container trade dress could be inherently distinctive, product design
could not.258 Without proof of secondary meaning as well as non-functionality,
there would be no protection against copying product designs. In so ruling, the
court substantially narrowed the availability of trade dress protection for product
design, as only those designs that had been on the market long enough and successful enough to create a consumer association with their source could even
have a chance to obtain trade dress protection under section 43(a).259
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

529 U.S. 205 (2000).
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id. at 211, 213.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
See generally Halpern, supra note 4, at 253 (stating that the Court in Wal-Mart was “narrowing the role played by trademark in protecting products and their design”). See also supra
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A year later, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to give overly broad protection to product design was made even more clear.260 In TrafFix Devices Inc.
v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,261 the Court revived the view that the freedom to
copy unpatented product designs trumped the concern regarding the risk of public confusion and provided a broadened definition of functionality which narrowed product designs that would be eligible for trade dress protection. The
case involved the plaintiff’s design of a dual-spring stand for road and other
signs, a design for which the plaintiff had an expired utility patent.262 The defendant reverse-engineered the stand and began producing signs using a similar
looking dual spring design.263 The plaintiff sued under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging trade dress infringement.264 The district court found that the
plaintiff failed to prove that there was any question of fact regarding whether the
design was functional and entered summary judgment for the defendant.265 The
Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the district court erred by failing to consider other ways that competitors could have configured the design that would
not have copied the plaintiff’s so obviously.266 Relying on Qualitex and its secondary definition of functionality, the Sixth Circuit asserted that for a design to
be functional, it must put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage”267 and not merely have some impact on competition. If reasonably comparable alternatives exist for road signs, then the plaintiff’s design can
be considered non-functional and thus protectable trade dress.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this formulation of the functionality
test. Although the Court’s principal focus was on the evidentiary effect of an
expired utility patent in determining functionality, the its analysis went beyond
this issue. The features of the dual-spring stand were found to be central to the
claims of the patent on which it was based, creating a burden of proving non-

260

261
262
263
264
265
266
267

note 249 (Walmart narrowed the scope of trade dress protection that had been allowed under
Two Pesos).
Halpern, supra note 4, at 260 (“[T]here is no doubt about the Court’s unanimous policy determination to reverse, or at least to stem, the tide of expansive trade dress protection.”).
532 U.S. 23 (2001).
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
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functionality that the plaintiff could not satisfy.268 The Court went on to address
the broader question of the definition of functionality, stating that the Sixth Circuit’s use of the competitive necessity test for functionality was “incorrect as a
comprehensive definition. . . . [A] feature is also functional when it is essential
to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the
device.”269 The Court now described this, the Inwood formulation it had first
announced in a 1982 footnote, as the “traditional rule.”270 It said that the secondary Qualitex formulation, the “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” test,271 was only relevant in cases of aesthetic as opposed to utilitarian
functionality.272 To make it even clearer as to how the traditional rule was to be
interpreted, the Court stated that there was no need to consider design alternatives in making determinations of utilitarian functionality.273 Because the dual

268

269
270
271
272

273

Professor Harold Weinberg observed, “One lesson is that for the patent to be relevant, the
design feature it discloses must be the same design feature that the senior producer seeks to
protect against trademark infringement.” Weinberg, supra note 16, at 43.
TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.
Id.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
The court’s separation of utilitarian functionality from aesthetic functionality has been the
subject of criticism by some authors. See, e.g., Halaby, supra note 207, at 172–75; Thurmon, supra note 16, at 250 (“The distinction between aesthetics and utility, therefore, is now
extremely important. In close cases . . . [t]his troublesome distinction is likely to lead to a
great deal of confusion and inconsistency in the lower federal courts.”). In Au-Tomotive
Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Ninth Circuit struggled to make sense of the
Supreme Court’s discussion in TrafFix. 457 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006); see also J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 7:80, at 7-251 (4th ed. 1996). As
noted earlier, the issue of aesthetic functionality is beyond the scope of this article.
Some scholars read TrafFix as holding that if functionality is established by other means,
there is no necessity to consider alternative designs, but not that evidence of alternative designs is precluded from consideration as relevant to the determination of functionality. See
Palladino, supra note 14, at 1227–28; Weinberg, supra note 16, at 62 (“Therefore, what
TrafFix may teach is that when a senior producer has the burden of proving that a choice design feature is non-functional, a junior producer’s strong evidence of functionality cannot be
overcome by a senior’s weak evidence of alternative design features. So read, TrafFix merely recognizes that multiple forms of evidence bear on functionality, and does not rule out
considering evidence of alternative design features.”) (footnote omitted).
Although it is true that TrafFix does not explicitly address the issue of whether alternative designs can ever be relevant, its rhetoric certainly makes clear that this is not what the
Supreme Court considers to be central to that determination. See also Barrett, supra note
145, at 116–27 (TrafFix represents a move away from the competitive impact test, adopting
instead a “role of the feature” test which does not require an examination of design alternatives).
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spring design was “not an arbitrary flourish,” but rather “the reason the device
works,” it was functional and non-protectable trade dress.274
The Court thus seemed to adopt a broad test for functionality: if a design was what made the product useful, if it related to its utility and was not
merely arbitrary, it was functional.275 This test, reminiscent of the approach
used in earlier cases such as Deister, was justified by the same policy concerns
underlying those earlier cases:
The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation
in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of patent law and its period
of exclusivity. The Lanham Act, furthermore, does not protect trade dress in a
functional design simply because an investment has been made to encourage
the public to associate a particular functional feature with a single manufacturer. . . . Whether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a product design which has a particular appearance may be functional because it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects
the cost or quality of the article.”276

In repeating the language from Inwood, the Court reemphasized that this
was the test to use for determining functionality. Its application of that test to
the road sign design in TrafFix indicated that what this test meant was that as
long as the design was a necessary part of what made the product useful and not
merely an arbitrary embellishment, it should be considered functional and unprotectable. Even if there were other ways to design a product that served that
same purpose, it would not change the fact that the first design was functional.
Adopting such a broad test for utilitarian functionality was consistent with the
Court’s view that the right to copy in the absence of patent protection outweighed concerns with secondary meaning and the producer’s investment in its
design.
Despite the seeming clarity of the Court’s intentions, within a year,
there was a split in the circuits as the lower courts struggled with the decision
and its meaning.277 The Fifth Circuit seemed to accept a face value reading of
274

275

276

277

Professor Thurmon observed that the Court’s focus on patent evidence illustrated the shift
from a focus on competitive need in determining functionality, as patent eligibility is based
on factors that have nothing to do with whether a competitor will need to copy the features
claimed. See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 324–25.
See also Barrett, supra note 145, at 116–27 (TrafFix rejected the competitive impact standard
and endorsed a test for functionality that focused on whether the features of a product’s design were material to the use or purpose of the product).
TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc, 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
See generally Barrett, supra note 145, at 131–35; Palladino, supra note 14, at 1219 passim;
Thurmon, supra note 16, at 326–34.
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the TrafFix decision. In Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH,278 a
case involving the design of pipette tips used for dispensing of liquids accurately and rapidly, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.279 The appellate court reversed, finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that its design
was non-functional.280 The appellate court said that although the verdict might
have been correct under the “competitive necessity” standard formerly applied
by the Fifth Circuit,281 that standard had been superseded by the Supreme Court
standard adopted in TrafFix.282 The test for when a design is functional is now
whether the “feature is essential to the use or purpose of the product or whether
it affects the cost or quality of the product.”283 The existence of alternative designs was not relevant to that determination, and thus the lower court had erred
in instructing the jury to consider whether there were alternatives ways of configuring pipette tips to serve the functions performed by the plaintiff’s product.284
Because the evidence showed that the plaintiff’s product features were not arbitrary or ornamental but rather necessary to the operation of the product, the

278
279
280

281
282
283
284

289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 354.
The circuits had at one time been split on whether the defendant had the burden to prove
functionality or whether the plaintiff bore the burden of negating it in a case brought under
section 43(a). MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:72, at 7-211 (citing Daniella Rubano, Note,
Trade Dress: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proving or Disproving Functionality in a Section 43(a) Infringement Claim?, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995)).
The Trademark Amendments Act of 1999 resolved this split, placing the burden of proving
non-functionality on the plaintiff asserting unregistered trade dress infringement. 113 Stat.
218, 220 (1999). The amendment added a third section to section 43(a): “In a civil action
for trade dress infringement under this Act for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter
sought to be protected is not functional.” See Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, 441 § 43(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3)). This amendment to section 43(a) created a “statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by the party seeking
trade dress protection.” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 30; MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:72, at 7-210.
This amendment may reflect that Congress, like the Supreme Court in Walmart and TrafFix,
was also attempting to narrow the scope of trade dress protection for the designs of useful articles.
See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 435 (5th Cir. 1984).
Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 356.
Id.
Palladino criticizes Eppendorf as being contrary to TrafFix in ruling that evidence of alternative designs is always irrelevant to determinations of functionality. See Palladino, supra note
14, at 1231–32. That criticism, however, is not terribly persuasive, given the fairly direct
language in TrafFix addressing this issue.
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court reversed, holding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff
had met its burden of proving non-functionality.285
In contrast, the Federal Circuit read TrafFix differently and concluded
that evidence of alternative designs remained a relevant consideration in determinations of functionality.286 The procedural context in Valu Engineering v.
Rexnord Corp. differed from both TrafFix and Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz in that
Valu Engineering involved the review of the TTAB’s decision to uphold a refusal to register a product configuration on the grounds of functionality.287 Thus,
unlike cases brought under section 43(a), the initial burden in Valu Engineering
was on the opposer to establish that the mark was functional under section
2(e)(5) of the Lanham Act.288 The Federal Circuit, however, ruled that the opposer in Valu Engineering had presented sufficient evidence to make a prima
facie case of functionality and therefore, the burden had shifted to the applicant
to establish that its design was non-functional.289
The application before the Federal Circuit involved the configuration of
guide rails placed along a conveyor to prevent objects from falling off, an object
with an obvious utilitarian function.290 The TTAB had applied the MortonNorwich factors and found that all four factors, including an abandoned utility
patent, advertising materials touting the useful advantages of the design, a limited number of design alternatives, and a comparatively low cost and simple
method of manufacturing supported the opposer’s claim of functionality, at least
with respect to the guide rails’ use in areas where conveyors are frequently
washed.291 The applicant argued on appeal that the TTAB should have considered all uses of the guide rails, not just usage in so-called “wet areas.”292
The Federal Circuit recognized that it had to determine the impact of the
TrafFix decision on the TTAB’s use of Morton-Norwich and its four-factor
functionality analysis. Despite the Supreme Court’s assertion in TrafFix that
285
286
287
288

289
290
291
292

Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2002).
Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1271.
Under the 2(e)(5) standard, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to deny registration to
prove an article’s functionality. Lanham Act, § 2(e)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(5)).
If a plaintiff has a federally registered trademark or service mark, however, the functionality
burden of proof shifts to defendant to challenge the validity of the mark. Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of a trademark, although rebuttable. See discussion at supra
note 61. For a comparison of the burden of proof under section 43(a), see supra note 280.
Valu Eng’g, 278 F.3d at 1279.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1272.
Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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there was no reason to consider design alternatives if a product’s design was
“essential to the use or purpose”293 and not merely an arbitrary embellishment,
the Federal Circuit read the case to allow for consideration of alternative designs
and found that TrafFix did not mean that the Morton-Norwich test should be
abandoned.
We do not understand the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix to have altered
the Morton-Norwich analysis. . . . Nothing in TrafFix suggests that consideration of alternative designs is not properly part of the overall mix, and we do
not read the Court’s observations in TrafFix as rendering the availability of alternative designs irrelevant. Rather, we conclude that the Court merely noted
that once a product feature is found functional based on other considerations
there is no need to consider the availability of alternative designs, because the
feature cannot be give trade dress protection merely because there are alternative designs available. But that does not mean that the availability of alternative designs cannot be a legitimate source of evidence to determine whether a
feature is functional in the first place.294

The court used as an example a product found to be functional based solely on
cost or quality factors.295 In that case, alternative designs would be irrelevant
because as long as the applicant’s design was cheaper or better quality than
those alternatives, those alternatives would not be competitive alternatives and
thus, the applicant’s design would still be considered functional.296
What the court did not adequately explain, however, is why alternative
designs would ever be evidence of functionality. If a design was utilitarian and
not arbitrary, how would alternative configurations make it any less “essential to
the use or purpose of the article” and therefore functional?297 The Federal Circuit was implicitly suggesting that even if a product design was useful, it would
still not be legally “functional” and denied trade dress protection if available
alternatives existed. In this respect, the Federal Circuit seemed to be following
the older formulation of the competitive effects test, which as the Fifth Circuit
in Eppendorf had recognized, had been rejected by the Supreme Court in TrafFix. In fact, the Federal Circuit explicitly stated that in making determinations
of functionality, the TTAB had to “assess the effect registration of a mark would
have on competition.”298
293
294
295
296
297
298

Id. at 1275 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001)).
Id. at 1276 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1276 n.5.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1275.
Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Palladino asserts
that Valu Engineering is correctly decided because it preserves the policy concern with the
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In Valu Engineering, there was no evidence of alternative designs so the
TTAB’s finding of functionality was not based on that factor. The Federal Circuit did not have to address what would happen in a case where available alternatives were used as the basis for finding non-functionality because of the lack
of competitive effect. The court’s broad language, however, upholding the continuing viability of the Morton-Norwich factors and its test for functionality, had
a substantial impact on how trademark examiners and the TTAB would handle
functionality decisions.299
Thus, within a year of the TrafFix decision, there was a split in the circuits, with the Fifth Circuit taking strictly the TrafFix admonition against the
use of alternative designs as evidence of functionality, and the Federal Circuit
essentially ignoring that language and continuing to apply the Morton-Norwich
standard set out twenty years before. Within the next year, three other circuits
had also addressed these issues.300

299
300

effect of competition, which Palladino argues the TrafFix court endorsed. See Palladino, supra note 14, at 1229–31. It is not clear how the Supreme Court in TrafFix endorsed that view
in its discussion of utilitarian functionality, either explicitly or even implicitly.
See infra notes 508–618 and accompanying text.
There were also a number of district court decisions which struggled with these issues in the
first few years after TrafFix. See, e.g., Maharishi Hardy Blechman Ltd. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 535, 547, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling that evidence of alternative
configurations of baggy, military style pants is admissible to demonstrate non-functionality
of plaintiff’s design); Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 854, 874 (S.D.
Ind. 2003) (finding an expired utility patent demonstrated that the convex and circular shape
of plaintiff’s thermostat cover was functional and holding that evidence of alternative designs
was irrelevant given that TrafFix “soundly rejected that approach”); Logan Graphic Prods.,
Inc. v. Textus USA, Inc., No. 02 C 1823, 2003 WL 21011746 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2003) (holding that a patent did not demonstrate functionality of the plaintiff’s mat-cutting boards and
tools’ overall look and that evidence of design alternatives is relevant to functionality determination) (citing Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re
Dippin’ Dots Patent Litig., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding that
plaintiff’s flash frozen ice cream trade dress was functional, using both the TrafFix test and
the Morton-Norwich factors without analyzing their differences or the policies behind them);
Keystone Consol. Indus. Inc. v. Mid-States Distrib. Co., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 901, 906 (C.D.
Ill. 2002) (holding that plaintiff was likely to succeed in its infringement claim based on its
registered trademark for a red-topped barbed wire fencing product because the defendant had
insufficient evidence to prove that the product’s configuration was functional as the color
was “ornamental and decorative,” and did not “enhance the efficacy” of the fencing, nor was
it “necessary to compete effectively in the marketplace”); Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target
Corp., No. CV-01-1582-ST, 2002 WL 31971831, at *9 (D. Or. July 31, 2002) (evaluating the
configuration of plaintiff’s footwear—three stripes on the side with a flat sole and colored
heel patch—as a whole to determine functionality and holding that the fact that some features
were functional was not enough to find the entire configuration functional where a “multitude of design alternatives are available to other shoe manufacturers”); Metrokane, Inc. v.
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In Talking Rain Beverage v. South Beach Beverage Co.,301 a case involving a registered trademark for a water bottle design, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment invaliding the plaintiff’s registration and dismissing its infringement claim based on its finding that the bottle
shape was functional and should not therefore have been registered.302 The bottle had smooth sides and a recessed grip which made it easier to hold and to
place in a bike bottle holder and gave it added structural stability.303 The court
quoted the TrafFix definition of functionality and then pointed out that it generally considered four factors similar to those used in Morton-Norwich to determine functionality.304 Instead of relying on evidence of a utility patent, however, the Ninth Circuit considered, “whether the design yields a utilitarian advantage.”305 The court recognized that TrafFix had established that there was no
need to consider design alternatives but observed that “the existence of alternative designs may indicate whether the trademark itself embodies functional or
merely ornamental aspects of a product.”306 As applied to the water bottle configuration, the court found that three of the factors supported the district court
finding of functionality: advertising touting its advantages, manufacturing advantages, and a utilitarian advantage based on the bottle’s greater structural stability and easier grip.307 In response to the plaintiff’s argument regarding the
numerous available design alternatives, the court, citing TrafFix, said that “the
mere existence of alternatives does not render a product nonfunctional.”308
Thus, the court upheld the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the
defendant in a decision that seems largely consistent with TrafFix and inconsistent with pre-TrafFix decisions which relied on evidence of design alternatives
to conclude that a particular configuration was non-functional.
In Antioch Co. v. Western Trimming Corp.,309 the Sixth Circuit also read
the TrafFix decision at face value and held that evidence of alternative designs

301
302
303
304
305

306
307
308
309

Wine Enthusiast, 160 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the features of
corkscrew, shaped like a rabbit’s head, were arbitrary, ornamental, and not functional).
349 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id. The court cited Disc Golf Ass’n, Inc. v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.
1998) as its precedent for using these factors, calling them the Disc Golf factors. Id.
Id.
Talking Rain Beverage v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 349 F.3d 601, 604–05 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 604.
347 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2003).
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was not relevant to the determination of functionality.310 The product in that
case was a scrapbook with a dual-strap hinge which enabled the pages to lie flat
while open, facilitating both insertion of additional pages and turning of pages, a
cover over the spine of the book concealing the strap-hinge, ribbed page edges
which provided reinforcement, held the staples together, and kept pages separated, and a laminated, padded cover.311 The defendant copied this design, and
the plaintiff claimed trade dress infringement. Defendant moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the trade dress was functional, but the district court denied its motion, finding that there were questions of fact with respect to functionality based on evidence of design alternatives.312 The district court, which
reached its decision prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in TrafFix, relied on
the competitive necessity test.313 After the TrafFix decision was handed down,
the defendant renewed its summary judgment motion, and the district court this
time granted it on the basis of the TrafFix test which precluded consideration of
design alternatives.314
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the court observed that
the competitive necessity test was still considered appropriate in cases of aesthetic functionality after TrafFix, “[t]he traditional Inwood test for functionality
is the main rule, and if a product is clearly functional under Inwood, a court
need not apply the competitive necessity test and its related inquiry concerning
the availability of alternative designs.”315 As worded, the court seemed to suggest that evidence of alternative designs, although not a required element of
functionality determination, is admissible where relevant, an approach that
seemed similar to that taken by the Ninth Circuit in Talking Rain Beverage. In
the case before it, however, the Sixth Circuit ruled that it was not error for the
district court to reject evidence of alternative designs because the lower court
had correctly concluded that “[t]he dual strap hinge design, the spine cover,
padded album cover, and reinforced pages are all components that are essential
to the use of the [plaintiff’s] album and affect its quality.”316
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although an arbitrary, fanciful or distinctive arrangement of individual functional features may be non-

310
311
312
313
314
315
316

Id. at 156–57.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Antioch Co. v. Western Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 157.
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functional, that was not the case with the plaintiff’s configuration.317 The scrapbook’s design was primarily based on its dual-strap hinge, and the other features
worked in conjunction with that central functional feature to provide the combined benefits promoted by the plaintiff in its advertising.318 Furthermore, the
court found that plaintiff’s configuration constituted a type of album itself which
plaintiff could not monopolize.319 Plaintiff’s design “brought together several
features . . . that allowed the overall album to function optimally,”320 and defendant was free to copy that configuration. Interestingly, the court pointed out that
the defendant had used its own logo and other symbols to prevent any consumer
confusion as to source, implicitly suggesting that, as seen in older cases,321 that
even though the defendant had the right to copy the design, it did not have the
right to pass off its product as originating with the plaintiff.322 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit, like the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, read TrafFix as returning the law of
functionality to a focus on the usefulness of the design at issue and the public’s
right to copy that design, regardless of design alternatives and “competitive necessity.”
The Seventh Circuit shed some light on its views on this issue in Eco
Manufacturing v. Honeywell International.323 Honeywell sought to enjoin Eco
from infringing the trade dress of its thermostat design, known as “The
Round.”324 The configuration had been previously protected by a utility patent
and a design patent that had expired in 1970, after which Honeywell had sought
a trademark registration.325 The TTAB initially had denied the registration, concluding that the thermostat’s shape was functional and could not serve as a
trademark.326 A decade later, Honeywell had again sought a trademark registration and succeeded.327 The registration later became incontestable.328 Eco proposed to manufacture a similar thermostat model with a circular, convex shape
and a round dial and sought a declaratory judgment that its product would not
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

Id. at 158, 160.
Id. at 158–59.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
See supra notes 131–145.
Antioch Co. v. Western Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150, 160 (6th Cir. 2003).
357 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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infringe Honeywell’s intellectual property rights.329 Honeywell filed a counterclaim for equitable relief.330
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to grant preliminary injunctive relief in favor of Honeywell based on the court’s conclusion that
Honeywell was not likely to be able to establish that the circular, convex shape
of Honeywell’s thermostat was non-functional.331 The Seventh Circuit observed
that TrafFix treated a utility patent as “strong evidence that the [patent] features
therein claimed are functional.”332 Therefore, “one who seeks to establish trade
dress protection [for the features claimed in the expired patent] must carry the
heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional.”333 The Seventh Circuit concluded that Honeywell had failed to meet this burden at this preliminary
stage in the proceedings. The court considered Honeywell’s proposition that
technological advancements to thermostat transistors made the round casing
merely ornamental in its current capacity and agreed that today there were
“plenty of other ways to package the controls.”334 Nevertheless, the court concluded that there were still several ways in which the round shape could be considered functional, including that the round shape could result in fewer injuries
due to the lack of corners and that persons who suffered from arthritis could find
turning a dial easier than pushing a slider.335 The court found that these theoretical uses were sufficient to prevent Honeywell from prevailing at this stage of
litigation. The court observed that it did not matter whether these uses were
“essential” to the use of the thermostat because TrafFix did not equate functionality with necessity.336 Rather, “it is enough that a design be useful.”337 Thus,
329
330
331

332
333
334
335
336
337

Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 651.
Honeywell’s appeal was principally based on its argument that the potential functionality of
the thermostat’s shape was irrelevant because it had an incontestable registration, which was
“conclusive evidence . . . [of] the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce,”
preventing others from selling a round thermostat as long as Honeywell made its product. Id.
The appellate court disagreed with Honeywell’s assertion, noting that a mark may be cancelled if it is, or becomes, functional under section 1064(3) of the Lanham Act. Thus, “incontestability does not avoid the question of whether the thermostat’s round shape is functional. Id.
Id. at 653 (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001)).
Id.
Id.
Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 654–55.
Id. (“The Justices [in TrafFix] told us that a design is functional if it is essential to the design
or it affects the article’s price or quality.”)
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like the Sixth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit read TrafFix as a
strict limitation on the availability of trade dress protection for the shape of a
useful article.
Similarly, in Shire U.S. Inc. v. Barr Laboratories Inc.,338 the Third Circuit also relied on TrafFix, concluding that the district court had not erred in
denying the plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief against defendant’s copying of
the shape and color of its medication, Adderall, because the plaintiff did not
seem likely to succeed in proving that the medicine’s configuration was nonfunctional.339 The district court had relied on evidence from physicians indicating that the appearance of a medication enhances patient safety by promoting its
use.340 The Third Circuit recognized that other cases had rejected such evidence
to establish functionality, but concluded that those cases were distinguishable
and that the district court’s finding of functionality here was not clearly erroneous.341 The court then observed, “Moreover, we have the benefit of the Supreme
Court’s most recent trade dress decisions which caution against the overextension of trade dress protection.”342 Although this case did not address the
issue of competitive necessity and design alternatives, it, like the other Courts of
Appeal (aside from the Federal Circuit), read TrafFix to represent a desire to
restrict trade dress protection for product configurations and thus, expand the
meaning of functionality.
B.

The Last Five Years: What the Split Has Engendered

In the last five years, there has been very little appellate court case law
on the issue of functionality. In General Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc.,343
the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the approach it had taken in Antioch, ruling that
GM’s evidence of available alternative designs was not relevant to determining
whether the configuration of a Humvee front grille was functional.344 That same
year, however, a different panel of the Sixth Circuit muddied these waters by
seemingly endorsing both approaches from TrafFix and Morton-Norwich. In
338
339
340
341
342
343
344

329 F.3d 348 (3rd Cir. 2003).
Id. at 358–59.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 358–59.
Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
468 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 416–17. The court went on, however, to conclude that the grille configuration was not
functional because it was not based on function but “more likely an unrelated afterthought.”
Id. at 417.
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Fuji Kogyo Co. v. Pacific Bay International,345 the court affirmed the district
court’s cancellation of the plaintiff’s registered trademarks for the design of its
fishing line guides on the basis of functionality.346 Fuji not only had three
trademark registrations for the fishing line configurations; it also had obtained
both utility and design patents relating to those products.347 The court observed
that Fuji was attempting to extend its patent monopoly through trademark law
by seeking trademark protection for the same configuration that had been protected under its now expired utility patents.348
Fuji argued in part that the district court had erred in placing too much
weight on the expired utility patents as evidence of functionality because the
configurations of its fishing line guides were not part of Fuji’s patent claims.
The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that as long as the configuration was
claimed by the patent or within the scope of the doctrine of equivalents349 used
to determine infringement under patent law, then the lower court did not err by
using the patent as evidence of the design’s functionality.350
In its discussion, the appellate court quoted the Federal Circuit’s Valu
Engineering decision and its continuing use of the Morton-Norwich factors to
determine functionality in the aftermath of TrafFix.351 The court noted that the
district court had relied on these factors, including the evidence of the utility
patents, advertising touting the advantages of Fuji’s design, and the cost efficiencies of the process used to make the fishing line guides according to Fuji’s
configuration.352 The court did not discuss the availability of alternative designs,
stating instead that the evidence showed that the guides’ shape was determined
by their use, and that the shape was widely believed to be a superior design.353
345
346
347
348
349

350
351
352
353

461 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 690.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 689.
The doctrine of equivalents is “a judicially created theory for finding patent infringement
when the accused process or product falls outside the literal scope of the patent claims.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (3d ed. 1996). The purpose of the doctrine was to prevent
fraud upon a patent by imitators who would change minor details of an invention in an attempt to bring their copy outside the scope of the patent protection. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (holding that “a patentee may invoke this
doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device if it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”) (citation omitted).
Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 687–90 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 686.
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Thus, while seeming to approve of both Valu Engineering and Morton-Norwich,
the Sixth Circuit still did not endorse the use of evidence of alternative designs
to determine that a design is non-functional.
The Federal Circuit in In re Bose Corp.354 reiterated its view that TrafFix did not mandate a change in the approach to determinations of functionality,
rejecting the applicant’s contention that res judicata should not apply to an earlier TTAB decision which predated TrafFix.355 The court said, “Bose next contends that the Supreme Court’s intervening case, TrafFix, represents a change in
the law and sets forth additional considerations in a functionality analysis. We
do not agree.”356
Thus, the split in the circuits continues, as a review of the decisions of
the district courts and the TTAB illustrates. As will be seen, this means that
generally, the test for determining whether a product design is functional for
purposes of registration is different when the test is in the context of trade dress
infringement.
1. District Court Struggles 2004–2009
a.

Treatment of Evidence of Utility Patents

One of the issues that has concerned the district courts in the aftermath
of TrafFix and the appellate decisions following is how to determine the extent
to which a utility patent is evidence of a product configuration’s functionality
for which trade dress protection is being asserted. Often district courts are finding themselves involved in questions of patent interpretation to make this determination. For example, in Keystone Manufacturing Co. v. Jaccard Corp.,357
the court had to analyze the plaintiff’s utility patent to determine its evidentiary
value with respect to the functionality of the plaintiff’s meat tenderizer trade
dress.358 After examining the patent claims, specifications and prosecution history, the court construed the patent to include the use of certain grooves and
openings which improved the cleaning and drainage of the meat tenderizers.359
354

355
356

357
358
359

No. 74734496, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 293 (T.T.A.B. July 12, 2005), aff’d, 476 F.3d 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
Id. at *28.
In re Bose Corp., 476 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord
Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We do not understand the Supreme Court’s
decision in TrafFix to have altered the Morton-Norwich (functionality) analysis.”)).
No. 03-CV-648S, 2007 WL 655758 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4–5.
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The court then found that the products sold by the plaintiff for which trade dress
protection was being sought did not, in fact, practice that improvement.360 The
court concluded that
[U]nder TrafFix, only a prior utility patent (or patents) that is practiced by the
product at issue is evidence of functionality for trade dress purposes. Otherwise, the direct connection between the expired patent and the claimed trade
dress that was critical in TrafFix is absent.361

Because the plaintiff was not practicing its patent in the product configuration
for which it was seeking trade dress protection, the court held that the patent did
not carry the evidentiary weight accorded patents under TrafFix.362
Other courts have focused on whether the product configuration reflects
the “central advance” of the patent. In Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Security
Instruments,363 the plaintiff sued the defendant for both patent and trade dress
infringement of its ground fault circuit interrupting product design.364 The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that TrafFix established that the
existence of a patent precluded the plaintiff from proving the non-functionality
of its trade dress.365 The court disagreed, saying that the TrafFix Court “did not
prohibit trade dress protection in all cases where features were disclosed in a
utility patent. . . . Rather, the Court prohibits affording trade dress protection of
the central advance of an existing patent.”366 Because the central advance of the
plaintiff’s patent was not the outward appearance of the ground fault circuit
interrupting product but the mechanism used in that product, the court concluded that the existence of that patent did not preclude the plaintiff from establishing non-functionality.367
On the other hand, in Franek v. Walmart Stores, Inc.,368 the court found
that the central advance of the patent was, in fact, the configuration claimed as
trade dress. The plaintiff had brought a declaratory judgment action challenging
the validity of a trademark registration issued to the defendant for the design of

360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
304 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Md. 2004).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 736.
Nos. 08-CV-0058, 08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009).

Volume 50—Number 4

652

IDEA—The Intellectual Property Law Review

a circular beach towel.369 The court found that the design was a central claim
advanced by a patent owned by a third party.370 The patent described as one of
its claims that the circular shape enabled a user to reposition his or her body
towards the sun without having to move the towel, an advantage also claimed by
the defendant in its product promotion.371 This invention’s preferred embodiment372 and the application’s brief summary supported the court’s conclusion
that the towel’s circular shape was the central advance of the patent and thus
strong evidence of the design’s functionality.373 As a result, the burden shifted

369

370

371
372

It is important to note how the burden of proof is treated differently in cases where there is a
registered trademark as opposed to unregistered trade dress at issue. See supra notes 280,
288. Registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of its validity, but the mark is still subject to a number of legal and equitable defenses. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). Where there is a registered trademark for a product design, there is a presumption that the trademark is valid, and
the burden is initially on the challenger to establish functionality. Once the challenger introduces evidence of functionality, such as a utility patent covering the design, then the burden
shifts to the trademark registrant to prove non-functionality. See, e.g., Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd.
v. Pacific Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683–84 (6th Cir. 2006); Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at
*9–10; Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc., No. 3:03-CV-93-H,
2008 WL 4165456, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2008); Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs.,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 792, 801–02 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (distinguishing TrafFix where there was
no statutory presumption of validity and therefore the burden was on the trade dress owner
initially to prove non-functionality). On the other hand, where there is no registration and the
party seeking trade dress protection is suing for infringement on the basis of § 43(a), there is
no such presumption of validity and the burden is on the suing party to establish nonfunctionality. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3). See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays,
Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001); Imig, Inc. v. Electrolux Home Care Prods., Ltd., No. CV 050529(JO), 2008 WL 905898, at *6 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2008); Specialized Seating, Inc. v.
Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (court erroneously states
that the burden is on party seeking to invalidate trade dress protection whether it is registered
or not). See also Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Techs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL
273129, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007) (holding that party seeking protection for unregistered trade dress ultimately has burden of proving non-functionality, but on a motion for
summary judgment, a party need only raise a question of fact regarding non-functionality).
The court rejected the trademark owner’s arguments that the patent was not relevant because
it did not belong to the trademark owner or because it was filed after the trademark owner
began using its trademark. Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009).
Id. at *4.
An invention’s preferred embodiment refers to the patent application requirement that “[t]he
specification . . . set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P’ship, 860 F.2d 415, 418 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (“The purpose of the best mode requirement is to ensure that the public, in exchange for the rights given the inventor under the patent laws, obtains from the inventor a
full disclosure of the preferred embodiment of the invention.” (internal citation omitted)).
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to the defendant to prove that the design of its beach towel was nonfunctional.374
Similarly, in Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc.,375 the court
found that the design of Stull’s child proof container cap was the central advance of a utility patent, making the patent conclusive evidence of the product’s
functionality.376 The patent in that case described the specific details of the
cap’s configuration and appearance.377 After reviewing the Supreme Court’s
functionality analysis in TrafFix, the court examined the patent specifications
and preferred embodiments as well as the patent claims to determine whether
the central advance of the patent and the essential feature of the trade dress were
the same.378 The court reasoned that
Those elements that make the cap unique, and therefore deserving of the patent, are the same features for which Stull received a patent. The cap looks
the way it does and is designed in a specific way because that “look” is necessary to its operation; the cap’s design furthers the purpose of the cap claimed
in or protected by the [relevant] patent. As noted above, that purpose is to
provide a novel and improved leak resistant locking arrangement for holding
the cap permanently captive on the container. Because the look of the cap is
necessary for its operation and is not ornamental, the essential feature [of the
trade dress] and the central advance claimed [in the patent] overlap. Under
the TrafFix analysis, the locking closure cap is functional as a matter of
law.379

The court therefore concluded that Stull had no validly protectable trade dress
and that Berlin Packaging was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the
trade dress claim.380
Other courts have reached different conclusions with respect to the degree to which a patent may bear on the functionality of a particular product design. In Clark Tile Co. v. Red Devil, Inc.,381 the district court denied the defen373

374

375
376
377
378
379
380
381

Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at *10. As discussed below, the court went on to consider the
relevance of design alternatives and ultimately concluded that the trademark owner had not
produced sufficient evidence of non-functionality to defeat the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. See infra notes 449–453 and accompanying text.
Franek v. Walmart Stores, Inc., Nos. 08-CV-0058, 08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009).
381 F. Supp. 2d 792 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Id. at 802.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 803–04.
Id. at 805.
No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2007).
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dant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were questions of fact
regarding the functionality of the plaintiff’s disposable plastic hand trowels.382
Plaintiff sold the hand trowels, used in connection with spreading adhesives, in
two different colors, red and white.383 The red ones had a 1/8 inch notch whereas the white ones had a 3/32 inch notch.384 Plaintiff sought protection for the
trowels’ overall configuration, including their shape and color, which defendant
allegedly had copied.385 The plaintiff owned a patent, however, which covered
several different embodiments of the trowels’ shape and configuration, including some claims which specifically described a trapezoidal shape for the blade,
an arcuate shape for the handle, reinforcing ridges along the handle and blade,
an insert plate recessed into an opening in the blade, and notched edges on the
blade.386 The patent included several illustrations of various embodiments, including those which showed different features and triangular shaped notches in
the blade.387 Defendant asserted that the trade dress of plaintiff’s trowels included these same features and that each feature was functional and thus, not
protectable as trade dress.388
In analyzing the defendant’s functionality assertion, the court first considered each component part of the trade dress.389 The court reviewed not only
the evidence that the triangular notches or serrations were part of the patent
claims, but also testimony from the plaintiff’s president that the size of the notch
determined how thickly the trowel would spread the adhesives and thus could be
considered a gauge to allow users to control a layer’s application.390 Despite this
evidence, the court concluded that questions of fact remained with respect to the
functionality of the notches.391 The court noted that the patent claims did not
require any specific type or shape of notch, but, in fact, said that shapes other
than a triangular shape could be used to spread adhesive.392 Thus, the court

382
383
384
385
386
387

388
389
390
391
392

Id. at *7, *8.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Clark Tile Co., Inc. v. Red Devil, Inc., No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 2007).
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
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found that the patent claim did not conclusively establish that triangular notches
were functional for purposes of trade dress protection.393
The court next addressed the defendant’s assertion that the insert plate
was functional because it was also described in one of the patent claims.394 The
court relied on language in the patent which stated that “the use of the insert
plate . . . is not essential to the invention”395 to conclude that the patent itself did
not establish this feature’s functionality despite the fact that the patent went on
to say that the plate “adds strength to the assembly . . . protects the user’s hand
from the material being troweled, and . . . provides a surface on which information such as advertising, instructions, and the like may be placed . . . .”396 The
court observed:
The fact that the insert plate serves some use or purpose does not necessarily
mean that it is essential to the use or purpose of the plaintiff’s spreaders. . . . This is particularly true here because the [relevant] patent expressly
states that the feature is not essential. Simply put, defendants rely too heavily
on the presumption that a feature disclosed in the claims of a utility patent
constitutes strong evidence of functionality. This Court finds that such a presumption is overridden where the language of the utility patent expressly
states that the feature in question is not essential to the invention.397

The court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s use of the words “not essential” in the
patent’s description to reach the legal conclusion that the feature was not essential and thus non-functional seems inappropriate. The wording chosen by a party in describing its invention for patent purposes should not have such weight in
the completely separate determination of trade dress protection.
The court also considered whether the insert plate affected the cost or
quality of the plaintiff’s trowels and concluded that there were questions of fact
regarding that issue.398 Because there were questions of fact regarding the functionality of both the triangular notches and the insert plate, the court said that it
could not determine for summary judgment purposes whether the overall look of
the trowels was functional.399 Other courts have often found that even if every
feature of a particular product configuration is functional, the overall combina393

394
395
396
397
398
399

Clark Tile Co., Inc. v. Red Devil, Inc., No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 2007).
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *7–8.
Clark Tile Co., Inc. v. Red Devil, Inc., No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 2007).
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tion of those features can be non-functional.400 The court here failed to address
that possibility.
Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Technologies, Inc.401 is another decision reflecting the difficulties faced by the district courts when deciding the
weight to be given to a utility patent in functionality determinations. In that
case, the plaintiff sought protection for the configuration of a battery pack attached to an electric fence dog collar.402 The design’s key element asserted by
the plaintiff was an indentation formed by two raised ridges that allowed a coin
to be inserted to lock and unlock the battery pack.403 The plaintiff owned a patent that included a claim for an external slot that would allow a coin to be inserted for purposes of locking and unlocking the battery pack. In the figure illustrating this claim, however, only an indentation was depicted, not the two
raised ridges actually used in plaintiff’s product.404 When the defendant’s copy
included the raised ridges, the plaintiff sued under section 43(a) for trade dress
infringement.405 The defendant moved for summary judgment, and the court
granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue
of fact with respect to the non-functionality of the coin slot configuration and

400

401
402
403
404
405

E.g., Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d,
505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that “functional features cannot be protected, . . . but a particular arbitrary combination of functional features, the combination of which is not itself functional, properly enjoys protection.” (internal citation omitted)); Tools USA & Equip. Co. v.
Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
combination of mail-order catalog features was nonfunctional and stating that “the critical
functionality inquiry is not whether each individual component of the trade dress is functional, but rather whether the trade dress as a whole is functional”); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s
B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[F]unctional elements that are separately unprotectable can be protected together as part of a trade dress.”); LeSportsac, Inc. v.
K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the combination of potentially
functional lightweight luggage features was nonfunctional and protectable). See also
MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:76, at 7-230 (4th ed. 1996) (“When the thing claimed as
trade dress or a trademark consists of a combination of individual design features, then it is
the functionality of the overall combination that controls. Thus, an overall design combination of individually functional items is protectable because while the pieces are individually
functional, this particular combination of those pieces is not functional.”) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. b (1995)). See also infra note 506
for a discussion of recent cases addressing this issue.
No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
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that the patent created a “heavy presumption of functionality” that the plaintiff
had failed to rebut.406
In analyzing the effect of the patent, the court addressed the plaintiff’s
assertion that the patent claims did not cover the coin slot as configured by the
plaintiff in its products, i.e., with raised ridges, and therefore the patent did not
have the strong evidentiary effect suggested by TrafFix.407 The court disagreed
and pointed out that in TrafFix, the plaintiff’s actual product looked different
from the invention disclosed in the patent, a fact that was of no consequence to
the TrafFix court.408 The court said that the burden was on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the patent claims did not cover the plaintiff’s coin slot configuration and that no evidence had been presented to so demonstrate.409 After considering other arguments raised with respect to functionality,410 the court concluded that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment based on the functionality and hence non-protectability of the plaintiff’s product design.411
The dangers implicated by an overly broad reading of the effect of a patent were recognized in another recent district court opinion, New Colt Holding
Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Florida.412 In that case, plaintiff sought protection for
the overall configuration of its revolver.413 Defendant asserted that the revolver’s features were “dedicated to the public” and not protectable because they had
been depicted in drawings of utility patents which had expired.414 The court
reasoned that the patent law principle which provided that matter not claimed in
a patent was considered dedicated to the public had no application to matters of
trade dress.415 The court said:
Indeed, such a rule would exclude trade dress protection for any shape or design visible in a patent specification regardless of the functionality of that fea406
407
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410
411
412
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415

Id. at *7.
Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Techs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129, at *7
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007).
Id. at *6. See also Berlin Packaging v. Stull Techs., 381 F.Supp. 2d 792, 800 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(dicta). Professor Weinberg points out that the patent at issue in TrafFix was read this broadly because the patent holder had successfully established patent infringement by a different
user whose configuration of the invention was similar to that of the defendant in the TrafFix
case itself. Weinberg, supra note 16, at 43.
Invisible Fence, 2007 WL 273129, at *3.
See infra notes 443447, 499–502 and accompanying text.
Invisible Fence, 2007 WL 273129, at *8.
312 F.Supp. 2d 195 (D. Conn. 2004).
Id. at 201.
Id. at 212, n.10.
Id. at 212.
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ture and would seem to cut against, if not render obsolete, the Supreme
Court’s statement about the significance of utility patents for determining
functionality. A utility patent would not be strong evidence of functionality,
but conclusive evidence of the unavailability of trade dress protection. Accordingly, it is most in line with trademark law to apply a functionality analysis, which addresses the concerns surrounding the perpetual nature of trade
dress protection applied to a utilitarian design, rather than fashion a potentially
overbroad rule and exclude designs otherwise protectable under the principles
of trade dress law. 416

These recent cases indicate how the lower courts are being drawn into
interpretations of patents and their scope in trying to evaluate the weight to be
given to a patent in determinations of functionality. Courts struggle to define
the central advance of a patent and what its claims cover; they struggle to determine whether the trade dress actually practices those claims and advances.417
It seems that the TrafFix decision has created an unnecessary level of confusion
as courts attempt to analyze the meaning of a patent in cases which really have
nothing or little to do with patent law. Moreover, this heavy focus on the patent
language seems to place far too much weight on the subtleties of a patent instead of the purposes of the doctrine of functionality in the context of trade dress
law. As Judge Rich recognized years ago, the right to copy a product belongs to
the public independent of patent law.418 The fact that a design is, or was, covered by a patent only means that that right is restricted for some limited period
while the patent endures; it does not define or restrict that underlying public
interest in competition and the right to copy the products of others as long as
one does not engage in passing off those products as one’s own.
b.

Evidence of Alternative Designs

The lower courts are also struggling with the question of whether and
when it is appropriate to consider the availability of alternative designs. In circuits where the appellate courts have addressed the issue, the district courts have
tried to follow the relevant controlling precedent. For example, in Maker’s
Mark Distillery v. Diageo North America,419 the Kentucky district court, following Sixth Circuit precedent which allowed, but did not require, evidence of al416
417

418
419

Id. at 212 n.10.
See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 362–64 (criticizing TrafFix for the complexity costs it will
engender by involving the federal courts outside the Federal Circuit in matters of patent
claims interpretation).
See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961); text at supra note 92.
No. 3:03-CV-93-H, 2008 WL 4165456 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2008).
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ternative designs on the issue of functionality, ruled that summary judgment was
inappropriate given that the possibility of alternative designs raised sufficient
questions of fact with respect to the functionality of the configuration of a wax
seal used on liquor bottles.420 In that case, Maker’s did not have a patent on the
design, but it did have a trademark registration for a “‘wax-like coating covering
the cap of the bottle and trickling down the neck of the bottle in a freeform irregular pattern.’”421 The defendant copied the configuration and claimed that it
was functional in that the seal made the bottles tamper-proof in compliance with
federal regulations, and preserved the contents of the bottles.422 The plaintiff
asserted that it used a patented twist cap, not the wax seal for those purposes,
but the court said what mattered was whether plaintiff’s trademark would prevent competitors from using that feature in a useful way, not whether plaintiff
used the seal for those purposes.423
To the extent the defendant was relying on the tamper-proof function,
the court said that “given the variety of alternative ways of complying with the
tamperproof requirement, it seems unlikely that the evidence would show” that
the wax coating was cheaper or a superior way of fulfilling that purpose.424
With respect to protecting the liquor in the bottles, however, the court said that
there might be fewer alternatives available to accomplish that purpose and thus
more evidence was needed to determine the functionality of that configuration.425 Thus, summary judgment was not appropriate. As there was no patent
or advertising touting the advantages of the plaintiff’s wax seal in this case, the
court’s functionality analysis rested almost entirely on the availability of alternative designs and their relative cost and quality.
On the other hand, in Kodiak Products Co. v. Tie Down, Inc.,426 the
Texas district court, following Fifth Circuit precedent, rejected the relevance of
alternative designs in concluding that plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the
merits of its trade dress infringement claim and thus, not entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief against the defendant.427 Plaintiff manufactured hydraulic disc
420
421
422
423
424

425

426
427

Id. at *7.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5 (quoting Fuji Kogyo Co. v. Pacific Bay Intern., Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 685 (6th Cir.
2006)).
Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., No. 3:03-CV-93-H, 2008 WL
4165456, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2008).
No. Civ.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004 WL 2599353 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004).
Id. at *4.
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brakes with a triangular piston housing design.428 Defendant copied this pattern,
claiming that it was functional and not protectable as trade dress.429 Plaintiff’s
principal response was that its design was arbitrary and that defendant could use
other arrangements and angles which would achieve the same purpose.430 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on alternative designs:
Simply because a manufacturer can achieve the same result through an alternative method does not show that a particular product feature is nonfunctional. Rather, a court must determine whether a particular placement
serves an essential function—in essence, whether that configuration is the reason the device works or whether it affects the cost or quality of the product. . . . An examination of alternative design possibilities is irrelevant under
the traditional test.431

The court then considered evidence that the locations used for the product’s
bleed screws and the intake valve were, in fact, the optimal locations, making it
unlikely that the overall configuration would be proven non-functional.432
In two recent district court decisions from the Ninth Circuit, there were
differing views on the treatment of evidence of the availability of alternative
designs. In Too Marker Products, Inc. v. Shinhan Art Materials, Inc.,433 the
court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that the
plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits due to the functionality of the
registered trade dress of its art markers.434 The parties agreed that the design
was not “essential” to the purpose of the markers, but the defendant asserted that
the design did affect the “quality” of the markers, thus fitting within the Qualitex definition of functionality.435 Defendant asserted that the square body of the
markers prevented them from rolling off work surfaces and that the rounded
ends, colored bands and indented caps were advantageous in terms of comfort,
color identification, and cap storage.436 The court found this argument sufficient
for purposes of defeating the motion for preliminary relief and found that plaintiff’s evidence of alternative designs was not enough to overcome defendant’s
428

429
430
431
432

433
434
435
436

There were two bleed screws at the 10:00 and 2:00 positions and an intake plug at the 6:00
position. Id. at *1.
See id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Kodiak Prods. Co., Inc. v. Tie Down, Inc., No. Civ.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004 WL 2599353,
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004).
No. CV 09-1013-PK, 2009 WL 4718733 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2009).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
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evidence of functionality.437 The court observed that TrafFix and Talking Rain
had “significantly reduc[ed] the importance placed upon alternative designs.”438
Similarly, in Atlas Equipment Co. v. Weir Slurry Group, Inc.,439 the district court adhered strictly to the TrafFix test for functionality in finding that the
design of a slurry pump was functional. Weir, the party asserting trade dress
protection, argued that the product’s exterior design did not have any bearing on
its ability to pump slurry; Atlas argued that, in fact, the pump’s design had some
utilitarian advantages relating to its stability, bearing load capacity, smaller
footprint, need for fewer bolts and ease of manufacturing, among others.440 The
court found that Atlas’ evidence was sufficient to establish that the design of the
pump was de jure functional and that the fact that it may not affect the central
purpose of the product, i.e., pumping slurry, was not relevant.441 On the question of the relevance of available alternative designs, the court, citing TrafFix
and Talking Rain, concluded that given the evidence of the product design’s
utilitarian advantages, “there is no need to address the availability of alternative
designs.”442
Where there is no clear appellate court precedent dealing with the relevance of available alternative design evidence, the district courts in those circuits
have sometimes reached conflicting results, as two decisions from the Seventh
Circuit illustrate. The plaintiff in Invisible Fence443 rested its argument that the
plaintiff’s battery pack design was non-functional on the fact that there were
alternative configurations that could be used to lock and unlock the battery
pack.444 In response to the defendant’s assertion that TrafFix precluded the court
from considering the availability of alternative designs in determinations of
functionality, the Indiana district court reviewed the split in the circuits and observed that the Seventh Circuit had not yet ruled on this issue.445 The district
court concluded, however, that it was “apparent from TrafFix and the resulting
437
438
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Id.
Id. at *4.
No. C07-1358Z, 2009 WL 4670154 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2009).
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10. The court, however, went on to address the evidence of alternative designs that
Weir had submitted, finding that it was merely speculative and unsupported. Id. at *11. See
also Minemyer v. B-Roc Representatives, Inc., 2009 WL 5275826 (N.D. Ill. October 26,
2009) (where plaintiff admitted that each component of its plastic pipe couplers was functional, evidence of alternative designs was not probative of non-functionality).
No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007)
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4–5.
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jurisprudence that if functionality can be conclusively established under the
traditional rule, then courts need not consider a plaintiff’s design alternatives.”446
As discussed above,447 because the court found that evidence of a utility patent
established that the design of the battery pack coin slot was functional, the court
found that it did not need to consider the potential design alternatives.
In contrast, another district court within the Seventh Circuit did consider
the availability of alternative designs despite the fact that it also found that the
configuration of the allegedly infringed product, a circular beach towel, was
covered by the central claim of a utility patent.448 In Franek,449 the Illinois district court quoted and relied on the language from Valu Engineering, concluding, “The Court finds the Federal Circuit’s synthesis to be sensible and thus will
consider evidence of alternative designs to probe whether the circular towel is
functional in the first instance.”450 The court then found that in fact the evidence
of alternative designs was further indication of the functionality of the circular
configuration:
[B]each towels could be made in any design, and if large enough, a sunbather
would not have to reposition the towel while following the sun. However, the
undisputed evidence before the Court indicates that there still are significant
advantages to the circular form. . . . If a circular design admittedly is the most
efficient shape, then any other manufacturer of towels permitting rotation with
the sun would be forced to manufacture sub-optimal towels.451

As the court further observed, “To be sure, a circular shape is not as essential to
the functionality of a beach towel as an oval shape is to the functionality of a
football. But it need not be indispensable; it is enough that circularity is one of
a few superior designs for a beach towel.”452
Thus, unlike the Invisible Fence court which found that evidence of the
utility patent conclusively established functionality and made it unnecessary to
consider design alternatives, the Franek court considered both types of evidence
in concluding that the circular beach towel configuration was functional. In
addition, it looked at the other factors identified in Morton-Norwich: the use of
advertising to tout those functional advantages and the effect of the design feature on the cost and quality of the towel. These cases can be distinguished in
446
447
448
449
450
451
452

Id. at *5.
See supra notes 406–408.
See supra notes 368–373.
Nos. 08-CV-0058, 08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009).
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id. at *17.
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that there was a trademark registration for the beach towel configuration in Franek, putting the initial burden of proof of functionality on the party seeking to
invalidate the trademark, and no registration for the battery pack in Invisible
Fence, placing the burden of proving non-functionality on the party seeking to
protect the trade dress. The Franek court, however, relied on the utility patent
evidence to shift the burden to the trademark owner to establish nonfunctionality. It then turned to the Morton-Norwich factors in determining that
the trademark owner had not met its burden and the party challenging the
trademark was therefore entitled to summary judgment. Those procedural distinctions, however, do not explain entirely the greater willingness of one court
to look at design alternatives in the face of its own conclusion that the configuration at issue was covered by the central advance of a utility patent. That fact
alone would seem to have been sufficient to establish functionality on the merits, not just for burden shifting purposes.453
In John M. Middleton, Inc. v. Swisher International, Inc.,454 the Pennsylvania district court engaged in a fairly superficial analysis of the functionality
of a cigar configuration. Plaintiff claimed trade dress protection for the following features: the octagonally shaped ivory-colored plastic tip, the specific length
and diameter of the cigar, the dark brown wrapper with pink and bone-colored
spots, a straight seam holding the wrapper together, and a black cigar band with
gold trim on the edge.455 The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing
that each element was functional and therefore the design itself was unprotectable.456 The court said, “The availability of alternative designs is one factor to be
considered in determining whether a feature is functional, though alternative
designs need not be considered if the feature has been conclusively shown to be
functional pursuant to one of the [tests identified in TrafFix],”457 and relied on
both TrafFix and Valu Engineering as support. In its analysis of the case before
it, the court then in fact considered design alternatives in reaching the conclusion that there were questions of fact going to the issue of functionality that pre-

453

454
455
456
457

See also Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F.Supp. 2d 999, 1010–11
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (registered trademark for folding chair design held invalid after trial based on
functionality; court relied both on evidence of utility patents covering the various elements of
the chair’s configuration as well as evidence based on the other Morton-Norwich factors,
stating that “[a]lternative designs . . . may be relevant with regard to proving functionality as
it affects use, cost, or quality.”).
No. 03-3908, 2006 WL 2129209 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2006).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
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vented summary judgment.458 The court considered each individual feature of
the plaintiff’s cigars separately and found that the defendant had failed to establish functionality with respect to each element.459 For example, in terms of the
cigar’s shape and dimensions and the dimensions of the cigar’s tip, the court
said that the plaintiff had offered evidence of numerous alternatives and that the
defendant had not demonstrated that changing those features would affect the
use or cost of the cigar.460 Thus, at least for purposes of defeating a motion for
summary judgment, the court was content to rely on evidence of design alternatives to create questions of fact on the issue of functionality. The court did not
address any of the underlying policy issues implicated by the functionality doctrine or the larger questions of trade dress protection of product designs.
In comparison, in New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Florida,
Inc.,461 the Connecticut district court engaged in an in-depth analysis of available
alternative designs in considering summary judgment on the question of whether plaintiff’s revolver design was functional. After reviewing TrafFix and the
split in the circuits on the relevance of alternative design evidence, the court
concluded that the law no longer required consideration of design alternatives
but did not prohibit it either.462
[U]nder the present circumstances and given the nature of the product, the existence of design alternatives is helpful for determining whether a particular
design is truly necessary to the way the revolver works. . . . The mere existence of other designs does not satisfy that requirement as those designs may
be functionally deficient by comparison. Accordingly, for design alternatives
to be probative, Plaintiffs must produce evidence that could demonstrate that
the alternative design would be equally effective as a functional matter.463

The court then engaged in a feature-by-feature analysis of plaintiff’s revolver
configuration, concluding that there was no question of fact with respect to the
functionality of some features and that there were questions of fact with others.464
For example, the defendant asserted that the shape, style, composition
and finish of the revolver’s grip frame were functional in that they facilitated the
458
459
460

461
462
463
464

Id.
Id.
John M. Middleton, Inc. v. Swisher Int’l, Inc., No. 03-3908, 2006 WL 2129209, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. July 26, 2006).
312 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Conn. 2004).
Id. at 212–14.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 214–19.
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handling of the revolver, worked more effectively, and prevented oxidation.465
The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to raise a question of fact regarding this functionality as it did not establish that alternative choices would
work as well.466 On the other hand, the court found that there were questions of
fact regarding functionality with respect to the angle of the grip frame in relation
to the frame and barrel of the revolver.467 Whereas the plaintiff asserted that the
angle was cosmetic and not related to how the gun worked, the defendant asserted that the angle affected how the shooter would point the barrel of the
gun.468 The court found that it was not clear that the angle did not serve both a
useful and a cosmetic purpose and thus, could not find it functional or nonfunctional for purposes of summary judgment.469 The court engaged in a similar
step-by-step analysis of each element of the revolver configuration, considering
plaintiff’s asserted design alternatives and finding some elements functional as a
matter of law and finding questions of fact regarding the functionality of others.
In the end, the court held that it was inappropriate to grant summary judgment
with respect to the overall design of the revolver, since there were factual disputes requiring resolution with at least some of the gun’s features.
In Sharn, Inc. v. Wolfe Tory Medical, Inc.,470 the Florida district court
denied a preliminary injunction to Wolfe Tory because it found insufficient evidence to support its claim that the trade dress of its medical devices was nonfunctional.471 The court found that each of the device’s individual features
served “a function that is essential to the overall use or purpose”472 of those devices, additionally demonstrated by Wolfe Tory’s advertising touting the features’ advantages. In response, Wolfe Tory argued that “the sizes and geometry
of the various features . . . were chosen arbitrarily, and that the combination . . . created a finished product with a distinctive size and geometry . . . .”473
Wolfe asserted that there were numerous alternative features and arrangements

465
466
467

468
469
470
471
472
473

Id. at 219.
Id.
New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 218 (D. Conn.
2004).
Id.
Id.
No. 8:09-cv-706-T-33AEP, 2009 WL 3416503 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2009).
Id. at *8, *9.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.

Volume 50—Number 4

666

IDEA—The Intellectual Property Law Review

which would serve the same functions and thus its arrangement was nonfunctional.474
The court ruled that it was proper to consider alternative designs “because in order to determine if a product feature is essential to the use or purpose
of a product then logically the Court should consider other available like features that may accomplish the same purpose of a product without affecting the
cost or quality of the product.”475 The court failed to address how this conclusion was consistent with TrafFix. In the end, however, the court’s rule did not
affect the outcome in this case because it concluded that Wolfe Tory’s evidence
did not demonstrate “a single alternative design which would have a similar cost
and quality of the [Wolfe Tory] devices.”476 Thus, Wolfe Tory had failed to
meet its burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of its trade
dress claim.477
Most of these cases were decided on the basis of summary judgment
motions where any question of fact regarding functionality would be sufficient
to deny relief, but in Imig, Inc. v. Electrolux Home Care Products, Ltd.478 the
district court had the benefit of a full trial in reaching its conclusion that the
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the non-functionality of the its vacuum cleaner design.479 The defendant conceded that the design elements were not essential
to the use or purpose of the vacuum cleaner, but argued that they affected the
cost or quality of the product and were therefore functional.480 The court had
allowed evidence of alternative designs, but did not find it persuasive on the
issue of functionality.
In adducing evidence of alternative designs, Electrolux demonstrated that it
could have chosen a design that would produce a cheaper and more efficient
vacuum. . . . For example, instead of using a chrome hood on the base assem474
475
476

477

478
479
480

Id.
Id. at *6.
Sharn, Inc. v. Wolfe Tory Med., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-706-T-33AEP, 2009 WL 3416503, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2009).
In Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., No. 09-cv-00970-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL
3526497 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2009), the Colorado district court failed to discuss or even cite
TrafFix or Inwood in a case involving the trade dress of airgun pellets. It relied largely on
the fact that there were a number of design alternatives available in concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that the trade dress was functional, although the court denied
the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction based on insufficient evidence of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.
No. CV 05-0528(JO), 2008 WL 905898 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008).
Id. at *17.
Id. at *17.
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bly, Electrolux could have produced a more durable and less expensive product by using a plastic hood. . . . I can fairly draw an inference from Electrolux’s choice to use chrome for the hood that it viewed as worthwhile the tradeoff of cost and durability for what it deemed to be a more distinctive product
design. But such an inference does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that
the design of the [Electrolux] hood, when combined with the other elements,
is non-functional.481

The court then found that that product’s design did affect the overall cost and
quality of the product and was therefore functional, as discussed below.482
The varied approaches to the treatment of alternative designs, reflected
both in the split in the circuit courts as well as the decisions of the various district courts, is troubling and confusing. It remains unclear whether such evidence will be admissible at all, and if so, how it will be used in determinations
of functionality.
c.

Definitions of Functionality

Although the district court cases quote the “essential to use or purpose
or affect cost or quality” test of TrafFix, it is revealing to see how those courts
interpret and apply that language. For example, some interpret the language to
require that the plaintiff prove that other configurations will serve the same
function as well as the plaintiff’s design in order to be considered functional.
As the court said in New Colt Holding,483 “[F]or design alternatives to be probative, Plaintiffs must produce evidence that could demonstrate that the alternative
design would be equally effective as a functional matter.”484 If equivalent options are available, the design will be considered non-functional. Only when
there is no equivalent, and the plaintiff’s design is the best, will that design be
considered functional. This is similar to the approach in Wolfe Tory,485 where
the court wanted evidence that there were alternative designs that did not affect
“the devices’ optimal functionality” or “their cost and/or quality”486 before treating a design as non-functional. It is not enough that there are alternatives; those
alternatives must be comparable in functionality, cost and quality to the design
for which protection is being sought.

481
482
483
484
485
486

Id. at *9.
See infra notes 493–505 and accompanying text.
312 F. Supp. 2d. 195 (D. Conn. 2004).
Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
No. 8:09-cv-706-T-33AEP, 2009 WL 3416503 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2009).
Id. at *6.
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Other courts do not require that the design be the best in order to be
considered functional. For example, in Specialized Seating,487 the court said,
To be considered functional, the [design at issue] does not need to be the best
design available. All that must be shown is that the design is one of a few superior designs for its purpose or an improvement to the quality of the product.
Precluding a finding of functionality for a feature unless it was the best design
would essentially allow the creation of a monopoly for all but the best version
of a functional feature.488

Under this approach, in order for the design to be considered non-functional and
protectable, the plaintiff would need to show that enough other designs exist to
give competitors options for producing products to serve the same function.
Even if the plaintiff’s design is not the best, if there are too few competitive
options, these courts would deny the plaintiff trade dress protection. Thus, in
Specialized Seating, because the court found that there were only a limited
number of ways to design the back panels of folding chairs for strength, comfort
and spacing, it denied trade dress protection to that design.489
The Franek court took yet a different approach. In determining whether
a beach towel’s circular configuration was functional, the court said that “the
correct inquiry is whether or not the article reflects a utilitarian design of a utilitarian object.”490 The court interpreted this to mean that it should determine
whether the configuration was selected for a useful purpose.491 If the design was
chosen to serve a utilitarian purpose, then it should be considered functional.492
Under this approach, far more designs will be found to be functional as there is
no requirement that the design be superior or one of limited options.493

487
488

489

490
491
492
493

472 F. Supp. 2d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Id. at 1013 (citations omitted). See also Franek v. Walmart Stores, Inc., Nos. 08-CV-0058,
08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009) (“[A] design need not be the
best designs available for its purpose; it need only be one of a few superior designs.”).
Professor Thurmon argues that the equivalent design standard is preferable, as it best ensures
that competition will be protected. See Thurmon supra, note 16, at 300–02.
Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at *11.
Id.
Id.
In its actual analysis of a circular beach towel’s functionality, the court relied in large part on
evidence of both a patent and alternative designs to conclude that the configuration was not
only useful, but superior for achieving its purpose of allowing sunbathers to reposition themselves without moving the towel. Thus, the court seemed to apply a higher standard than the
one it had at first articulated as described above.
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That approach is also similar to the one taken in Berlin Packaging,494
where the court defined the test for functionality as requiring the party seeking
trade dress protection to show that the feature “is only an incidental, arbitrary or
ornamental aspect of the device.”495 Because the child-proof container cap at
issue was “not a whimsical design” but “designed to address specific functions,”
it was held to be functional.”496 Even the additional features such as the words
“pry open” and an arrow on the cap were considered functional because they
were “essential for the use of the device—they instruct the user of the device
how to operate it.”497 The court did not consider whether the design was superior or one of a few design choices available, but instead focused on the fact that
the design was utilitarian and not ornamental.498
In Invisible Fence,499 the court also considered whether the plaintiff had
demonstrated that the ridges of its battery pack coin slot were ornamental, incidental or arbitrary to its purpose of enabling users to lock and unlock the product, but only after it concluded that the patent established the essential functionality of the overall configuration.500 The court then discussed, in dicta, the general standard for proving functionality, saying that the test was not whether the
configuration served a use or purpose, but whether it was “essential to the use or
purpose.”501 The court compared this to the distinction made between de facto
and de jure functionality by some courts, where de jure, or legal functionality,
required not only that the design was useful but that the product worked better
in that configuration.502
494
495
496
497
498

499

500
501

502

Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 792 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Id. at 797.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 804.
See also Atlas Equip. Co., LLC v. Weir Slurry Group, Inc., No. C07-1358Z, 2009 WL
4670154, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2009) (a product design is de jure functional where
product design features all have a utilitarian function, even if those features do not contribute
to the central purpose of the product); Kodiak Prods. Co., Inc. v. Tie Down, Inc., No.
Civ.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004 WL 2599353, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004) (design of piston housing not shown to be arbitrary in relation to its purpose even if other alternatives are
available; design is functional if it is “the reason the device works or whether it affects the
cost or quality of the product”).
Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Techs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129 (N.D.
Ind. Jan. 26, 2007).
Id. at *2, *4, *6.
Id. at *7. The court had concluded that plaintiff’s patent established the essential functionality of the battery pack’s overall configuration.
Id. at *7 n.11.
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Finally, the Imig503 court also seemed to apply a rather lenient test for
functionality in concluding that the configuration of a vacuum cleaner was functional. In that case, the court was not applying the “essential to use or purpose”
prong of the TrafFix test but instead the “affects cost or quality” prong, as the
parties agreed that the design did not serve a useful purpose.504 The court’s
analysis of the evidence seemed to place an extremely heavy burden on the
plaintiff to prove that its design choices did not lower the cost or improve the
quality of the vacuum cleaner.
For example, the shape of the base assembly hood has a low profile that allows the vacuum to reach under furniture. . . . The prominent display on the
bag of the term “heavy duty commercial,” which is used commonly throughout the industry, suggests a descriptive or identifying function. . . . The use of
a dial for the height adjuster is less expensive than the alternative of a slide
lever . . . and the location in the front of the base is viewed as a “useful” feature.505

The court’s conclusion seems based on a view that if each element serves a purpose, then the overall configuration is functional, even if some choices were
more aesthetic than utilitarian, and even if for some choices, other design alternatives were available.
This spectrum of approaches to determining functionality is another example of the confusion that still afflicts the lower courts in attempting to decide
cases of product design trade dress in the aftermath of TrafFix.506 As seen in the
503

504
505
506

Imig, Inc. v. Electrolux Home Care Prods., Ltd., No. CV 05-0529(JO), 2008 WL 905898
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008).
Id. at *7, *9.
Id. at *9.
Another issue that has created some inconsistencies among the courts involves the approach
taken to designs involving multiple features. Some courts have recognized that even if each
individual element is functional, the overall configuration may still be non-functional if those
elements are arranged in an arbitrary or ornamental way. E.g., Minemyer v. B-Roc Representatives, Inc., No. 07-C-1763, 2009 WL 5275826, at *8 (N.D. Ill. October 26, 2009)
(where plaintiff failed to show that it assembled components of its plastic pipe couplers in an
arbitrary or fanciful way, it failed to meet its burden of proving that the overall arrangement
was non-functional); Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., No. H-08-0361, 2009 WL
1562179, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2009); Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P.,
472 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding that overall configuration of product
must be considered, but if “there is no other way to engineer or construct” the product, it is
functional); Kodiak Prods. Co., Inc. v. Tie Down, Inc., No. CIV.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004
WL 2599353, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004). Other courts fail to consider whether the
overall configuration itself may be non-functional even if each individual element is functional. See Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 792, 805 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (holding that where every element of design is functional, there is no need to consider
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next section, the approach of the TTAB is more consistent and predictable, but
its difference from the approach of the courts raises another set of difficult issues.
2.

TTAB Decisions on Functionality

In an article published in November 2004, Attorney John Welch reported that only one percent of the TTAB rulings since March 2000 had dealt
with trade dress issues and even fewer had dealt with issues of functionality.507
Attorney Welch opined: “This paucity of Board decisions may reflect a reluctance on the part of applicants to seek registration for trade dress in light of current case law. Or perhaps most trade dress applications are refused registration
and the refusal is not appealed.”508 Mr. Welch reported that there had been eleven decisions in that time period which addressed functionality, only three of
which had been deemed citable by the TTAB.509 All three had upheld the denial
of registration on functionality grounds. Mr. Welch’s analysis of these three
cases and the eight other non-citable cases led him to conclude that the MortonNorwich factors were still critical to the TTAB’s functionality analysis and that
“a utility patent disclosing or claiming the utilitarian advantages of the trade
dress, and/or promotional material touting those advantages, will be roadblocks
to registration.”510
In the years since November 2004, not much has changed in the approach taken by the TTAB, although there are far more recent decisions addressing the issue of functionality. The Board continues to affirm an overwhelming number of refusals and sustain oppositions to register product design
on the basis of functionality. It continues to rely on the Morton-Norwich factors

507

508
509
510

alternative designs or secondary meaning); New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla.,
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 219 (D. Conn. 2004) (“If there are factual disputes as to the individual elements, then it follows that there would be a factual dispute as to whether these individual features add up to a functional whole.”).
John L. Welch, Trade Dress and the TTAB: If Functionality Don’t Get You, Nondistinctiveness Will, ALLEN’S TRADEMARK DIG., Nov. 2004, at 9, available at http://www.lla.com/welch/tradeDressTTABOCT2004.pdf.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
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in reaching those conclusions.511 A review of some representative decisions will
illustrate the TTAB’s approach.
a.

Cases Involving Utility Patents

In American Flange & Manufacturing Co. v. Rieke Corp.,512 the Board
sustained an opposition on functionality grounds to an application to register the
configuration of a closure that consisted of a hexagonal base and a butterflyshaped grip used for turning to seal drum containers.513 The Board first observed that the appropriate functionality test used by the Board in light of Valu
Engineering’s interpretation of TrafFix was the Morton-Norwich test, which
identified four factors, including the existence of a utility patent related to the
product configuration at issue.514 In analyzing the patents in the case before it,
the Board revealed its approach to interpreting the relevance of a particular patent to a determination of functionality.
The Board separated its product design analysis into two components;
the hexagonal base and the butterfly grip, and stated that if either was functional, then registration should not be granted.515 With respect to the hexagonal
base, the fact that the patent relied on by the opposer was not owned by the applicant was rejected as irrelevant.516 The Board said, “Any expired patent is
potentially relevant if it covers the feature at issue, regardless of the owner.”517
It then went on to reject the applicant’s argument that because the patent application had been filed after the base was already in use, the patent was not di-

511

512
513
514

515

516
517

E.g., Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1403 (T.T.A.B.
2006), withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B.
2009); In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1509 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
Am. Flange, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1397.
Id. at 1411.
Id. at 1403. The Board also observed that the “applicant bears the ultimate burden on the
issue of functionality” once the opposer (or the examiner in a refusal) has made a prima facie
showing of functionality such as evidence of a utility patent relating to the product’s configuration. Id. at 1404.
Id. For further discussion of this aspect of the Board’s approach, see infra notes 603–605
and accompanying text.
Id.
Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1404 (T.T.A.B. 2006),
withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009); accord In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1627 (T.T.A.B. 2009); In re Woodlink, Ltd.,
No. 78971622, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at *12–13 (T.T.A.B. July 17, 2009) (not precedential).
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rected to the hexagonal shape, but rather to a particular means of sealing the
drum containers. The Board said:
Applicant may be correct in noting that the hexagonal base was in use long
prior to the patent application and that the patent was “directed to” a sealing
means rather than the hexagonal base. Nonetheless, the patent language clearly refers to the functional advantage of the hexagonal base, that is, “to accommodate a standard wrench.” Thus the terms of the patent indicate that the
feature is a functional one and not an “ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”518

In contrast, in its analysis of the butterfly-shaped grip’s functionality,
the Board found that although there was a utility patent for a “transverse raised
handle,” the patent did not specify that the handle needed to be butterflyshaped.519 The Board concluded that although the grip need not have been the
“primary object of the patent,”520 the fact that the language never identified the
butterfly shape meant that the patent was not evidence that feature’s functionality.
Similarly, in In re Howard Leight Industries LLC,521 the Board upheld a
refusal to register the configuration of foam ear plugs where the examiner had
relied on a utility patent as evidence of functionality.522 The applicant sought
registration for the ear plugs’ design—a bullet shape with a flared end—and
argued on appeal that the examiner had erred in relying on the patent claims to
establish functionality because those claims did not specifically address the
functionality of that particular shape.523 The Board disagreed, concluding that
TrafFix did not restrict the evidentiary use of a patent to its claims, but rather
allowed for the use of specifications and arguments in the patent’s prosecution
history to establish functionality.524 The Board then incorporated large segments
of the patent application into its opinion, including the claims, and concluded
that the patent in this case was “a sufficient basis in itself for finding that the
configuration is functional, given the strong weight to be accorded such patent
evidence under TrafFix.”525 The Board reasoned that although the “primary
focus of the patented invention is the composition of the foam material out of
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525

Am. Flange, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1404.
Id. at 1410.
Id.
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1515.
Id.
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which the earplug is formed,”526 the patent also disclosed the functional advantages of both the bullet shape and the flared end in its claims and preferred embodiment description. The bullet shape allowed the plug to fit into the ear canal,
and the flared end prevented too deep of an insertion. Thus, the Board concluded that neither aspect of the product design was an “arbitrary or incidental
design flourish, but rather [they are] essential to the proper functioning of the
earplug.”527
On the other hand, in In re Udor U.S.A. Inc.,528 the Board, while still affirming the refusal to register a spray nozzle’s configuration on grounds of functionality because of other evidence,529 disagreed with the examiner’s use of the
nozzle’s utility patent as evidence of functionality.530 The Board compared the
drawings submitted for trademark registration with the patent drawings and description, and concluded that the patent did not show or describe the external
appearance of the nozzle for which trademark registration was being sought, but
rather the patent was limited to the nozzle’s internal workings:
As we understand the teachings of this utility patent, it is clear that the spray
patterns of these removable/changeable nozzle heads are determined by rather
complex principles of physics. . . . While we do not purport to understand fluid mechanics, we accept the teachings of this patent that the tuned interaction
of pressurized fluids hitting an impingement surface and the deflection ridges
determines the variety of dispersion patterns of these various nozzle heads.
These features are internal, largely non-visible components of the spray nozzle that are neither shown nor described in the trademark drawing, and some
of which are not readily apparent without disassembly of the spray nozzle.
....
. . . The product features shown and described in the trademark configuration design do not serve a function within the terms of the utility patent, and
are not shown as useful parts of the claimed invention.531

Thus, the Board found that the patent was not convincing evidence of the applicant’s nozzle configuration functionality.532
Based on the treatment of the patents in these cases, it appears that the
Board is willing to consider a utility patent to be strong evidence of functionali526
527
528
529
530
531
532

Id. at 1514.
In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1514 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
Id. at 1988; see infra notes 572–579 and accompanying text.
Udor, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1982.
Id. at 1981–82.
Id. at 1982.
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ty as long as there is language in the patent, its prosecution history, or its preferred embodiment that relates to the usefulness of the specific configuration,
even if that configuration is not the “primary object” of the patent.533 This approach gives greater weight to patent evidence than that adopted by those courts
which require that the product configuration overlap with the “central advance”
of the patent in order for it to be strong evidence of functionality.534 Thus, it is
likely far more difficult to obtain trademark registration of product design if
there is a related utility patent than it is to obtain protection under section 43(a)
for unregistered product design even when there is a related utility patent.
b.

Evidence of Advertising Touting the Utilitarian
Advantages of Product Design

The Board also gives substantial weight to the second Morton-Norwich
factor, evidence of advertising that touts the utilitarian advantages of a product’s
configuration. In those cases where there is a patent, the Board has relied on

533

534

See also In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1633, 1635 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (utility
patent supports finding of functionality of bicycle wheel spoke arrangement even if applicant’s specific arrangement is not identical to the preferred embodiment; Board asserts that
“[t]he fact that the patents may encompass a wide variety of spoking patterns means only that
the patents are broad in scope, not that applicant’s particular applied-for design is not functional”); In re Woodlink, Ltd., No. 78971622, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at *14 (T.T.A.B. July
17, 2009) (not precedential) (utility patent is strong evidence of functionality of bird feeder
design); In re Tash, Nos. 76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *6–7, *8–9
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2008) (not precedential) (applicant’s toilet plunger utility patent is evidence of functionality even if patent claims are broader than the specific configuration
claimed in the trademark application where description in patent identified the utility of that
configuration); In re Richemont Int’l, S.A., Nos. 76413051, 76413157, 2006 TTAB LEXIS
251, at *27–28, *33 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2006) (not precedential) (watch configuration which
allows watch face to be reversed for protection is functional; utility patent covered the specific configuration, and fact that applicant uses new technology in its design does not render the
patent less relevant or prove that the configuration is not functional); In re The Kong Co.,
LLC, No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854, at *11–12 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006) (evidence
of patent supports finding of pet toy functionality, even though trademark application did not
define configuration to include key elements of the patent, whereas the drawing included
with the trademark application revealed said elements); cf. In re Karsten Mfg. Corp., No.
77170356, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256, at *16–18 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2009) (not precedential)
(although Board finds that patent claims cover applicant’s golf putter configuration and thus
are evidence of its functionality, Board, in dicta, opined that a patent must be examined
closely to be sure that the features described or depicted within are actually functional, and
not just incidental or unrelated to that function).
See supra notes 363–379 and accompanying text.
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advertising evidence to bolster its finding of functionality.535 On the other hand,
the absence of such evidence has not been enough to outweigh the utility patent
evidence of functionality.536
Advertising evidence has been given more substantial weight in cases
where no utility patent exists. For example, in In re N.V. Organon,537 the Board
relied largely on the applicant’s marketing claims touting the advantages of using orange flavoring in antidepressants in finding that the flavor was functional
and thus non-registrable.538 The Board observed that the absence of patent evidence, as well as the absence of evidence that there was a cost advantage in using the orange flavoring, did not mean that there was insufficient evidence of
functionality given the advertising evidence and the lack of available alternatives, the other two Morton-Norwich factors.539 The Board observed that “[t]he
second Morton-Norwich factor, namely applicant’s promotional materials touting the utilitarian advantages of the orange flavor, is particularly significant in
assessing functionality in this case.”540 The applicant’s website claimed that the
orange flavor made the medication more palatable and thus resulted in increased
patient compliance—evidence that was considered persuasive of its utilitarian
advantages over non-flavored medication.541
Similarly, in In re Gratnell’s Limited,542 the Board relied solely on advertising evidence and the lack of available alternatives in finding that the appli-

535

536

537
538
539
540

541

542

See, e.g., In re Woodlink, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at *14–15 (not precedential); In re Karsten, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256, at *17–18; In re Tash, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *8–10; In re
Elevator Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al., 2007 TTAB LEXIS 501, at *21–22 (T.T.A.B.
Feb. 21, 2007) (not precedential); Am. Flange & Mfg Co. v. Rieke, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1397, 1405 (T.T.A.B. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
See In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1635, 1636; In re Udor U.S.A. Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1978, 1982 (T.T.A.B. 2009); In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1507, 1517–18 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
Id. at 1645.
Id. at 1646.
Id. at 1645. The Board concluded that the flavoring, by increasing patient compliance and
thus the efficacy of the medication, functioned in a utilitarian way, not merely aesthetically.
Id. at 1647–49. As discussed infra notes 583–586 and accompanying text., however, the
Board’s analysis of the appropriate test here is not entirely consistent with that conclusion.
As discussed below, the Board also found that there were not enough alternative flavors
available to provide competitors with other options. See infra notes 583–586 and accompanying text.
No. 78450327, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 187 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2009) (not precedential).
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cant’s configuration of its plastic trays was functional.543 In its advertising, the
applicant promoted the fact that the trays were stackable, space-saving, sturdier,
safer to grip, and that the design allowed the tray’s contents to be visible.544 The
Board rejected the applicant’s argument that these statements were “mere puffery,” as they “point to specific characteristics of applicant’s product.”545
On the other hand, in In re Brayco Products, Ltd.,546 the Board found
that advertising evidence relied upon by the examiner was not sufficient to establish functionality.547 Where the advertising did not specifically assert that the
elongated oval configuration of a flashlight claimed as trade dress made it a
superior product, then that advertising was not persuasive evidence of the design’s functionality.548
c.

Evidence of the Availability or Not of Alternative
Designs

Despite the TrafFix language that indicates that evidence of alternative
designs is not an essential part of the functionality analysis, the Board consistently considers such evidence, even in cases where a utility patent has clearly
established the functionality of a product’s design. For example, in In re Howard Leight,549 as discussed above, the Board relied heavily on the utility patent
evidence to conclude that the design of the applicant’s earplugs was functional,
in fact saying that the patent evidence was “a sufficient basis in itself for finding
that the configuration is functional, given the strong weight to be accorded such
patent evidence under TrafFix.”550 As such, the Board stated that there was no
need to consider alternatives in light of TrafFix and Valu Engineering, but nevertheless considered that evidence and concluded that the applicant’s earplug
shape was “one of but few possible alternative designs which provide these features and serve these functions.”551
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551

Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *7.
Id.
No. 77296052, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 666 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2009).
Id. at *6–7.
Id.
In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1518 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
Id. at 1515.
Id. The Board further observed:
However, even if some of these alternative designs are deemed to be functionally equivalent designs and thus are evidence in support of a finding of non-
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In American Flange,552 the Board analyzed two features, including the
hexagonal-shaped plug base made by applicant for securing storage drums.553
The base’s functionality was demonstrated by a utility patent, as discussed
above. In spite of finding that patent to be strong evidence of functionality, the
Board went on to examine in considerable depth the availability of alternative
designs to bolster its conclusion. The opposer presented evidence that there
were two dominant ways on the market to configure the plugs’ base: hexagonal,
like the applicant’s design, and round, the system then used by the opposer.554
The opposer pointed out certain advantages to the hexagonal shape, principally
that it was easier to grip with a standard wrench.555 Applicant asserted that other
wrenches were available to turn the round shape base and that other shapes
could be used with other wrenches.556 The Board was not convinced, finding
that the hexagonal shape was “in many ways optimal”557 and that other shapes,
including the round shape, were harder to grip for opening and closing. Thus,
the lack of suitable alternative designs was further evidence of the hexagonal
base’s functionality.558

552

553
554
555
556
557
558

functionality, we find that this evidence is simply outweighed, in our functionality analysis, by the clear and strong evidence of functionality contained in
applicant’s expired utility patent.
Id. at 1516. See also In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1636 (T.T.A.B. 2009)
(where a feature is found to affect the quality of a product, there is no need to consider alternative designs to establish competitive necessity) (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2001)); In re Elevator Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al.,
2007 TTAB LEXIS 501, at *29–32 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 2007) (not precedential) (citing Valu
Eng’g, the Board stated that “the fact that other competitive alternatives may exist, does not
alter the initial finding that the configuration is functional and, thus, unregistrable”; the
Board then went on to look at alternatives and concluded that the evidence did not refute the
superiority of applicant’s design to those alternatives); In re Bose Corp., No. 74734496, 2005
TTAB LEXIS 293, at *26, *29–30 (T.T.A.B. July 12, 2005), aff’d, 476 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (evidence about other designs not necessary in light of other evidence of functionality
from patent and advertising; moreover, evidence of such alternatives does not indicate that
other alternatives function as well as applicant’s speakers).
Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1404 (T.T.A.B. 2006),
withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1407.
Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1409 (T.T.A.B. 2006),
withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009). On
the other hand, as discussed infra notes 552–558 and accompanying text, the evidence re-
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Similarly, in In re Richemont International, S.A.,559 the Board specifically considered the fact that there were only a few alternatives to the plaintiff’s
reversible watch configuration in support of its finding of functionality.560 The
applicant had introduced evidence of three other reversible watches, each of
which used a different mechanism to reverse the face of the watch.561 The Board
reviewed this evidence and concluded that “while there may be minor variations
in how the watch may be reversed, there are only two basic ways: horizontally
or vertically.”562 The fact that the patent also demonstrated the superiority of the
horizontal mechanism used by the applicant was also considered by the Board in
concluding that there were too few equivalent alternative designs and therefore
the applicant’s design was functional.563
The Board also upheld a finding of functionality in In re Karsten Manufacturing Corp.,564 based on the strong utility patent evidence covering the applicant’s golf putter configuration and the lack of available alternative designs.565 Despite the fact that the applicant introduced evidence of eighteen alternative designs manufactured by its competitors of “high moment of inertia
putter heads,” the Board was not convinced.566

559
560
561
562
563

564
565
566

garding the lack of design alternatives for the butterfly-shaped handle used to turn the base of
the plug, for which the Board had found no probative evidence of functionality in the utility
patent, was not sufficient to establish functionality. The Board accepted the applicant’s assertion that other handles, including that used by the opposer, worked as well, if not better,
than the butterfly-shaped handle used by the applicant. Id. at 1410. The Board did not discuss how many possible alternatives there were, or whether the butterfly-shape was one of
only a few configurations that would work as well.
Nos. 76413051, 76413157, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 251 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2006).
Id. at *39–40.
Id.
Id. at *39.
Id. at *40–41. See also In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1636 (T.T.A.B. 2009)
(“[T]he question is not whether there are alternative designs that perform the same basic
function but whether the available designs work ‘equally well.’”); In re Tash, Nos.
76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *10–11 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2008) (“Furthermore, in order for a mark to be held functional, the evidence need not establish that the
configuration at issue is the very best design for the particular product or product packaging.
Rather, a finding of functionality is proper where the evidence indicates that the configuration at issue provides specific utilitarian advantages that make it one of a few superior designs available.”) (emphasis added).
No. 77170356, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2009).
Id. at *18, *21, *23.
Id. at *20–21.
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Although this evidence shows a variety of designs that are specifically different, all are similar in design and involve the same utilitarian features. . . .
These other designs presumably work equally well, but the number of alternatives to increase the moment of inertia in a putter head is relatively limited.567

This conclusion illustrates how difficult it may be for an applicant to
use evidence of alternative designs to establish non-functionality in the face of a
utility patent. Although the Board concluded that this evidence weighed against
a finding of functionality, it relied on TrafFix in observing that “[i]t is important
to note, however, that the availability of alternative designs does not convert a
functional design into a non-functional design.”568 Thus, even if there was more
persuasive evidence of equivalent design alternatives, the Board might not have
found non-functionality here.
The Board’s reluctance to rely on design alternatives as evidence of
non-functionality in the face of a utility patent is also demonstrated by In re The
Kong Co.569 This case involved the registrability of applicant’s dog toy, which
was covered by a patent claiming it as a teeth cleaning product based on its
shape and grooves.570 Applicant asserted that there were many differently
shaped dog toys on the market, but the Board did not find that evidence probative of non-functionality because it did “not see a single example of a product
which is functionally equivalent to applicant’s product from the standpoint of
dental hygiene.”571
Thus, where there is a utility patent which demonstrates the functionality of a product configuration, the Board will look at evidence of available alternatives despite TrafFix’s statement that such evidence is not necessary once
functionality has been established by other evidence. The Board, however, appears to view such alternatives from a perspective which makes it very unlikely
that such evidence will outweigh the patent as evidence of functionality. By
requiring that those alternatives be few in number and function in a way that is
equivalent to the applicant’s design, the Board has made it very difficult for an
applicant to use alternative designs to prove non-functionality in a case where
there is a relevant utility patent.
Where the patent does not establish the functionality of the product configuration, or there is no patent, the Board relies more on the evidence of alternative designs, but again, in a way that makes it unlikely that a design will be
567
568
569
570
571

Id. at *21.
Id. at *22.
No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006).
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *19.
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considered non-functional. For example, in In re Udor U.S.A. Inc.,572 the Board
seemed quite reluctant to allow for registration of a spray nozzle design, even
though it concluded that the utility patent was not probative of functionality
because it did not relate to the product’s external appearance.573 Not only was
the patent irrelevant, there was no evidence of advertising touting the functional
advantages of the design.574 In finding functionality, the Board thus relied
heavily on the lack of available alternative designs. The Board criticized the
examiner for giving “relatively-short shrift”575 to the lack of evidence regarding
available design alternatives. The Board said that there were no alternative designs presented by the applicant in the record and that “[t]here is certainly no
point in our speculating about hypothetical alternatives . . . .”576 In fact, the
record demonstrated that competitors were producing nozzles very similar to the
applicant’s, although none was identical.577 Based on this common use, the
Board concluded that the nozzle’s shape was not “an arbitrary flourish in the
configuration of metal spray nozzles” and was therefore functional.578
The Udor decision is a good example of a case where the Board was
willing to stretch quite far to find that a configuration was functional. Without
patent evidence or advertising touting functionality, the Board relied on the fact
that competitors were using a similar but not identical nozzle shape and the applicant’s failure to produce evidence of alternative designs to reach a conclusion
that the shape was not arbitrary, but a functional element of the product. As
discussed below, the Board also relied on the lack of evidence demonstrating
that the shape was easier or less expensive to manufacture than other shapes.
The Board did not believe that the applicant had produced sufficient evidence
on the third and fourth Morton-Norwich factors, ignoring the fact that the burden initially falls on the examiner to establish functionality in registration decisions. The Board justified its conclusions by stating that “the decision-maker
should ensure that one who seeks to establish trade dress protection in a product
configuration does not stifle competition due to uncertainty about exactly which
non-patentable product designs adopted by the junior user might comprise in572
573
574

575
576
577
578

89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
See id. at 1982.
Id. The Board also relied on the fourth Morton-Norwich factor, the simplicity and cost of
manufacturing the nozzle in applicant’s configuration, as discussed below. See infra note
588.
In re Udor, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1982.
Id. at 1983.
Id.
In re Udor U.S.A. Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978, 1984 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
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fringing trademark configurations.”579 The Board seemed to be leaning over
backwards to prevent registration of a shape that it considered utilitarian and too
similar to what competitors were already using.
This demanding standard for using alternative designs to establish nonfunctionality is also illustrated by Gratnell’s,580 involving the registrability of
stacking trays. There was no patent, but there was advertising evidence touting
the advantages of the applicant’s configuration.581 Applicant submitted two examples of alternative designs of stackable trays but the Board was not persuaded, finding that the alternatives, in fact, “highlight the superiority of applicant’s design for monitoring content, handling and storage because of the combination of the recessed front, flanged edges and flat surfaces incorporated into
applicant’s design.”582
Similarly, in Organon,583 the Board was not persuaded by evidence of
other flavors that could be used to make medications more palatable in concluding that the orange flavoring used by the applicant was functional.584 The Board
observed that Federal Circuit precedent established that “the mere fact that other
designs are available does not necessarily mean that applicant’s design is not
functional. . . . The question is not whether there are alternative flavors that
would perform the same basic function, but whether these flavors work ‘equally
well.’”585 Because there was evidence suggesting that not all flavors mask the
taste of medication as well as orange, and the fact that applicant only offered
cherry and grape as alternatives, the Board concluded,
Although we cannot definitively say that orange is the most popular flavor, it
certainly would appear on the short list of most popular flavors. Thus, on this
record, we cannot say that there are true alternatives, or at least a significant
number of acceptable alternatives, to an orange flavor for antidepressants.586

579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586

Id. at 1986.
In re Gratnell’s Ltd., No. 78450327, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 187 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2009).
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *8.
In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
Id. at 1648.
Id. at 1645.
Id. at 1646. See also In re Armament Sys. & Procedures, Inc., No. 75107678, 2005 TTAB
LEXIS 384, at *35, *43, *50 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2005) (not precedential) (despite availability of other colors, red, used to designate non-working weapons used for training purposes,
was deemed functional because common usage had established red as the color that signaled
that a weapon was not real and there were too few other bright colors that would work as
well as a visual cue); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil-Quaker State Co., Opposition No. 91120520,
2004 TTAB LEXIS 397, at *21–22 (T.T.A.B. May 28, 2004) (not precedential) (Although
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In sum, whether or not there is a patent, the Board places a heavy burden on the applicant to present persuasive evidence that alternatives exist, that
there are more than a few, and that those alternatives are equivalent, or better,
than the applicant’s design. Even with such evidence, the applicant is unlikely
to overcome the weight of the evidence of functionality presented by a utility
patent. Without such evidence, the Board is likely to conclude that the design is
functional, even if no patent exists and there is no advertising touting the advantages of the product.
d.

Evidence that the Design Is Comparatively Cheap or
Simple to Manufacture

The fourth Morton-Norwich factor, which considers the relative cost
and simplicity of manufacturing the applicant’s product, appears to be treated as
the least important of the four factors in recent cases. In some cases,587 the
Board has not addressed this factor at all, and in others,588 it has found that there
is simply insufficient evidence regarding this factor and that it remains neutral
in the overall analysis.
Even in those cases where there is some evidence that the plaintiff’s
product is either more expensive or more difficult to manufacture, the Board has
downplayed the significance of this factor. For example, in In re The Kong

587

588

the Board recognized that the law gives more leeway for packaging and container design than
for product design, it held that the clear color was functional where applicant sought to register it in relation to motor oil containers, in part based on the limited alternatives available, i.e.
opaque containers, and the advantages touted in advertising).
E.g., In re Tash, Nos. 76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 18,
2008); In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507 (T.T.A.B. 2006); In re
Baby Bjorn AB, No. 75751554, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 666 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2004).
E.g., In re Gratnell’s Ltd., No. 78450327, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 187, at *9 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 9,
2009); Am. Flange & Mfg Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1409, 1410
(T.T.A.B. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1127 (T.T.A.B.
2009); In re Richemont Int’l, S.A., Nos. 76413051, 76413157, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 251, at
*41–42 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2006); In re Udor U.S.A. Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978, 1985
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (evidence of relative cost of manufacturing is conclusory); In re Elevator
Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al., 2007 TTAB LEXIS 501, at *30–32 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 21,
2007) (applicant’s vice president statement that he is not aware that product is simpler or easier to manufacture than others was not enough to establish non-functionality); cf. In re Bose
Corp., No. 74734496, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 293, at *30 (T.T.A.B. July 12, 2005), aff’d, 476
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (examiner’s reliance on statement in patent that configuration is
“relatively easy and inexpensive to manufacture” considered sufficient evidence of functionality on this factor).
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Co.,589 the applicant introduced evidence that other pet toys were less, or as costly, as the applicant’s product.590 The Board considered such evidence unpersuasive: “Even if applicant’s design is more expensive to manufacture than the ordinary pet toy, the functional advantages of Applicant’s product in the area of
dental health may very well outweigh any increase in cost.”591 Similarly, in In
re N.V. Organon,592 the Board commented in a footnote that
Even if the addition of an orange flavor to applicant’s pharmaceuticals adds to
the cost of manufacture, such additional cost does not prove that orange flavoring is a non-functional feature of the goods. Indeed, improving the utilitarian features of a product may dictate that the manufacturing process be more
expensive or complicated.593

Thus, in the overall analysis, the relative cost or simplicity of manufacturing a
product does not seem to play an important role in the Board’s determinations of
functionality.
e.

Viewing the Whole Versus the Parts of a Product

Consistent with its general reluctance to find a product configuration
non-functional, the Board has not been persuaded to find non-functionality
simply because some features or aspects of a product’s configuration may be
arbitrary or incidental. In In re The Kong Co.,594 the Board explained its approach. In that case, the applicant asserted that there were a number of non589
590
591
592
593

594

No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006).
Id. at *22.
Id.
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
Id. at 1651 n.7. See also In re Woodlink, Ltd., No. 78971622, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at
*17 (T.T.A.B. July 17, 2009) (not precedential) (“Even if applicant’s design is no more expensive to manufacture than other bird feeders, the functional advantages of applicant’s
product nonetheless afford applicant a competitive advantage.”); In re Dietrich, 91
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1637 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (“[E]ven if applicant’s wheels with this design are more costly to produce, and while a lower manufacturing cost may be indicative of
the functionality of a product feature, a higher cost does not detract from the functionality of
that feature.”); In re Karsten Mfg Co., No. 77170356, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256, at *22–23
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2009) (although evidence that applicant’s golf putter is not relatively
cheap or simple to manufacture weighs in favor of finding non-functionality, the Board still
concludes functionality based on other factors); American Flange, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1409 (“If
the evidence related to other factors, on balance, indicates that the hexagonal base is functional, the functional advantages may very well outweigh the rather minor increase in cost [of
manufacturing the hexagonal base].”).
No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006).
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functional, arbitrary elements to the configuration of its dog toy, including the
shape of the rubberized element, the position of the rope, and the number and
placement of the grooves.595 The Board considered those features “incidental
and of little importance in determining whether the mark is functional overall.”596 The Board reasoned:
The reason for this rule is self evident—the right to copy better working designs would, in due course, be stripped of all meaning if overall functional designs were accorded trademark protection because they included a few arbitrary and nonfunctional features.597

Similarly, in In re Elevator Safety Co.,598 the applicant asserted that the
examiner had erred in finding its product configuration functional because she
had dissected the configuration into its parts rather than considering functionality based on the overall configuration.599 The Board disagreed, stating that before
a design can be considered registrable, the entire configuration must be nonfunctional.600 In this case, the Board concluded:
The configurations are by their nature functional because the designs bring the
functional features together and the configurations retain the functional aspects of their parts. They are, in the end, only the sum of their parts, inasmuch
as the various patents of record show the way in which the parts are put together and interact.601

The Board thus seems less willing than some courts602 to consider whether a
configuration of useful features may be non-functional when arranged in an
arbitrary or ornamental manner.
This reluctance to find a design non-functional even if part of the design
is non-functional is most dramatically seen in American Flange & Manufacturing,603 where the Board considered only two features of the applicant’s drum cap
595
596
597

598

599
600
601
602
603

Id. at *14.
Id. at *15.
Id.; accord In re Tash, Nos. 76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *11 (T.T.A.B.
Apr. 18, 2008) (“Where the evidence shows that the overall design is functional however,
the inclusion of a few arbitrary or otherwise nonfunctional features in the design will not
change the result.”).
In re Elevator Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al., 2007 TTAB LEXIS 501 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 21,
2007) (not precedential).
Id. at *27–28.
Id.
Id. at *27.
See supra note 506.
Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397 (T.T.A.B. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
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or plug: the hexagonal shaped base and the butterfly shaped handle.604 The
Board found that the butterfly shaped handle was non-functional but despite this
fact, it still found that the device’s overall configuration was functional because
the hexagonal shaped base was functional.605 That is, even where there are only
two features, the functionality of one feature will outweigh the non-functionality
of the other in an overall functionality determination.
f.

Board Findings of Non-Functionality: Two Cases

As the discussion above reveals, the Board has generally upheld refusals
to register on the basis of functionality. Relying heavily on the Morton-Norwich
factors, in particular evidence of a utility patent, the Board has in almost every
case found that the configuration of a useful product is functional and nonregistrable. In recent years, there have been only two clear cases606 where the
Board has found that the configuration of a product is non-functional.
In Triforest Enterprises, Inc. v. Nalge Nunc International Corp.,607 the
applicant sought to register the overall shape of a plastic water bottle, sold as an
empty bottle, not as a container for another product.608 The bottle was transparent, cylindrical in shape with rounded “shoulders,” a narrow neck, a screw cap,
and a flat bottom.609 The opposer, a competitor of the applicant, claimed that the
shape was functional.
604
605

606

607

608
609

Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1411. The Board suggested that if the applicant had sought registration of just the
butterfly-shaped handle alone, the result could have been different, but seeking registration of
the two features together correctly resulted in a finding of non-registrability. Id.
In American Flange, the Board did conclude that one feature of the applicant’s product was
non-functional—the butterfly-shaped handle on its plug. The Board found no relevant patent, no advertising touting the handle’s advantages, no indication that the shape was easier
or less expensive to make, and “numerous alternative designs which would work equally
well . . . .” Id. at 1409–11. Despite finding this feature non-functional, however, the Board
went on to conclude that the overall configuration, that is, the combination of the butterfly
shaped handle and the hexagonal shaped base, was functional and non-registrable. See supra
notes 603–605 and accompanying text. In Duramax Marine LLC v. R.W. Fernstrum & Co.,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (T.T.A.B. 2006), the Board concluded that a two-dimensional
drawing of a useful product could not be held to be functional where the registration was for
the actual drawing and not for the three-dimensional shape of the product itself. Id. at 1793.
Thus, Duramax cannot be considered a decision finding a product configuration itself to be
non-functional.
Opposition No. 91165809, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 578 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2008) (not precedential).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–2.
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In an opinion that does not even cite TrafFix but merely relies on the
Morton-Norwich factors, the Board rejected the opposer’s claim of functionality. On the first factor, the evidence of utility patents, the Board found that the
patents the opposer submitted as evidence were not relevant as they related to
products that were not plastic water bottles.610 There was also no evidence of
any touting of the bottle shape’s utilitarian advantages by the applicant. With
respect to the third factor, the Board found that “the record is replete with evidence of alternative designs. . . . [W]hile each incorporates some of the features
of applicant’s bottle design, there are still other features which give each design
an overall look that is different from applicant’s design.”611 Regarding the
fourth factor, the Board found that the opposer had not submitted any evidence
that the applicant’s design was cheaper or easier to manufacture, but rather that
there was evidence that the bottle was more expensive and complicated to make
than alternative designs.612 Without further analysis, the Board, after this somewhat cursory review of the Morton-Norwich factors, concluded that the design
was not functional and dismissed the opposition.613
This decision is troubling for a number of reasons. First, it is troubling
that the Board did not cite TrafFix or Valu Engineering, nor did it engage in any
in-depth analysis of the policy implications of its decision to allow this shape to
be registered. Secondly, it is troubling because the Board did not give any
weight to evidence that the shape of the bottle was one that had been commonly
used by others in the marketplace for a long time, evidence that might suggest a
competitive need for such a shape. Moreover, the Board found unpersuasive the
fact that the applicant’s own president had testified as to the many utilitarian
advantages of its bottle configuration.
Although the decision may be explained away as a case of poor lawyering,614 it is illustrative of the dangers that are presented by a principle that allows
for registration and protection of product configurations. It seems quite absurd
that a company would be entitled to stop others from copying the useful configuration of a water bottle already prevalent in the marketplace, merely because
that company is the first to seek registration and where others, such as the op610
611
612
613

614

Id. at *2.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *20.
Triforest Enters., Inc. v. Nalge Nunc Int’l Corp., Opposition No. 91165809, 2008 TTAB
LEXIS 578, at *20–21 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2008) (not precedential).
Apparently, the opposer had failed to raise lack of acquired distinctiveness as a basis for
denying registration, an argument that might have been more successful, given the fact that
the shape was commonly used by others in the market. Id. at *21.
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poser in this case, are unable to come forward with sufficient evidence under the
Morton-Norwich factors to block registration. If there is no patent and no advertising which touts the advantages, it may theoretically be very difficult for
the opposer (or an examiner) to come forward with evidence proving there are
not any suitable alternatives, and that the applicant’s configuration is cheaper
and easier to make than those alternatives. The fact that in most of the cases
before it, the Board has had a patent to rely on, or advertising to point to in support of finding functionality, does not mitigate the risks presented by cases such
as Triforest, where there was no such evidence on those first two factors to
make a persuasive case for functionality. Given how little attention is ordinarily
paid to the fourth factor, this means that in some cases, only the third factor, the
availability of alternative designs, will be determinative of the result. Since that
factor is the one that the Supreme Court identified as not essential to a determination of functionality, it seems ironic that for registration purposes, it will carry
the most weight in cases where there is no pertinent utility patent.
This was demonstrated even more recently in In re Brayco Products,
Ltd.,615 a case involving a flashlight configuration. The design claimed as trade
dress was “an elongated oval light casing having one end featuring a similarly
formed transparent window for covering an array of lights beneath the transparent window.”616 There were no relevant patents, the advertising did not tout the
advantages of the specific features of the configuration, and there was no evidence that the applicant’s design was less costly or easier to manufacture.617 In
reversing the examiner, the Board seemed particularly interested in the wide
range of alternative flashlight designs, introduced into evidence by the applicant, none of which used an elliptical cylindrical shape like the applicant’s. On
the basis of this evidence, the Board concluded that “the elongated oval design
applicant seeks to register does not appear to be essential to competition,”618 and
thus reversed the examiner’s refusal to register based on functionality.619
3.

Summary of Recent Developments

As we have seen, the federal courts have not followed one consistent
path in determinations of functionality. Although they quote the test from TrafFix for the definition of functionality, some courts apply a narrower test than
615
616
617
618
619

No. 77296052, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 666 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2009).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4, *6–7, *10–11.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11–12.
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TrafFix suggests. Some courts continue to rely on evidence of alternative designs to determine functionality despite the language in TrafFix suggesting that
such evidence is not relevant for that purpose; other courts adhere to the TrafFix
admonitions against relying on such evidence. Moreover, TrafFix has caused
courts to engage in difficult interpretations of the scope of patents in order to
determine whether such patents present persuasive evidence of a particular design’s functionality.
In the Federal Circuit and at the TTAB, there tends to be one consistent
approach, but that approach does not appear to follow the one suggested by the
Supreme Court. The TTAB, in light of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Valu
Engineering, continues to use the four factors set out in 1982 in the MortonNorwich decision, including the factor which requires an examination of alternative designs as part of the functionality determination. Although the Board has
almost always refused to register product designs when functionality has been
asserted either by an examiner or an opposer, the Nalge and Brayco cases indicate that there is still some risk that where there is no utility patent or advertising which touts the advantages of a particular design, the Board may allow registration simply on the basis of evidence of alternative designs—evidence that
the Supreme Court has considered irrelevant to a determination of functionality.620
For the reasons discussed in the next section, this is an undesirable result in almost all cases. The Board and the courts should either follow TrafFix
more strictly, or Congress should act to eliminate the risks inherent in allowing
for protection of the design of useful products.
IV.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

In the years following, there has been much scholarly debate over the
TrafFix decision, what it means and whether it was the correct ruling. Some
have argued that TrafFix was a radical departure from prior law and a serious
mistake;621 others believe that it simply muddied the waters and did not really
620
621

See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2001).
For example, Professor Thurmon argues for a return to the competitive necessity test for
functionality, i.e., that a design should be considered functional only if it is necessary for
competitors to copy that design in order to compete effectively. If adequate alternative designs exist, then he would allow for full protection of that design in the interest of preventing
consumer confusion. He believes that the requirement of distinctiveness will limit the potential number of product designs that receive such protection, but that once a design is proven
to be distinctive, it should be protected to prevent consumer confusion. He also rejects the
idea that patent law and its policies will be undermined if parties can receive protection for
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mean what it said.622 Others believe it was a step in the right direction but did
not go far enough.623

622

product designs that are not eligible for protection under patent law because trademark law
differs sufficiently. Trademark law provides more limited protection than patent law and
Thurmon finds it highly unlikely that an inventor would seek a trademark instead of a patent
in order to obtain longer, but less extensive, protection. Thus, he sees no reason to deny
trademark protection in order to preserve the patent system. Thurmon, supra note 16, at
341–62. Instead, Thurmon’s preferred solution would be to use a strict competitive need definition of functionality to filter out unprotectable designs as a first step, though he recognizes that most designs will be treated as non-functional under this test. He would then allow a
defendant to assert as an affirmative defense that all that was copied were functional elements of that product design, which would result in no liability as long as the defendant has
taken steps so that its product will not be confused with the plaintiff’s product.
The problem with this approach is acknowledged in part by Professor Thurmon himself.
Id. at 368–70. It will result in the registration of most product designs, resulting in more litigation over these issues. Moreover, it will lead to complex and expensive litigation. The
courts will have to determine functionality not once, but twice—first, as part of the plaintiff’s
prima facie case for protection and then again as an affirmative defense. Thurmon admits
that these are problems with his proposal, but because he believes that granting protection to
product design is necessary to reduce the risks of consumer confusion, these are costs he believes to be worth incurring. He prefers that only the designs that are truly necessary for effective competition be denied potential trademark protection.
See also Berger, supra note 16, at 402–04 (competitive need approach to functionality
asserted to be superior to the approach adopted in TrafFix); Clegg, supra note 16, at 307–12
(TrafFix criticized for narrowing the availability of trade dress protection for products; author
proposes a “traderight” which would expand trade dress protection). See generally Amir H.
Khoury, Three-Dimensional Objects as Marks: Does a “Dark Shadow” Loom over Trademark Theory?, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 335 (2008) (author argues in favor of broad
protection of three-dimensional objects as trademarks in order to prevent confusion in the
marketplace).
One author argues that the Court should clarify the standard by defining it to treat only those
features that would put a competitor at a significant competitive disadvantage as functional.
That author would allow evidence of alternative designs as one type of evidence that could
be considered to establish this standard. See Palladino, supra note 14, at 1237–39. This position seems to contradict TrafFix, which clearly limited the “significant competitive disadvantage” test to cases of aesthetic functionality. It also would narrow substantially the definition of functionality, giving far more protection to the designers of useful products, a policy
direction which the Supreme Court seems to be opposing and which this author also opposes.
Another author argues that TrafFix may have made the doctrine of functionality “more
opaque.” Weinberg, supra note 16, at 5. Professor Weinberg believes that if courts cannot
rely on evidence of alternative designs as part of the functionality determination, they “will
be deprived of their best tool” for doing so. Id. at 6. Professor Weinberg asserts that functionality should be determined based on economic theory and consumer demand for the
product’s features. He argues that evidence of alternative designs may be the best available
evidence to make that determination because it helps to determine whether and why a particular product configuration may be more desirable to consumers than others based on cost,
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What all these scholars assume, however, is that protection of a useful
product’s overall configuration is appropriate in at least some cases. I would
suggest a different, more radical view. Perhaps it is time to return to the law as
it was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the overall configuration of
a useful product was not considered to be protected against copying as long as
the copier did something to prevent consumer confusion, whether by adding
some distinctive marking or simply labeling the product with its own name.624

623

624

utility, aesthetics, and other factors. Id. at 27–35. He reasons that if demand indicates that
consumers desire a particular design feature for its utility or aesthetics, one may infer that
there are not sufficient alternative designs to compete with that particular design, and therefore it should be considered functional. Weinberg states that, “TrafFix represents a missed
opportunity to simplify and clarify the doctrine and to provide useful guidance for its application. Instead, TrafFix may make matters worse by, among other things, adding to the doctrine’s ambiguity and complexity, and by apparently limiting the use of evidence of alternative design features as the fulcrum for deciding functionality cases.” Id. at 37–38.
Professor Weinberg agrees that the policy in favor of the public right to copy outweighs
the concerns with consumer confusion, but he also believes that some design features should
still be protected under the Lanham Act. Id. at 40. He argues that the best way to strike this
balance is with a broad definition of functionality that includes both useful and aesthetic features that are important to consumers, as demonstrated by the fact that there are few, or no
suitable alternative design choices.
See also Halaby, supra note 17, at 172–74 (TrafFix rule criticized as difficult to apply).
This author proposes a definition of functionality based on consumer demand: a feature is
functional if it is a feature a consumer desires for any reason—utilitarian or aesthetic—other
than source identification. Id. at 182–90. Such a test would lead to far wider protection of
product configurations and is thus contrary to the policies identified in TrafFix and to the
point of view asserted in this article.
See also McCormick, supra note 16 at 573–75 (TrafFix test is unclear; courts should
instead use a definition of functionality which focuses on whether the product will operate
properly without the feature for which protection is sought, or whether that feature allows the
product to be made at a lower cost or improves the operation of the product).
Professor Barrett argues that TrafFix represents a return to the position reflected in the SearsCompco-Bonito Boats line of cases, where the law was primarily concerned with preserving
the public’s right to copy any product not protected by patent or copyright law. Professor
Barrett sees the Court as extending that reasoning beyond state trade dress protection law to
federal trade dress protection, meaning that product designs should not get either state or federal protection for the useful designs of useful products. See Barrett, supra note 145, at 136–
58. She suggests, however, that the Court’s willingness to use the “important ingredient in
the commercial success” test for aesthetic functionality conflicts with this goal, as that test
would undermine the design patent laws and prevent free copying of some product designs.
Id. at 145–46.
Although Professor Thurmon suggests a different approach to resolving these issues and
prefers to protect product design in order to reduce the occurrences of consumer confusion,
he recognizes that this approach was once the law and incorporates part of that approach into
his proposed resolution. That is, he recognizes that the law can allow a defendant to copy as
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Adopting such an approach would eliminate the conflict with patent law and the
confusion created by the functionality doctrine. As long as the copier took adequate steps to prevent passing off, there would be no reason to be concerned
with consumer confusion. Moreover, this approach would eliminate some of the
problems created as a result of the Walmart case, where courts now get entangled in determinations of whether a product’s design has acquired sufficient
distinctiveness to be protectable.
Some may respond to this suggestion as being too far-fetched for Congress to consider, given the more recent history which has been more generous
in granting protection to the overall shape of products.625 Others will suggest
that denying all protection to product configurations will lead to chaos and confusion in the marketplace regardless of any labeling or disclosures used by copiers. There is, however, historical precedent for this approach as well as good
policy reasons to do it.626 There is also an analogous model to refer to for reassurance that the world will not come to an end if we adopt this approach. That
model can be found in the treatment of terms that lose their trademark significance and become generic, as well as the treatment of terms that begin as generic
and take on secondary meaning, but are nonetheless denied trademark protection
on the theory of “de facto secondary meaning.”
For example, in the famous case involving the mark “Aspirin,”627 the
court found that the term had become generic among the consumer segment of
the population who had no alternative identifying term, but that it retained
trademark significance among pharmacists and doctors who knew the chemical
name for the drug, acetylsalicylic acid.628 The court concluded that the plaintiff
could not prevent others from using “aspirin” in selling the drug to the general
public, but that when sold to pharmacists, it would still be necessary to use some

625

626

627
628

long as steps are taken to prevent consumer confusion. See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 366–
67.
Recent legislative action by Congress, including two amendments to the Lanham Act incorporating functionality provisions, seems to indicate that it appears to favor at least some protection to product design. See Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, 113 Stat. 218, 220
(1999) (placing the functionality burden of proof in actions brought under section 43 (a) on
the plaintiff); Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998) (adding
functionality as grounds for rejection of trademark applications, for oppositions, and for cancellation proceedings). See also Thurmon, supra note 16, at 357 n.550.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does
Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (2000).
Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
Id. at 514–15.
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other term to distinguish the plaintiff’s product from those of others.629 Similarly, in the Thermos case,630 while the court concluded that the term “thermos” had
largely lost its trademark significance and could be used by competitors, those
competitors could not use a capital T or the words “genuine” or “original” in
identifying their vacuum bottles, and they had to use their own company name
to distinguish their products from those of the plaintiff.631 As such, the courts
have clearly concluded that the right to copy—in these cases, a word, not a
product configuration—outweighs the risk of confusion, as long as some steps
are taken by copiers to reduce confusion. Certainly the public’s interest in copying useful products is at least as important as the public’s right to use certain
words.
The “de facto secondary meaning” cases illustrate this even more dramatically. In those cases, even though a term is recognized to have taken on
meaning as a source identifier, courts have insisted that such terms remain
available for competitors to use despite the risks of possible consumer confusion. For example, in America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,632 the plaintiff tried
to claim trademark rights in the phrase “You Have Mail.”633 The court refused
to grant such protection, even though the plaintiff presented evidence showing
that some segment of the public associated that phrase with the its online services.634 The court reasoned:
AOL’s evidence of association may establish what is called “de facto secondary meaning,” but such secondary meaning does not entitle AOL to exclude
others from a functional use of the words. Stated otherwise, the repeated use
of ordinary words functioning within the heartland of their ordinary meaning,
and not distinctively, cannot give AOL a proprietary right over those words,
even if an association develops between the words and AOL.635

Similarly, in Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc.,636
the court refused to find the term “Lite” protectable despite evidence of secondary meaning because the word was considered generic in its origins.637 In cases
such as these, the courts have obviously again weighed the risks of public con629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637

Id. at 515–16.
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 581.
243 F.3d. 812 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 814.
Id. at 822–23.
Id. at 822 (citation omitted).
561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 77, 81.
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fusion against the need for a competitor’s access to common words and found
the latter interest to be more important, despite the potential for confusion
among purchasers. That same competitor access concern is at least as pressing
when it comes to the design of useful products. Consumers as well as competitors have a great interest is having multiple producers of goods, especially utilitarian goods.
In fact, this concept of genericism has been applied to product configurations in a number of cases as a basis for denying protection, either as an alternative to, or in conjunction with, a functionality analysis. The Second Circuit’s
decision in Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc.,638 is often cited
as the first case discussing this notion of generic trade dress. In that case, the
plaintiff sought trade dress protection for greeting cards which were made from
glossy photographs, die-cut to the shape of the images.639 The court refused to
find that trade dress protectable, describing it as a generalized idea.640 The court
further observed that “the fact that a trade dress is composed exclusively of
commonly used or functional elements might suggest that that dress should be
regarded as unprotectable or ‘generic,’ to avoid tying up a product or marketing
idea.”641 A few months later, the Second Circuit returned to this concept in Mana Products, Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 642 where the court used the
genericism idea in the context of determining the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s makeup compacts.643 The court observed that “where it is the custom in a
particular industry to package products in a similar manner, a trade dress done
in that style is likely to be generic.”644

638
639
640
641
642
643
644

58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1069–70.
Id. See also Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619,
638 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating as dicta that generic product configurations are not protectable as
trade dress because “no designer should have a monopoly on designs regarded by the public
as the basic form of a particular item”); Yurman Design, Inc. v. Paj, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115
(2d Cir. 2001); New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195,
210 (D. Conn. 2004) (shape of handgun is generic after being used by others for many years);
Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Corner, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1247 (D. Haw. 2003)
(shape of cookie is generic and not protectable, as it is nothing more than “a nondistinctive
combination of a few basic, common design elements”).
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More recently, the court in Walker & Zanger, Inc. v. Paragon Industries, Inc.,645 summarized the case law on generic trade dress as falling into three
categories:
(1)

if the definition of a product design is overbroad or too generalized;

(2)

if a product design is the basic form of a type of product; or

(3)

if the product design is so common in the industry that it cannot be
said to identify a particular source.646

The court concluded that the design of decorative tiles which the plaintiff sought
to protect as its trade dress was generic for all three reasons: the claim was overly broad, portions of the trade dress were basic to tile design, and plaintiff’s
design was commonly used by others in the tile industry.647
Thus, the interest in public access to certain product designs, like the interest in public access to certain common words, has been considered to outweigh the interest in preventing confusion through the doctrine of genericism,
just as it has in cases where the product design is considered functional. Before
a court or the TTAB can resolve whether a particular product design is or is not
protectable as trade dress, however, they must address all the complexities
raised by the functionality doctrine, not to mention the complexities raised by
determining genericism and distinctiveness. Given the important public policies
at stake in preventing the monopolization of the designs of useful products, this
seems like an inappropriate approach to the problem. Courts and consumers
would be better off with a bright line rule that simply prevented anyone from
obtaining exclusive rights to the design of a useful product except through the
provisions of the patent and copyright laws. If a producer wants to protect
against consumer confusion and passing off, courts should be able to remedy
those concerns by requiring adequate disclosure by competitors who wish to
copy that product design. There is no need to prohibit the copying of the design
itself, as the Supreme Court recognized long ago in Sears and Compco.648
V.

CONCLUSION

It is now almost ten years since the TrafFix decision was handed down,
and in the last five years, the courts and the TTAB have continued to struggle

645
646
647
648

549 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1176.
See supra notes 127–141 and accompanying text.
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with that decision and the doctrine of functionality. There are, however, a few
important observations that can be culled from the more recent case law.
First, it is extremely difficult to obtain registration of the overall configuration of a useful product. The TTAB continues to apply the four point Morton-Norwich test for determining functionality, including evidence of design
alternatives, despite the language in TrafFix which asserts that such evidence is
not pertinent to determinations of functionality. In applying the MortonNorwich test, however, the TTAB has taken a very strict approach and has refused to find a product design to be non-functional in almost every registration
case, even though the burden of establishing functionality rests with the examiner or the opposer. The TTAB has also adopted the underlying reluctance to
protect product configuration trade dress reflected in TrafFix, although not following strictly its language. Thus, a producer attempting to register the overall
configuration of its product is not likely to succeed.
Most product configuration trade dress will be protected, if at all, under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act through litigation in the federal courts. As
discussed above, the federal courts are not following one consistent path in determinations of functionality, differing in their treatment of patent evidence and
evidence of alternative designs, and how they even define functionality. Some
courts define it very broadly to reach any design that serves a purpose; some
courts at the other end of the spectrum define it quite narrowly to cover only
configurations that are the best design of that product. Some courts fall in between, defining functionality based on whether the plaintiff’s design is one of a
few possible options available to competitors. Many have not been able to be
decided on a summary judgment basis, meaning that many cases will need to go
to trial to be resolved. This lack of clarity is costly to producers. More importantly, it is costly to consumers who will ultimately bear the burden of this litigation in the prices they pay for products.
Society’s interest in obtaining the best goods at the lowest cost is being
hampered by the doctrine of functionality and the potential protection afforded
to the design of useful products. Consumers and competitors would be much
better off in a world where there was no trade dress protection for product designs. Patent law and copyright law provide adequate incentives to promote the
creation of useful and aesthetically pleasing products, and the concern with consumer confusion can be best dealt with by labeling and disclosure requirements.
It is time to return to the approach followed for many years before the
twists and turns in trade dress law that began in the 1970s. Congress should
amend the Lanham Act to prevent registration and protection of the configuration of useful products.
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